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PREFACE
In formulating this thesis special attention was given to the
.relevant statements of the principals involved notably Theodore

I

f1oo;3cvelt and Elihu Root,

11

Due to the amount of controversy cen-

tering on tne Corollary and its application, the exact words of
the particip8nts are used whenever necessary.

The amount and

length of the quotations are central to establishing the link
bet~·reen

the strategic significance of intervention and humani tari-

an i_ns ti nc ts,

Special assistance was rendered by various libraries and
collections in the Chicago area.

Included among these are

John Crerar Library, the Chicago Public Library, Elizabeth Cudahy
Library, the Library of International Relations, Newberry Library,
9.Dd

Earpcr Library of the Uni ve:r.~si ty of Chicago,
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PART I
THE ROOSEVELT COROLLARY:
BIG STICK
Contrary to popular opinion the Roosevelt Corollary, a·s
iA~erican

imperialism in 1898, did not just sud~only appear.

Actu-

ally, the principles contained in Roosevelt's pronouncements were
tl1e result of an evolution of the Monroe Doctrine that had been
~

I
!

soing on sh1ce its lnception.

.This development was changed and

rec,olded by various forces and ernphaises throu(3hout its history.

1

It, 1ike history, was the produ'ct of its time.

A particular as-

'pect was to be maximized or minimized by the historical conteX,t
in which it was placed.

The original message of 1823 and its

espousal of the principles of No-Transfer, Non-intervention, and
l'fon-colonization 11ere engendered by a desire to isolate the New
':.'orld from the political entanglements of Europe, especially wars
rrhe principle of Non-inte1'"'vention, however, can be clearly linked
to t:i.1e rise of numerous Latin· American states and their existence hastened the growth and development of the principle.l
1
John A. Logan, Jr., No Transfer (New Haven:
sity Press, 1961), p. 245

Yale Univer-

.

7

President Polk was later to re-define the Non-colonization in
~regard

to lesser American states.

The rc~sscrtion of this principle especially in reference
to Iforth America, is at this day but the promul52.tion of a
pol:tcy which no European,power should cherish the disposition to resist. It should be distinctly announced to the
Horld as our settled policy that no future European colony
or dominion shall with our consent be planteg or established
on any part of the North American contlnc:nt.
The acquisition of territory is a practical demonstration of
the ri&rit and power of soverele;nty.

The Ifonroe Doctrine closed

the Ame:-cican continent to the colonial

adventu1~es

of Europe

whi~h

in effect curbed the territorial appetite of the strong and the
•
teuntations of the \'teak. Gradually, these restr·ictions were to

I,

uicl:n from ::exi co to Vcnzuela and finally to Santo Domlne;o. 3

I

'l'he

crisis in l,icxico in 1860 c2.uned President Buchanan to enunciate a

further refinement of the Hon.roe DoctPine.
I deem this a most important consideration-·-European
Governments ·would have been deprived of all pretext to interfere in the territorial and domestic concensus of Mexico.
\'le should thus have been relieved from this obligation of
resisting, even by force should this become necessary, any
attempt by these Governments to deprive our neighboring
Republics of portions of' her territory---a duty from which ue
2

Richard W. Van Alstyne, !r.;i_g_ri,_ga1l. .D:L-q_19ID£~~ in Action
(Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press,
1947), p. 29.
3
Talcott 'dilliams, "Europe and the United States in the
;·rest Indies, 11 .Anoals of_the ~merican Acg,_de1:1Y__Q_f Poli ti cal and
Social Science, XXVI (19051, p. 42.
(Herein after referred to
as ~nnals.)
·

..-.,.,-, ....

8
could not shrink without abandoning the tr~ditional and
established policy of the American people.
In aadition, the United States legation in Mexico City issued to the diplomatic corps there a manifesto on the projected

intervention.
.J.

5 ovcrn.<>1.envs

In that

rn<J.nife~~to

the Uni tcd States c.enied Europoa1

• A
, t
to inte:cfei-•e, directly or indirectly, with
_e .CJ.sn

11.J.h

u

the political independence of the republ1c of :Mexico, 11 and. would,

,
I

"to the extent of its power, defend the nationality and independ-·

once of said republic."

In response to this statement, a Britinh

diplomat clearly envisaged the Roosevelt Co:collary:

"If the posi-

tl(1n of the Uni tod States -• • • is authorized and rnainta:i.ned, I
ca1,:-:-:cot but vlew it as binding that country to assume the moral

l·obligdion toward other nations, of restoring peace and order in
i

J'-':exico, and of preve::1tin3 the recurrence of scenes which disgrace
humanity and neutralize

~

• • the international rights and natural

cor,~:"1ercial relations of civilized nations. 11 5

\Ij_lliam H.

Steward on June 2, 1866 issued the following

statement regarding activities in Mexico in particular and Latin

I

America in general.
the republican system (in any South American State) shall
not be wantonly assailed and that it shall not be subverted
as an end of a ln:wful war by European powers. We concede to

4

J. Reuben Clark, Memorandum O:Q. the Monroe Doctrine ('\'lashin5ton: United States Government Printing Office, 1930), p. 135.

5

J.

.

F. Rippy, "The Antecedents of the Roosevelt Corollary
of the Vian.roe Doctrine, 11 Pacific Historical Revie.!'..L IX(l940),
p.
269. (Herein after referred to as "Antecedents.")

cv<: l ' j n·i ti on the right to rnn ke peace or Wgr, for such c:1 us c: s
t)1Gn pol1 ti cal :<rribi tions, ~s it thj_nk rir::;ht And wise.:
In s1_1c.h wnrs ns :=i.re 1·:n,,=ed h~t·.1cen n:J.tions ':lhich ;:-ire in
.
f•·ien:l:::;hip v:ith ourselves, if they are not pushE?Q., like the

,)t1 11"r

··;~-1r j_n ;:cxico, to the poli tic'J.l point hefore mcntto:1.:rl
not 1.ntcrvcne, hut rcm8j_n ncutrA.l concr;<ilng nothing
to one belligerent what He allow to the other.

f<'T.-·nch
Vie: •1o

ronroc Soctrine in re3ar~ to the relations between Lntin A~erican
tecritories and European powers.
dependencies are no longer rns:u·dcd ris subject to t:r:3:-;;
fer from one Europ8&n power to snother. ':!hen the present re-·
lation of colonies ceases they are to becooe independent
powers, exercising the right of choice and of self-control
,~1:\_,the,__'.ie_te~~m,~12~ti7n of their future condition and relations
These

;, i

Gn ,; '-'ner flO•· LJ. s.

Gr~nt's

Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, foreshadowed the

Roosevelt Corollary and the Santo Domingan Receivership in his instructions to rinister Partride on the convention with Venezeul2.
"You are authorized to propose to the governm2nt of

'~enezuela

to place all the customs-houses of the country in the hands of

p•;r.'::~ ons to be des ig:n:::i ted by the, United States.,. 8
~as

Al though Fi sh

primarily concerned with the collection of the claims of

Arerican citizens, which he considered entitled to preferential
tre3tment, he was not unwilling to assume the obligation of

6
F. E. Chadwick, "The Present Day Phase of the I·~ onroe Doctri::e," in L-::,tin America, ed. by George H. Blakeslee (Kew York:
G. E. StrecherE & Co.,-·-r924), p. 115.

7

.John Holladay La tane, The United States and La tin America.

(Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, Page & Co., ·1920), p. J24.
8
J. Fred Rippy, The Caribbean Dan~er Zone (New York: G. P.

Putr~GJn'

s .Sons, 1940), -pp·~-42-:Ti.J-.--- -

.

-~·,,,-

.

Lollect:1.ng the claims oi' the Europcalls.9
Tho concern over possible European acquisitlon of American

.territory was a5ain prevalent in the attitude assumed by Presildent E:::cyes in ro5ard to De Lesseps' atteillpts to construct a
'French financed Panaman Canal.
ltook the

3:i.~ouri.d

In his message to the Senate he

smal~est

that the

measure of poll ti cal control or

Lrotection of the proposed canal by
Loy1'oination of European

po~·rc:r's

"f'~ny

European power or· any

·was h:.<:i.cJJnissablee "10

Intertwined and over·r·iding many of the other considerations
of t'rrn I-:ori. .roe Doctrine was the concept of Manifest Dest1ny and all

Irit

(:ntn.J.led.

.

'rhe eminent position of the United States, its spc-

lcial soral mission to the world, and its justification for its ac'tions '.!CI"e esccntial to the conduct of A!!lerican

ls;iecio.l
~world

i 0 ole

affai:r$..

The

oi' the United States as the IP.oral guo.i dian oi' the

was voiced by

0

nurnerou~

spokesman throughout the period.

\-Te are not insensible to the glamor of

11

1-l[-mife st De stin.y, '-' ·
Hhich means a destiny of power and control; but there is <..-i.
hi3her and no less manifest destiny to extend sounµ government and stable institutions.11
Richard Olney, Cleveland's Secretary of State and author of
jthe fctoous Twenty-Inch Gun Note, p:covided a co:nbination of all of
-the ele:rients of the concept of Manifest Destiny because he offered
9
Rippy, "Antecedents,'.' pp. 272-273.
10
Edward Stanwood, "The Moral Aspects of the 1~onroe Doctrine," Outlook, 70(Feb. 8, 1902), p. 371.
11
"A lfotion To Take From the Table " ·The Indenendent, LVI

l

r·:arch 3, 1904)' p.

508.

'

--
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~....,,·~ ~-·
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1:~ynthesi

··"-···'

11
s of all its compor"cnts.

'rhe realization of Aocri c2.n

loi'ler i·ro.s intertu5.ned with a concern for lesser states.

~irst

duty of every nation, as

eJrc~dy

~s

The

ohscrved, is to itself -

l1s a pror:iotion and concJervn.tion of its own interests.

f

11

Its positio·

::m 2.cti ve ::-:c::nber of tho }::'ltrn·:nzJ.tion.al fe;riily does not require

!1 t ever to lose sit)lt of that

p1~1nciple •

11

This •,muld tend to be

lin lrneping with the General view of what Jfa.nifest Destiny ehtailed
~1ney, ho·..rever,

continues, "But, just weie:;...'1.t be1ng given to that

L:cinclple, and its a'oilities and resources and opportunities perL1tting, there is no reason why the United States should not act
'for the relief of suffering hw;1ani ty and for the <1dvancemcmt of

v111z~ ti on 1iherever
J~ffccti ve. 1112 Such a

Jc.i

Luthor of the

~ractlcally

:CLOW

and whenever such action would be timely and

no~

statement does

fo..t;1ous quote that

11

seem in keeping with the

'roclay the United States is ,

sovcrcisn on this continent, and its fiat is laid upon

'.the subjects to ;·rhich it confines its interposition. 11 13
Olney was convinced that "the Primacy of the United States
cas respects the affairs of the American

conti~ents

is a principle

lof 1 ts policy which will no doubt hold 600d and be as firmly as-

lsert~-~~n the future as in the past. u14

I

He further elaborated

12
Ri chcird Olney, "Growth of Our Foreign Policy, " f- t lanti c
~}:ont_h},x, I:XXXV (Karch, 1900), P•
298.

13
Clark, P•
14
Olney, p.

159.
298.

··•·

,,.,T.,,,.. ,_

'-"~'"" .~,

., <#•,

'h•

:

.,,.. ~-

-'·'

~,_n_,_ .~.

·;~.. ,,-

-~ .~,,,_.,.,_,._,.._.-:,,~,7;.<~·<t""'°""""'<;iC<'~c::;.,..,,..,_._._._,-.-

...,._.,..,,,,..,.,.,.,,,,••,..

'""""'~

.-w~ ·'····-_.·.,,...,·•"<11v,;,•'~··

""'

~....~ .....,.--..,;_,.,.,,,..,,_.•

"-

.., .....

12
thin belief in his well kno~m letter of July 20,

1895.

The,t Ancx•i ca is j n no part open to colonization, though thE1
ni'oposi tion Has not universally admitted at the time of its
first enunciation, has long boen uni vc::rs:i.lly conceded. \'le
:::.Te now convinced, the:cefore, only with th2.t other practical
application of the Ifo:nroe Doctrine the diro1"'e5ards of which by
['~n :r<:uropcan power is to be deemed an ar-t of unfriendliness
to~ards the United States.
The precise scope and limitations
of this rule cannot be too clearly apprehended. It does not
establish any senoral protectm:·ate by the United States ove1"'
otlllr Arneric~n states. It does not relieve any American
state from its obligations from inflicting merited plmishment for the breach of them. It docs not contemplate any
:l.ntcrference between it ~end other llme2ican states. It dOO$
not justify any attempt on our part to change the establis~
ed form of t;ovorrunent of any 1\merican state or to prevent the
people of such state from altering that form according to
their own will and pleasUre. The rule in question has but' a
sint;le purpose and object. J:t is that no European power or
combination of European powers shall forcibly deprive an
;~;::erican state of the rie;ht and po1·rer of self-c;o".re:cr.u-nent c.nd
of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and
destinies.15
The question of territorial a3grandizement in the New World

·by G-n F:ln'opean power was construed by Olney to be in opposition
to
~~.nd

11

a doctrine of American public law, well founded in principle

D,bundantly sanctioned by precedent, which entitles and re-

quires the United States to treat as an injury to itself the forciblc assumption by an Eur·opeo.n power of political control over

~·" .t"tl.!..o.8
~.,, l"ican i..JLc..,.
°.1..·,te • 1116

c;. .!.i.

He continued in stating his case in even

stronger and more bellicose language.
Hence the message just quoted declared that the American
continents \·1ere fully occupied and ·were not the subjects

15
16

Clark, P•

156.

Ibid., P•

160.

for future colonization. by European powers. To this
snirit and this pur:i:->ose, also, are to be attributed the
nassases of the same. message which ti-·eat any infringement
;f the :cule a3ainst inte:eference in American affairs on
U:e ·,:,;~r·t of the po1·:ers of Europe as an act of unf'r•iendlinecs
to tl1e United States. It was realized that it was futile
to lay do·..rI1 :-,uch a :rule unless its observance could be
enforced. It was thcrei'ore courageously declared not
::ce:ce ly thn.. t Eu.:coi)e ouc) it not to interfere in Ame:ci can af:tail's, but t~·R.t <3.ny Eur·upean power doing so would be ree;n. rded ri.s o.nto.~~oni :>;i.ng the interest 2nd inviting the opposi tj.on
of the United Statos.17
.
Olney' s message prorn:pted much coiHrront both :ln praise and

. criticism.

The criticism most often ass1nned 8tems from the ideas

a_ 0 ·,reloped by Lord Salisbury in his reply

to the letter.

It follows of necessity that.if the Government of the United
St< .tes wi11 not conti-•ol the conduct of these com:nuni ties,
r•n:L t:~,c;r can it underto.ke to protect them from the conseq11c;1;ees attacking to any misconduct of which they may be
!:)Uilty t,O\·mrds other nations. If they violate in any way
the rie;hts of 2nothor State; as of its subjects; it is not.
allet;cd that the J\fon;_-·oe Doctrine will assure them the asl~ist~·
<lnce of the United Statos in escaping fr-om any repartion
':1l1ich they may 1Je botmd by lnternational law to give.iS
1

The J,ondon Q.hronicle a semi-official organ of the British
e:,overnr0ent vol ced much the same sentim,)nt.

If an enlar5ed application of a neglected doctrine is to be
enforced 1d th all the might of the United States, at least
let us be assured that the United States will make itself
responsible for the foreign policy of all the petty impet1wus little ~3tates of the two continents. There is no intor
naVLonal ri5ht without a corresponding duty.19

17

Ibid., PP• 155-156.
18
Jpi_Q..' p. 165.
19
Rippy, "Antecedents," p.

276.

Henry Cabot Lode;e, Roosevelt's friend and mentor, was of a
different opinion

regarding the M:o:rn"oo Doctrine and 1-rhat could bo

·-'"'JC cted and demanded of it.
e ·'·l

It is not a doctrine of international lmv, and the ::1.. ttempt
to discuss it or oppose it on that ground is a ·,·raste of
woros. Like the inclopcndence of this co1mtry, it ls a o_ue st ion of fr1ct and not of law • • • •
The Monroe Doctrine •.•
• ls merely the dec1c::.ration that no foreign pOi·rer must establish a new 3ove1'11mcnt, acquire new territory by pu,rchas13
or by any other method whatever, or :;eek to control exlstL15
go-.rernments in the A:titYt>1ca.s. 'J111at is the princ1ple which
I~r.
l·'iOD.l"Oe declared.
If tl:re:i.'e is any dispute as to the
:'lc:~.n:inss of his language, it is not needful to di·;ell upon it ..
j_'hat is what the American people bo1iove he Doant.20
Theodore Roosevelt realized two i:;nportant aspects of the I.Con•
roe Doct:i.'ine.
"A navy will sustain the honor of the American
rJ.o..g • • • •

I want to see the Monroe Doctrine upheld in its

onti:c1ty • • • •
o.nd :.luul. 11 ~1
interest.

I be11eve in those policies with all my heart

"Primarily our <".,ction :i.s based on national self-

In other ·words, :tt is patriotic. 11 22

At the sa1ne time

his long time confidant James Bryce, a British diplomat, i·:rote to
Roosevelt in Jan. 1, 1896. ·

11

As to the Mon~oe Doctrine, I have

never been able to see how it applies at all to such a case as
this (the Venezuelan affair of 1895-1896); if the United States

20
Wallace Thompson, "The Doctrine of' the Special Inte:cest of
the United States in the Region of the Caribbean Sea, 11 t..m~1-~.ls

CXX.X.II (1927}, p.
21

154.

Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biog~~phy (New
York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), p. 167.
22
Ibid., P• 279.

15
over all Central and South
,.,re '-'
n:oing t o asslline a protectorate
-

C•

A:r:erica, c<.nd see that these so-called _Republics behave like civil:il~cd

States, thc~t is anothel' rnattero

:.-now .,,,}1 om they have to deal wi th. 11 23
,

-~

,,_

The other• countl'ies will

In order to one day act in

the rr1::t11r1<::r 2.dvocated 1)y Bryce, Roosevelt felt that American navy

I

had to be strcnc;thcned; :i.n fact, it vras essential "if we mean to
protect the people of the lands uho look to us for• protection
tyr:rnny ~~nd a3gression 11 •

f:L'OL

If this 1:0x'e not the C.'.-'.sc the United

StP.tes ;:niGht as well "abandon all talk of devotlon to the Honroe
Doctr•ine or to the honor of the American na:21.e. 11 24
.,.
'"'cnt on to dcsc:ci be the :M:o:n:coe Doctrine as:

In 1898 he

forbidding European encro0ehment on American soil. It is not
desirable to define it so 'rigidly as to prevent our taldng
into account the varying degrees of national interest in
vn.ryine; cases. The United St2.tes has not the slightest wish
to ostahlish a universal protectorate over other Amex•ican
Sto,tos, or to become involved in an ordinary quarrel with a
European power, such quarrel must be settled between them by
o.nyone of the usual methods. But no European state is to be
e.1.J.owed to aggrandize itself on .Mnerican soil at the expense
of an Ar:iei-lcan state. Fu1·th0r:;:iore, :no transfe1" of an Americ<"m colony :from one Eu:r-opean state to another is to be per-:rnitted, if, in the judgement of the United States, such
transfer would be hostile to its mm interests. 25
Latin America at the turn of the century was a cause for
1,mtu2-l distrust on the part of all contending po1·1ers.

23
Rippy, "Antecedents,

24
Pringle, p.

25
Logan, p.

172.
262,.

11

P•

275.

Roosevelt

'

p:

"

16
said in 1898 "Gerr:iany, and not

Er~3land,

is the power with whom we

are rnos t apt to have tpouble ovor the l>roff{'Oe Doctrine.
mistrust of the United States 1;.';:i,s voi eod by the
in 11399

11

1126

Bri tis'

fu~.Y.:l,Q_l'{. __of R~yi~!!_~-

the only quest ion as:.i:ed in Fn5land with certain laquid

curiosity is as to how it wjll be before it (Santo Domingo) follows Porto Rico and Cuba in becoming a dependency of Uncle
Sam I s. 1127
ur:t::e~1sing

In this period of growing bellicose feeling and ever
fcr"r of encroac:b..ment on the prlnciples of the r.:onroe

Doctr·i:rie it is not difficult, to see Elihu Root's sense of ur5ency
whon he st2-ted "no man who carefully watches the signs of the
times can fail to soe that the American people will wl thin a

;_~ew

years have to either abandon the ?fonroe Doctrine or fight for it,
and

:e are not e;oing to abandon it. 11 28

1
..

In regard to a possible

. attempt at British anne:w,tion of the GaJ_ap2.5os Islands, he went o
to reiterate his position "An attempt to obtain possession of
those Islands by a foreign power would raise for the United States
the question whether the Monroe Doctrine ·was to be abandoned or
not, for there could be no part of the territory of the American
continent to which that Doct:clne would apply with greater force,

-----------------·-·---------··-----------· ---------------------·--·--- -

26
Theodore Roosevelt to C. A. Moore, Feb. 14, 1898, The
of_ The9dore Roost2_yelt, ed. by Elting E. Morison (Cambrid.;e: Harvard University Press{ 1951), Vol.
I, p. 722. (Herein after referred to as Morison.)
27
"The Assassination of the President of San Domingo,"
F.eview of Reviews, XX(l899), p. 123.
28
Phillip c. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Dodd, "Viend & Co.,
1938), Vol. I. p. 543.

J-,eti~.~rs

- -.w---.--·_"'!I,,,___________"''°'_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

~..,

....

-~-~!l~<U>r.-.._~.-.-.--------

p
., .... -, •·• '-"•4'.•c.,.,. ..... ,._. .• ,' .,.....,__,.;.,o"""""'"l"!>'~OU>;o4>"~ l"•'''-'~"""'""'~;V.0:..-..U-otl..<J.,~....,,..._q,....-,,.._,,__,_ _ _ _
__.,...,._.,.......,,.,

...;; ... -~ •. H_,,..,., _ _ <O'<l<L•>'

, ~ .. W~-,.,..~- •.,,

~ .. ,

'~

•O.'

17

.

and, that, in my jud5nent, the United States would not permit tl;e
11

1

slo.nds to be occup).ed by any other than ci_n American country. 29
'~he 2"rea

over which America was to c18.im sway was severely!

restricted by the Report of the General Board in.1901 Hhich that
"tl'le p1·Jnciples of strategy and the defects of our seographical
posi t1on ,.,2.ke it irnpracti cable successfully to maintain naval
control by our :torce beyond the Amazon unless present conditions
'i
11 y
are raa_ca

~ • II 3Q

h d
c.ang~

'Hli s appra:tsal came into dire ct con-

flict with a number of the fears e.nd assUi'Tlptions of Americans in
formulating their policies.

The Monroe Doctrine was to foster
•
repub1i c2"nlsm throughout all of Latin America, to stren5then tl1e
United States position from both a political and economic
point.

st~nd-

In addition, its opposition to the complication of the

Caribbean situation by European control of territory either permanent or temporary would suffer from it lack of sufficient
strength to combat possible aggression.31
Concern over possible German advance at the cost of American
px'imacy was widespread throughout prominent circles in the United

States.

This fear centered on possible German acquisition of a

-------- --------------~----------------·

29

Ibid., p.

563.

30

Seward W. Livermore, "Theodore Roosevelt, the American
Navy, and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902--1903~ ·American Histor-

ical Review, LI(l946), p.
31

457.

Chester Lloyd Jones~ The Caribbean Since 1900, (New York:
Prentice--Hall, Inc.m 19361, p. 107.

]_8

foothold on South Aoorican soil and a naval station in South
American waters.3 2
00 ut1 1 ern Brazil,

'J:'he e;r·owth of' Ger-r,1an colonies, especially

~· 7 ns

felt to

ce

.:~n

occasion for a possible con-

frontation over the Monroe Doctrine.33
~1
~t
v•1 c;.

in

This fear was so great

Roosevelt needed no push of nublic opinion to force him to:

...

,

...._

-

uphold the Doctrine for both Lodge and himself had long been con-

cerned about Germany and its intent on Venezuela.34

In their

correspo:c1cJence rnuch is made of the dane;er that Germ<:n1y offered

to J\;nerice?n interest in t11e Caribbean.

"I find that the Gerrrw.ns

regard our failure to go forward in building up the navy this
year

..

:-:.s

a ;.oisn that our sp2.sm l)f pr0pto.ra t1on, as they think it,

has come to an end; that we shall sink back, so that in a few
yc8.rs they will be in a position to take sor;,e step in the West

Indies or South Arier1ca which will n:C'.ke us ej_ther put up or shut
up on the Monroe Doctr1ne; they are counting upon their ability
to trounce us if He try the former horn of the dilem..'na. 11 35
The feal" of any European, especially a German, ase;:candizc1;;,en

---------------32

"The Venezuelan Crisis And After,"

XXVII(l903), P•
33

R~vL~w qf__R_~__yie1·rs,

145.

Stephen Bonsal, "Greater Germany In South America, 11 i;orth
Ameyi_c_.0n :Review, 176(Jan., 1903), p. 60.
34
\
Howar•d K. Beale, J'he()_Q9re Rool?eyel t_ ancl_ the Ri s~_9_f___Arr~er
i c_9,___t_o t'o:i::lC!__J'01-;er (Baltimore: ThE? Johns Hopldns Press, 1956),
p. Li-03.
35
Roosevelt to Lodge, March 27, 1901, Morison, III, pp. 31-2

19
a few
was tl1 e cause of another letter from Roosevelt to LodKe
~
months 1[1.ter.

11

I would do a11 · in power to have the United States

t.::.ke the attitude th<J,t no European nation, Germany or any othcn·:i
should gain a foot of soil in any shape or way in South A::nerlca,
or establish a p:cotcctor>ate under any disc;uise over any South
.t~-l~:cl'l

te~3 t

we

1 call (~;O'Ll.·,-,+-,.,.y.1136
.:..l.u.J..

The Venezuelan cris1s sc:i.·vod as a practical

for tl1is approach to the }:onroe Doctrine.

s~ould

11

I was bound that

not be put in the position of preve11ting the collection

of an honest debt.

I was also bound that there should be no ter-

ri tori al 2,ge;randi ze:CTent by an European power under the cover of

.

the collect:lon of such a debt. 11 37 ~
The question of the collection of debts raised a thor·ny p;.....,oblem as was demonstrated in the Venezuela crisis.

The Aserican

m~nlster, Russell, had stated i;,hat the 1-~onroe T)octr>ine would not

"serve as protection for rascals, 2.nd that the United States
would not lift a finger in case of a for-cible :tntervention on the
part of Germany in Venezuela. 11 3 8

'This appe.rent contradiction is

resolved only if consideration is 3iven to Roosevelt's duality
re5arding the Mor. .roe Doctrtne and the mission of civilized \'lestern powers to help civilize the bD..ckward people lil:e the Venez-

36

Roosevelt to Lodge, June 19, 1901, Harison, III, p.

37

p.

Roosevelt to G.W. Hinman,
400.

38

D~c.

98.

29, 1902, £,forison, III,

Dexter Perkins, The Honroe Doctrine_, 1867-1907 (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1966), pp. 323-324 •.
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ue l :"''D"',., • :59
thcI'e

HilS

A1thonuh
the United StG.tes sanctioned Ger•man actions 1
t:r·
a q_u:1lific:1tion to them as Sccreta:cy of State Hay

reso:ct to fo::cce on the part of European powers against the Republies of Cc:nt:i:·0,l ex:d South .Ar::erica but they could not object to
<".et~_on t::c~rnn

any

1Jy them with the view of obtaining redress for

injuries inflicted on their subjects, provided such action did
not contemplate any territorial 2.c~quis:l t,j_on. 11 40
:::Loosevelt had felt that his policy uas a logical continuation of Clevele.nd' s and took time to tell him so.
~:e

ne ti:.at

tion 1<1ith

11

It seems to ·

hn.vc succ::-cded in accomplishing this time in connec£~;-;tting

Englo.nd and

G~rmany

explicitly to recosnize

the J.:oni-'oe Doct:cine in refel''ence to their controversy

i;.ri

th Ven-

c1:ucJa ;::nd in e;ettine; all of the :parties in inter·est to accept

2.r()i t1·ation by the He.. gue Court..

I congratulate you heartily

on the rounding out of your policy. 11 41
Shaw

11

Later, he wrote to Al1::.;,·r-t

1:.y pos1tion has been consistent for a long time on the

~~onroe Doctrine.

I "supported President Cleveland in 1896 • • •

the :p:r:i.ncip1es 1·:e set fo:r·th ·Here explicitly accepted by both

Ge:cmc:.ny and En5land, and of course nothing that they have done or
39
Beale, p.

405.

40
Dana G. Munro, Intervention and DolJ~a~~Dii:>J.omac_y in the
Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University

Press, 1964), P•
41

69. -

Roosevelt to Cleveland, Dec.

p.

398.

26, 1902, Horiso!l, III,

or threa

tened to do so far has in any 1;ay or shape cc:?l:Lr'licted vd tr

tention as to i'lhat the Von.roe Doct:c:tne means. 1 '* ~~2 In efour con
.
the uni tcd States had enla1'3ed the ideal of dut:-y to keep
E~opean

in .."":nerica and to prevent

powor•s from

8etting up·

or protectorates in L~tin America.43
The Venozuela crli3is gave

b~_rth

to one of the nl/L'"l:erous con-This part:-:l..cular one

surrounding Theodore Roosevelt.
on his actions r:.nd th<-;ir
In a letter to

Willis1~

1ict:i.v1r~lon

during

tl~E2!

actual

Roscoe Thayer, Roose.;7E2!lt explain-

thus: "I also became convinced that Gerr:iany int'.=-E2!nded to
some Vcnezuoln,n ha:cbor ,?-nd turn it into a

st.:co~e;ly

to exercist

of arms, on the model of Kiauchan, with a view
mca:3lH'e of control over the future Isthmian

over South .t~meric:~n affairs g.:;ne1•a1.ly. u44

fortif)_c -

Canal, 2.nd

This soemg3 to be a

logical continuation of the ti1ou3hts he had expresseCl to Spring--earlier.·· ' 1 \·/hcn I flrst came

I was inclined to think the Germans had
South America.
~n

:\.nto the

s~l:">:tous

de-

But I think I succeeded i:C=l impressing

the Kasier, quietly and unofficially, and with

eq~ql

courtesy

·and emphasis, that the violation of the Monroe DoctrL--l1e by terri-

torial aggrandizement on his part around the Caribbe~~ meant war,

____ ___________
_,_

42
43

Roosevelt to Shaw, Dec. 26, 1902, Morison, VI:C:::t, p 0 1102.

Albert Bushnell Hart, "American Ideals of Int&l:"'national Re
l (1907),

lations," The American ,Journal of I:n_t__ er_ national Law,
pp. 633-4.
--44

Roosevelt to W.R. Thayer, Aug. 21,1916,Morisor!l,VIII,. p.110
, .....
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•

not ult;.,,"' te ly, but b:nedi ate ly, and without any de lay. " 1+5
Roosevelt's second letter to Thayer was more bellicose in
tono

,
1 0

.'.~:,;cl

he.s touched off a stlll rc:.ging contr>ovorsy as to his

nsons and recollections.

11

I 2.i1swe:ced that I tho1"oughly counted

tho cost bGfore I decided on the step, and ssked him (Ambassaeor
EolJoben) to look at the map, as a glance \·;ould show him that
there i·tas no spot in the world where

Germany~

in the event of con-

flict with the United States would be at a greater disadvantage
then in the Caribbean sea. 11 "•'•6

C:ci tics,

have noted that

this statc;r:ll:nt was shar·pened by the war 2x1d also Roosevelt's

dis·~

Jike for Eolleben after he had.induced him to prepare the way for

-t:1e blockade by defining the Monroe Doctrine in his message to

the Con£::)'ess as "not intended to guarantee any state against pun-is]·F;:ent if it

miscor~ducts

itself, p:covided that

puni~1h;:;1ent

does

r:ot take the form of acquisition of territory by any non--American
?01·,'er'.

11

47

Roosevelt, however, was quite satisfied with his action in

the crisis.

In a speech at Chicago

Apr~l

2, 1903 he noted both

Garmany and England had exp:c•ossed in the moGt explicit te:..""ms that
45

Roosevelt to Spring Rice, Nov.

1, 1905, !;f.orison, V, p. 63.

1+6
Roosevelt to W. R. Thayer, Aug. 21, 1916, Iforison, VII!,
p. 1103.
47
Hubert w. Bowen, "Roosevelt and Venezuela," ,North American
Review, ccx(l919), p. 416.

\
not the slin:htest
intention on their part to violate
, "Y ,c-,r,d
__ , .....,
t D<tbe }:om•oe Doctrine, a,nd

11

tl1is assUX'<.3..nce was kept ,:Tith an honor-

rb1-- e u.-c·ood :f\:d_ th ;fni Ch ;;cpit S l.'ull E~ck.:n.o·l'llcd3er::ent OU Our part•

11

'·s

''

(...1..

In his .:::nnual

Dlc s

sage of 1903 he

~3t<:.ted

It w.1.11 1)8 i«':.1c!"'.t)er--ed the,t ,~u-vin3 the sccund session of the
last Con5ross G:coc.1,t Bx•itc?t1n, f1 1 :r·,i1~--.uy, and Italy folmd an
alli~nco lor the purpose of bJ.ockading the parts of Venezuel·
~,nd uslng such other means of pr•essure as .:ould secure a 3,::;:ttJ.c:-:-.cnt of claims due, as they alleged certain of their subjc:;cts. Their employment of force for the collectj_on of t·h2f3e
cla:Lns ;;as tei-;·11i.n;-::i.tod by an 3..i9'C;enwnt brought about through
the offices of the diplomatic representatives of the United
States at. Caracas and the Government at ~·rashington thereby
ending a situation which was bound to cause increasing
friction, and ~1ich jeopardized the peace of the continont .49
'
1

i3c Cl'etary of State Hay had rc•c::de clear i'iashington' s
1;osJ. t~.on earlier. Advocating and adhering in practice in
quc~~ttcns concerning itself to the resort of international
a:c'bitJ.·o.tlcn. ln r:;ettlc:rnent of controversies not adjustable
by the o:ccorly tr-,)<. ,t::-:-i·::nt of diplo!.!mtic nee;ot:tat:i.on, the
Gove:r·rr.,c:nt of the Unlted St.-1.tcs ~,.·ould o.11·rays be glad to see
the ~1estions of the justice of claims by one State against
2,nother g,rowlng out of i:ndi vidual wrongs or national obligations, as well as the gun.r2,:n.tee for the execution of whatever c:.w2~rd may be made, left to the decision of an impartial
:.::trbitral tribunal before which the litigant nations, weak
and strong alike, may stand as equals in the eye of interlaw and mutual duty.'.)0 ··
·
0

1+8

Ho'.'levrd C. Hill, P:..~J{J?.:;_Y.§_it-.:_9:2lsi. tJ.:ie C_gr:i,j_)J2.san (New York:
Russell and Russell, 19651, p. 131.

49

J?a"Q£rs. R~I~tJ.ng___!._o_t.hE?_fo~_~J__e;n R~lati9ns of the United
S't_a0s 0Tashin13ton,Government Printing Office, 1904), 1903
p. XVIII.
(Herein after refe:cred to as f_or9_~£iP. Re]..aj;.ions~.

50

.

fore~_g:n_Relat_ions, 1903, p.

6.

Rc.'.iction to Rooscvel t
f;::.vorn.1Jle.

Iproix~j~ly ~-ind

1

s )olicy was both favorable and un-

Scme felt that the United States had conducted itself
l:iroue}1t

:eoal 1wncfi.ts to the L.'"!.tin Au:ericans by re-·

iliicin3 claims, protecting their territory and in effect, serving

. opin1_on th3.t .:l.ooscvelt hL1self had procipi tated the action as an

zu:copoan test to the statsrJents in his annual messages.
:3. ttcr1pt

to uphold the .Mom... oe Doct:r·:l.ne

h~"<.,d

Thus th.i.s

o.1>:.::ost :resulted in its

'.L'he :uaj ori ty of the claims which had brought about the <:.ct:to11

1,·e:cc b::<.fJed on i.njuries

<..11d

losses dur1.ng the civil wars in whj_c:i

C:1'.;tro lwd :rlsen to p01·:er and on the violation of' contr2..cts by
the 1lcnc zue lan sovernrnent. 53

The Gel"man government aD.nou:n.ced to

the United States that it along with Great Brj_tain and Italy
would establish a pacific blockade of Venezuelan harbors.

The

Unj_ted States replied, houever, that it did not l"<?co511:tze such
oJ.oc}i::adcs \'rhich adversely affected third party rights as valid.

The i'JOWers then proposed to establish a "warlilrn blockade" but

"without a declaration of 1-:ar" in oPder for the Germans to stop
the approval of the Blindesrath necessary for a for·;nal declaration

51 11

Elihu Root on the Monroe Doctrine," Tiie_.J.11<iep§nd~~nt.
LVII (Dec. 29, 1904), p. 1514.

52

A Jeffersonian Democrat, "The Venezuela .Affair and the Mon
roe Doctrine," North American Reyiew, 176(Harch, 1903), p. 321.

53
Hill, PP• 109-110.

I
: of

l

r::.J_

u.~'.r._, i-

l\oonovelt ::i.nd Hay while approvlng :Juch action on the

pnrt of the Allies sou5ht to limit it,

1

Docti·ine

1..·L;re

I

~c tenets of the Draso

iznorcd while the Brtt:tsh mn.de political bCly of the

need ror Ameri ccen e.s s ll'"pi; 1 on of the re e ponsi bility f'or the a cti ans

Iof

I
2

the Latin

':Che concept of e,J1ow:i113 ce1"t.'.1in

lun~ooirRble
•

A"eric.~n L'cpnbltcs,55

,u'.1:nst cfolinquent Latin

circumstances.

Iof the ·-6i<lcor;ios
stntcs.~

Amer~can

1.·;1ich was

T~

rm. ni ti ve

clctions to be t<".k(;;n

t~

states opened the way for many

first of thcee being

sacrifice

necessa~y. to the very existence of the

Second, the conditions in most Latin American states

would lc.:,ve all o.f th::::m

o~pon

to such action. 57

'.i'hird, it could

pr-ovide the neans for a I,atin Am0r1can l"ejection of the ~-~onroe
r-8
, Doct:eine and a swing to GerEw.ny • .?
Fourth, if such actions as

1

1."~.'::;o"'.~ ~ouscs
. J..

neizures c:cro allo1·:,;d by foreign creditors i t

1,_,_d ,,.L10st be hnpos:3ible to dislodge them and a subsequent

viol;n\ion of the Ifo::roe Doctrine would result.59
o.cU.on uould ru:c1cer the

l-~on1•oe

Flnally, such

Doctrine suspect in Latin America

54
55 Lat2ne,
56

.Th&Jlpits;d__fil~_E'.-_t§.E_a:nd_

Van Alstyne, p.

217.

57 A Jeffersonian Democrat, pp.
58

Ibid., p.

Latin Ame_,tj,_9_§:, pp. 251-252.

331-332.

323.

"How to pp~
Develop
the ?·ionroe Doctrine,
XXVII (1903),
231-232.

59

Ibid.

~

11

R0viey__Q.f Reviews,

'
~~61
as doTJonstrated in o.n odi t.o:cial from the .Q.QJ't.Q.1_9__g_~_}i~11J1~ of Rlo

de J~niero on March 30, 1903:

11

The 1.fo11roe Doctrine as such h;:i.s

At best it is siQply :3.nothcr uoct1J:1ent for tl:e
no vr:.lue 1fi:1:.,_tevor.
benef1 t of tho;-:ie who would determine the c1v"rc.ctcristic psychol1)t;Y
of
'l'he e ction taken by the .A.11ies sanctioned by the United
str~tes

was cont:cary to tho Drago Doctrine formulated by the I•Iinis·-

ter of Ar3entj_na.

It fo:e1x:'.,de the foJ.·ci ble col le ct ions of pubJ i?

debt[3 bD.~Jed on the contention,

11

It is

C1.11

inho:ccnt qualifico.tion of

all coverei5nty that no proceedings for the execution of a judse~

;.1cnt

, ;c'.y

co

in~3t,j. tutod or carried out ae;ainst :i. t. 11 61

:;;o:ce, it held tha.t the public debt ce.m1-ot ocassion
vent"_oa

1101"

zu·~.:ed

inter-

ei/en the o.ctual occupation of the terri toi-y of Amori:S2.~-:3iC~lJ.ly,

C<}.pit;::i.1:\st

21i.r•t}1eI'-

t:'.t1e doctrine provided first

11

the

·,·cw lends !:1is r2oney to a fo:eeign state always takes in-

to 2.cc.ount the resou:cces of the country and the prob2.bility,
sreo..ter or less, that the obli5ations contracted will be fulfillcc1
Hi th delay.

.All 5over:a::tient s thus enjoy different credit accord-

ini_sly to their degree of ci vilizat:ton 2.nd culture and their con-----·----------·----------------------- --

60

61

Forei~n Relations, 1903, p.
~

26.

Henry G. Hodges, The Doctrine of Intervention, (Prince• ton: 'I'he :Ganner Press, 1915), PP• 85-6.
62
Samuel Flagy Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the
Stc:.tes (Ee1·1 York: He,rcourt, Brace· & Co., 1943), p. 147.

Upi~e

. >r J
~

QUCt

of

.Lfl

'-··, 1 ,
U

0

~ -..... .-.. ~ . ,

,.o.L1.l •• :>J

intcrn~tional

tran~iactions.

11

Ono of the fundamental principlos

enti~y

law, the

and equality of all states, re-

qu:L:'ed that n.c:<:eowleO.scnent of debt and payl'lent must be left to
the

cor.ccrned natlon "without discrimination of its inherent

r1::)1 ts

tary

Cd3

The coJlcct:ton of loans by mili-

a soverelt:-:n cnti ty.

~0ans

implies territorial occ10ation to make them

~ffective,

s.nd terr'i torial occupation si5nifles a suppress:tcn or subordina·tion of the

The

~raso

goverD~ents

63
of the cov;'Jt1·:tcs on 1.fn5.ch it is i;;rnosed'~
I

Doctrine was actually an adoption of the Calvo

Doctri~e

which condemmed intervention (diplomatic as well &s arffied) as a
J.c[~i t.5

,;:ate ,.Gethod of enforcing any or all p:ci vr~te claims of a

pc c11.n i.rt:cy 1:2.ti.:_1'e, o.t least ;3uch o.s are based upon contr2,Qt or are

the result of civil war, insurection or mob violence.64

America's

refusal to prevent the arm ad intGrventlon of the AJ.lj.od PoHers of
necessity make the Calvo and t1 0.e;o Doct:cines stand on their own
1

raerits rather than under the sanction of the United States.65
United States did, however, offer the Porter Resolution to replace

the Drago Doctrine.
p~rtios

the

It provided that none of the contracting

would resort to force in collecting contract debts unless

~0btor

state should disregard an offer of arbitration or, after

--.-----··---~--·---

63

John Hollo.day Latane, A_l:Lii?°t.9.r.Y__of American
York: The Odyssey Press, 1946), p. 496.
64
Hodges, p. 85.

65

Hubert

vr.

~--lndependent,

- - - ..-..

Bowen, "The l>(onroe, Calvo and Drago Doctrines,"
LXII (April 18 1 1907) 1 p. 903.
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t11e offer, shoi1J.d f
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bi__. l

•• ,_

+o ,.-:;nb1nit to +'ne ~-',-,r;l_·(·d. 66_
v
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Ifficodiatcly after the crisis debates took place in Parliament
a profound effect on futu:ce British action and

on the r_';C;velopr:lent of the I!.onroe Doctrine.
11

in the couTse of these dclli'.tcs stated;
I freely- 2.01ait--·that the bc!'l(f-,olde:cs

<3.y

I

PrLne

r~inister

Dalfou:c

do not deny---in fact~

occupy an inte:cnational

position which may require intc:crn:i.tio:nal action; but I look· upon
such 1ntcrl1ational action with the e;c: .v0 st doubt :::.nd 'rnspi cion,
0

and I doubt whether we have in the past ever cone to war for the
bondhoJ.ders, for those of our countrymen who have lent money to a
forci(,_p

~~ovcnncnt;

and I confess that I should be very son:.'y to

that ,,;;:cde a pr::::..etice in this country. 11 67
Dcctrine, 2alfour

m~de

on Feb. 14, 1903.

11

\·te

In ree;ard to the Iv:onrce

his position clear in a speech at
welco;;~e

Liverpoo~

any lncrc:<.1se of the influence of

the UDited States in the ·western Ec:misphere.

1-fo desire no colon-

iz::i.tJ.on, we desire no alteration in the bo.lanca of pm·;er, we desif·e no acquisition of territory.

\'le have not the slightest in-

tentj_on of :tnterferring with the mode of government in any portio
of the continent.

The Monroe Poctrine, therefore, is not really

in question at all.n68

66
J. F. Rippy,

11

Britlsh Bondholders and the Roosevelt Coroll['::.:cy of the ::~onroe Doctrine, 11 J'oli tj_,..Q.<!l Scienc_~---5':..ld.@;.fterl~,
XLIX, p. 203,

67
Latane, American Forelg__n Policy, p.

68

495.

. Dexter Perkins, H0n_ds_Qff (Boston: Little, Brovm & Co.,

1941)' p.

224.

29
•rhe press in both En5land imd the United States kept up a
stc .dy cL:: 1 ,:or for the enunciati?n of a new .A:nerican position to
8

changing conditions of the day.

The most
'

corrsion .?cl'tY:'c";nt l'8.n very much stmilar to this.
ce_nnot

a:2s11 ..1e

The United States

to fo:r:bid forei5n po\·1e:cs from collecting debts due

from a South Ar1c:cican Republic unless it be willing to assuGe the
responsibility and exercise the authority to enforce the pr9tect-

ol"~1 te lt clo.ir;J.ed to establish.69

ri.'l:te ;tu:"_clog J;:j.};lg§. stated the pre·

rnise e;vcm r:lore succintly on Jan. 30, l9U3 "the Po'l'ier wnich holds
a shield over the weaker States is under an obli5ation to compel
th0:n to o1rnc.cve their dutio s jn
-:Srool:s ::>.s:wd

11

:c(:~2.r·d

11

to othe:cs. 70 Sydney

Eave we BUcceeded in convincing America that the
11

:.Conroe Doct:cine Ci'.:c:cies w:i.th it certain l"esponsibilities? 71
Thus the idea tl10.t ~.:un:coe Doct:cj_ne 1-:as put for·1·1ard.

At least in
2
part due to British urging the Roosevelt Corolla:c•y resulted.r(
The question of European occupation of American ter:ci tory

was cent:cal to the Venezuela crisis and to the Hhole concept of

the ?-Conroe Doctrine and its relation to the European powers.

11

The

Uni tcd States was ·willins to c,llow European governinents to punish
------------- - - - ·

69

11

-------···-·---·--

Vene zue la and the Mo:nrpe Doctrine,

1902)' p.

972.

70 •
,_
1 t s,
.r1.nl;ececen
R ll)py, II•

71 11

Outlook, 72 (Dec. 27,

I

II

P•

276
- •

The Venezuela Crisis and After,

72

11

Perkins, Monroe Doctrine,

11

p.

145.

1867-1207, p.

240

I
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[~clcit;ant

Latin Anerican republics, provided assurance was

"t '-~1,·re
be no p, ermarwnt occupation of te·.I.-.ritoL-"Y• ,;73
5i ven t ,no.
l'" ,; . ,_,:,-Juld
.
Fi~om

the tj_~~10 of his es cenB:to:i to the ?:ce :=:ldcncy, Roosevelt had.

voiced his assent to E:tx:c9pean action ac;ainst defaulting governr;~cnts

p:covj_ded it did not vj_o1,.,..te the Monroe Doctrine.

11

1 do Ecit

..... nt the 1J.1i ted States tc:c:ci tor·iaJ.ly to a5rr,,..andize itself in
Q-

If(..,;,,,.

south .L-'\:w1'ica, end neither do I

w2.nt to see any European cou.:r1tl:'.J

ward <'.ilY :SuI·0pen.n Gountry, let the European country srmnk it; hu:,
I do not wish the United States or any other COlmtry to get additional te:n:•i tory

j

n South .i'\•,,orl

c9..: 7 4
11

In a letter to his Secreta:cy of State, JoJ.m Hay, Roosevelt

cleG.rly outl1n0s hj_s policy:
'J'he chlef interest of the United States in relation to the
other r1.:;publi cs upon the -~~neri can continent is the safety
c:.nd r~c::crn<:i.nence of the political system which underlies tl:.eir
and our existence' as nations, ---this system of free self
covernnent by the people. It is, therefore, to be desj_red

that all the :L:ecodom m-;der just laws, each soverei.sn co:·:_;:uni ty pursuing its own cour·se of orderly development without
external rest:caint or inte1'fercnce. To this Condi ti on of
security the peace and prospex•i ty, of all our neighbors will
;::,;~terially contribute.
Every failure on their part to maintain social order, every economic distress which mi{y'lt 51 ve
:cL;e to domestic disturbance, every discord between t~:cm
i,.,,hJ_ch could impede their industries, menace their stability,
or b:cing upon them the- calarni ty of foreign interference
could be a misfortune to us • • • the deep interest which
the Government of the Uni\;ed States has in the peace and
tr2.nquili ty of all the American states and in their terri-

---------·----·----------·---------·------------73

74
p.

Jessup, p.

497.

Roosevelt to Von Sternberg, July 12, 1901, Morison, III,
116.

:::1
torial intesrity. tfuile no specific engagements or declar~
tions should be made with regard to ~3Uch questions, it is
desirable to cause it to be generally understood that the
Govorn.rnent would ser·iously condemn any attempt to destroy
the territorial :integrity or to encroach upon the sove1'ei::;n
r·it;hts of t_he existing state, or any con.du.ct on their part
which might tend to evoke such a cc..lamity.15
A~nin

in the

fj_~st

year of his Presidency, Roosevelt made his

position cleel:e :tn no uncerta1n t•:-o:i:·ms.

trine as being eq_ui valent to the
1s, I

o~"lcn

do not want the United States or

"I regard the I·,:onroe Doc-

door in South America:, that
<:.:ny :~uropc;r;n po~:er to cot

territo:eial possessions in South America but to let South America
gre.dually develop on its o·wn lines, ·with an open door to all outside !l:J.l,ior•s,

~~c-~:'."i1e

as the individual. count:cies enter into indi-

yiaual treaties with one another~

Of course this would not ~ny-

where int«::rfol"e with trc:m.si tory intervention on the part of n.ny

State outside of

~"iouth A.:-,1e:;_•ica,'

wb:;n there i.-;a.s a row with sau:e

Sto.te in South Arne:cica. 11 76 'l'he £.ionroe Doctrine was a declaration
that theI'e must be no territorial age;:eandizement by any nonAmerlcan po1·1er at the expense of any American power on American
It "..;as in no Hay intended as hostile to any nation in the

soil.

Old 1·:0r1d.

Sttll less we.s it intended to give cover. to o.ny e.5-

t;rcssion by one NeH '\'iorld poHer at the expense of any other.

"It

is simply a step and a large step, toymrd assuring the universal
peace of the world by securing the possibility of permanent peace
=.~------------

----------

75
Roosevelt to Hay, Oct. 8, 1901, Morison, III, pp. 164-165.

76
p.

Roosevelt to Von Ste:cnberg, Oct. 11, 1901, Morison, III,
172.

32
hc:rii sphere. 11 77
on t l1iS
'I'he

vc~nezuela

crlsis of 1902-1903 ce.used Roosevelt to further

refine the clpplication of the :,ronroe Doctrine.

11

·rhe American pE o-

ple interpreted the rv:o:n:coe Doct:;:•ine as meaning of course that no
Europcc:m po>·:0r should c;ain .9.S!.Xlt_rgl of any American republic • • •

by any

fJUCh

:.:.rnbterfuge as exerc:ts:i.ng this control under the color

of a. pretense to the 5uarantee or collecting a debt. 11 78

pretense of such 2.ction would be reuioved

11

The very

if all of the republics

to tha south c.f ·Lis will only grow as those to which I allude have
a.lrec.dy 1.5rovm all need for us to be the especial champion of the
Doctrine w~.11 difoappear, for no stable and growing American Republtc Hl shes to see some 3r·oat non-American military power acquire terr:l tory in its neighborhood. 11 79

The United States, ho;:-

ever, would not "5u::?.rantee any state against punishment if it mis-

conducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form
of the l?,cquisi tion of territory by aJ:}.y non-American power. 118 0
This policy was to demonstrate that America did not intend to permit the rfonroe Doctrine to be used by any nation on this Continent
,!

as a shield to protect it from the consequences of its

77
78

79

for~ign

Relations, 1901, p.

01·m

XXXVI.

Roosevelt to Hay, March 13, 1903, Morison, III, p.

Foreign Relations, 1905, p.

XXXVI.

80

Foreign Relations, 1901,

P~·

mis-

XXXVI-XXXVIII.

446.

deeds

n.e;ainst foreign nations.81
The policy while not allowing control of te1~r1 tory did not

mca1·1 that .:t'oreign):

ere di tors should be denied theil"' J~ust due.

Thus, America was to stand for justice and not sanction for the
avoidance of hone st claims. 82

)'-1any of these countries, ho',;cver,

..,.:ere in a state of constant economic peril which invited such action as prohibited by the Monroe Doctrine.83

Roosevelt fe1t ''if

a republic to the south of us commits a tort against a foreign
nation, ouch as an outrage against a citizen of that nation, then
the l·~onr·oe

Doctr•ine does not force us to interfere to prevent pun

ishr.ent of the tort, save to see that the punishment does not assume the fo:cm of tep:r•i torial occupation in any shape. 11 84

Assuming this principle the creditor was placed in a difficult situation.

The intervening nation must occupy such terri-

tory as appropiated only until it claims have been met and must
reject the idea of permanent occupation.BS

On this point Elihu

Root in his speech to the New England society noted:

81
.E_QX'QJiill._Re_l_g_tj,gn§., 1905, P•

82

11

XXXIV.

The United States and Guatemala," Outlook, 104 (Xay 17,
1913), p. 89.
83
Theodore Roosevelt, "South,,_America- and the It.:oru"oe Doc11
tx•ine, Outl9_Q_~, 106(March 14; 1914), p. 583.
84
.
Foreip:n Relations, 1905, .P• XX.XIV.
85 . .
Hodges, p. 83.

;·:e don't undertake to say that the republics of Central and
South America are to be relieved from their international
obll3ations. \'le don't undertake to say that the Powers of
Europe shall not enforce their ri5hts a3ainst these memberB
of the sisterhood of state,s. It is only w}1en enforcement
tho~;e ri5hts comes to the polnt of taking posse~-;sion of the
territory of any American people that we say th2.t it is in-~
consistent with the peace and safety of the United States.
And we can not ~-;ay it with justice unless 1·m also say that
the American republics nre themselves to be just.86

of

In this same ree;::ird, he
::_,1 aintoJ.n

\,.;,:is

later to state that "if

this Doctrine, wD.ich' is vital to our

safety, at the same time when ·we say to other

nat~_onal
Po~w:rs

11e

are t

life and

of the ':torlrl.,

'You shall not push your remedies for '\'T!"ong against these republics to the point of occupying the!r territory'; we are bound to
say the.t '·,·.rhenever the ;.-r:cong cmmot be otherwise redressed, we
ourselves will see that it is redressed'. 11 87
Roosevelt, hir.:iself, was of the opj_nion that one of the fundauental objects of the lfonroe Doctrine 1·ms to assist the Latin
American republics in their desire for peace and order.

The grad

ual growth of the ethical element in indivi_dual relations and
the sharing of burdens should be expanded to nations.88

Actually,

h01-.'ever, the civilized man can keep peace and obtain justice only
if he subdues his barbarian

~eighbors.

Fair dealin5 must also

enter into the relations but force must be the overriding consid-

86
"Our 1 Fiscal Protectorate' in Santo Domingo," J.,iterary
Di~est, XXX(Dec. 28, 1905), p~
120.

87 11

Elihu Root on the rfonroe Doctrine,

II

p.

1514 .

88
For~isn Relatipn~,

1905, p.
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The 3ains to be realized from such a~tion far outwelshed the dr•awbaclrn because every expansion. of civilization made

for ::_1c2.ce.

'l'hus the gains of a 3reat civilized p01:er meant the

triu~Jph of law, order, and righteousness.90

In effect, the steady

aim of the United States, as of all enlightened nations, was to
strive to bring ever nearer the day ·when there should prevail
throughout the world the peace of justice.91
Since one of the most effective instruments for peace was
the r-:onroe Doctrine as it he.d been and was gradually developed by

this E2tion and acc_ep_ted by oth0r nations, its extension could result 5.n tho hemispheric peace Roosevelt soug...t-it.9 2

Therefore, it

re22.lncd America 1 s clear duty to st1·i ve in every practiable way to
bring nor.rer the time when the

~'.rnrd

wou1d not be the arbiter a-

J

mons :n.a ti on:;. During Roosevelt Is time, the practical thing to do
1-;as

to try to minimize the nwnber of cases in which it had to be

the ar1)i ter, and to offer, at least to all ci v:_ilized poi·rers, so:ne
substitute for 1·mr which would be available in at least a consid-

erable nwnber of instan.ces.93

One of the major causes of conflict

-----~----------

S9
Theodore Roosevelt, "Exp;;.msion and Peace," The
LI(Dec. 21, 1899), P• 3403.
·
90
Ibid.
91__
_
Fo~ei;:r.~qelatiqps,

1904,' p.

Ind~J2_endent,

XXXIX.

92
Foreign Relations, 1905, p.

XXXIII.

93
Ibid., p.
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·1

the collection of defaulted debts.

I

In 11 1s instl"'Uctions to the representative at the Hague he sought
to rc:~;ove this possible source of confrontation.

11

It is doubtlt\ss

tl"J.e th.:1t the non-payment of public debts ;;;,ay be accompanied by

r1

h·

sUCl' 1

ci_ :::'CliJ'stances of fraud and

as to j USGlIY Gne use 01 f orce.
..L

•

.....

.L,

..,,

~~onsdoing

a violation of treaties
-~o

This Gover1'ln1ent 1·;ould be gl;:;.d

see an inter·ne.tional consideration of the subject which shall
discrininate between such cases and the simple non1;erforn12.nce of
a. contract ·Hi th a p:ei vate person and a resolution in favor of re-

lirmce upon peaceful means in cases of the latter class. 11 94
)~:c;d_cc.n

.

2.ssu::nption of such a role led to misunderstn.ndj_ns

"An idea had beco1oe prcvo.-

on

I

Doctrine i:np1ied, or C2.l:'l':ted
I

with it, an as::o1.-1Dption of supe1•io:city, and a ri5ht to exercise
some kind of protectorate over countries to
doct~ine applies.

~iliose

territory that

Kothing could be fa:cther :from the truth. 11 95

In rc<llity, Foreign J:.:inister Drago of Argentina pointed out that
11

the traditional policy of the United States without accentuating

super·iori ty or seeking preponderance, ccnder:ined the aggression of
the nations of this part of the 110rld and the control of their
de0tinies by the sreat Powers o.f Europe. 11 9 6

94

Fore~n Rcl~tt9ns,

95--

Ibid., P•

1906, p.

11

·\'le

XLIX.

XLVII.

l___~6lliQ.' P• =II~-- . .
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Elihu Root added
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1

for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except
for no soverei5nty except the sovereignty over ourselRl)o sevel t hoping to di sspell other rumors .\1."ote to Root
1

"It 1s not tr·l.1.e that the Unit&d States has 2.ny land hunger or en~

tertains any projects as re5ards other nations, save as are for
their welfare. 11 9 8

Latr::r he was to state 2.s1::dn

11

it r11ust be unde.~"'-

stood that under no circumstances will the United States use the
I-".onroe Dcctrine as a cloak for territorial aggression. 11 99

President Roosevelt was keenly aware that "the right of

fi"<(G-

dom o.nd the responsibility for the exercise of that right can not
be di'IOJ.'cod. 11 lOO
·by

'
This was especiallr
true for those who profit6d

the Monroe Doctrine.

For they

11

must accept responsibilities

along with the rights which it confers; D.nd that the same statement applies to tD.ose who uphold the doetrine. 11 101

It was a raere

truism. to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere
else, that dosired to maintain its free(':.om, its independence Lriust
realize the right of such independence could not be
separated from the responsibility of making good use of it. 102

ulti~ately

97

Ibid., p.

XLVII.

98 .

Roosevelt to Root, May 20,1904, Morison, IV, p.

801.

99

Charles H. Sherrill, Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine, (New
York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916), p. 95.
100
Foreign Relations, P• XXXIX.
101
Jbid., .P• 334.
102
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only we, but all .Ar;:ei-'ic::i.n Repub1ics who are benefited 'by

.L' .

t....'1.G

e:x:istGnce of the Doctrine, mu::it recognize the obligations each
n.ation is under as :t'03ards fo1•eign peoples no less than its duty
to insist upon its own rights. 11 103
I

If the United States was.to insist upon the rights

proclai~e~

under the Eonroe DcctPine, Ro8sevelt had to undertake the forLllidable task of rc-awakeing the American people to its tenets.and
e.do.ptations.

11

1 am hav1ng my hands full also in endeavoring to

make our people act on a national interpretation of the Konroe
:Doctrine.

No such policy as that of the £•1onroe Doctrine can re-.

irFl.in fossilized whj_le the nation

31~m·rn.

Either it must be o.i)an-

doned or it must be modified to meet the changing needs of natione.l life. ul04
11

He a5r•eed who:le-heartedly with 1·,'hitelaw 2eid

the thine;s that make the Monroe

D~ctrine

t}-0..2.tl

have disappeared • • •

I

we rJay find, if nobody is opposing, that its extension quite so
far 1)eyond the original purpose • • • as the furvor of our patriots has c2.rried it, may prove to be attended

~11th

wholly urrnec-

essary inconveniences in the absence of a salutary European pressure, we shall either modify the present extreme extensions of th
old doctrine . • • or some day or another we should have to fisnt
for it.

Secondly we should limit it to our legitimate sphere of

national interest--Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and the waters

------------------------.--------------103

Foreign Relations, 1905, p.

104

p.

XXXIII.

Roosevelt to Spring Rice, July 24, 1905, Morison,
2-286.

_rv,
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,. a '1

_'; _, I

on 'both OCC:CJ.ns :i.l-::out the Isthrnus.

Finally, we should apply it

with increased strinsoncy in the sphere, beyond it moderated in:
remote countries which under 1;han5ed modc:rn condi t:l.ons are no
that sphere. 11 105
lonse,r \·iithin
·

Thus, the Doct:eine had to be e1..:.

ther c-.dvnncod or expanded to cover the ever lncreasing number oi'
-~
QJ.

SJ.J~u+c•'"'
v _,. 0

·cpininl.1'
......:>_~

c~,

0

from the reckless creation of public debts and

loose :fjrH;,ncial 0.drn.lnistration which courted Eur·opean interven-

tions ::o.nd to set the limits to which that intervention could
rea.ch. l06

nif we h:::.d refused to apply the Doct1"ine to changing

be completely out\:orn, would not meet any
..
of the needs of the present day, and indeed uould probably by
conditions it would

DOi'l

this tL:ne have sunJc into complete obliv:l.on.

:·n(~eting with

and is

It is useful at ho::r:e,

reco5ni ti on abroad because we have adopted

our application of it to meet the growing and changing needs of
the

:Jr.mi''D
•e-re
... .l.<..J~ ...
01 1.l.~
f

•

rrl07

It was because of this ability to change itself to fit the
si tu2tion that Roosevelt :felt "the l.:Onroe Doctr·ine · should be the
card1nal :feature of the :foreign policy o:f all the nations of the
two Ar:1er·icas, as it is of the United States. 1110 8

The extent to

f

~

Which economic concer·ns 5overned foreign policy, especially the

t·t.

---

'

'

It

i~

p.

105
5Z7. Roosevelt to Ifni telaw Reid, July 24, 1903, Mori son, III,
106
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Latane, American Foreign
Policy, p.
Foreign Relations, 1905, p.
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gor.!l'Oe Doctr>ine, has been the c::::.use of r::e.ny G..n argument over the

ooti y[',tion behind the new inter:;iretation of the lfonroe Doctrine
In his messae;e of 1901 he stated "this

Roo:::cvelt fo1·u1le.ted.

doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial

relat~.ons

of any

American poHer, s::::ve tha.t in tn1th allows ee.ch of thsm to form

In other 1·10:.cds, it is really a e;uara,nty of

such as its desires.

the commercial independence of the A111ericans.

j

Tl'!e do not ask urcderl
I

this doctrine for any exclusive cornLlorcial dealings 1'f3.th any other!
A2el'l· can

-f",t·,ate. 11 109

H-Oweve r ,

f monition

to busiP..ess.

I

'-'-oi·r
vlJ.

r,- .......
ir.,c~1i.:>

•,,.
c--~

u'i"·~o
'e>l-' 0 ·11
_

.:oc._

in th e sc..r:
~ le

L.1e ssa3e

'ne 3ave this

2.d-1'

"Business concerns \ihich have the largest
•

•

•

.,,.,,,re
L"°''"'

t·~e
!'l

Jead
in -'-he
s"-ri·fe
""'or
0
0
_
.i

· cor.::,,cr·cial nupre:mD.cy among the nations of the world.
only just begun to a:3sw-;ie the

con~ile.nding

America has

position in the j_nter-

national business Horld which we believe will more 2.nd more be
hers.

It is of the utmost importance that this position be not

jeopardized, especially at a t:lme when the over·powering abu..>'ld.:::mce

of our o-vm national resources and the skill, business enerf:5Y, and
mecho,nical aptitude of our people make foreign markets
-ial. 11 llO

essent~-

:r,,_any critics saw more to the Monroe Doctrine than rr~erely

e~ononic considerations.111

11

The roots of our Caribbean interests

'
109
f_9_r.e:\_f:_ll_J1elations, 1901, p. XX.XVI.
110
1
1/illiam Appleman Williams, The Tragedy 9f American Di plogi.2.cy, A Delta Book (New York:Dell Publishing, 1962), p.
57
111
Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cam-

l

~:~doe: :~r~~iversity Press, 1947), p.

134.
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It seems elem."' that the motives that in-

spired its policy vrore basically political rather than economic• "113

Em·r~".l'd Hill 5oes even further than these statements.

"Political rather than

econo~ic

cou:cce.

consideration seem to have deter-

l'for must it be overlooked that the

policy he favored was often opposed by influential financiers andj
..,.,.,'·io·.-. ~-··~au1s.11114co ....,..-~
1,o~·-1'- •
~
.1.

-"·

Samuel Flagg Bemis also believes that

strato5ical requir•c;::ients of continental security • • • not

"-'~ ;~ V.,

L

sel:i.~i s:

interests (\·!all SL"cet) r·eally explains the Roosevelt Corollar7 1~Jl5
i·!illie.m A1Jple;:nan 1:iillia:-ns, ho\·rever, clings to an econornic inter-

pret2.tion.

111

rhe economic and political leader of the count:cy de-

ci<i<~d

th2.t wliat was 3ood for Americans w2.s

al~30

ers.

=:ti..:-.!ani t< .:ci2.n conce:cn 1·.ras thus reinforced by hal'd-hcaded

c;ood for foreign-

1

econo1ni c r·equirements. "~16

Almost everyone is agreeded that Roosevelt realized that the

112
He!1ry Ki thedge :tforton, 11 The United States in the Caribbean," in The_JinJ t~d St_0_t913_and_the_Q_~:rib:Qean by Chester Lloyd
Jones, Henry Ki thedge No:r·ton,_ and Par}:cr T. ~-~oon, (Chicago: The
Univ2rsity of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 83.
113
:M\mro, Intervention, p~
531.
114
Hill, p.
212.

115
Bemis, p. 115.
116
Williams, PP• 57-58.

'

l:-2
1
major determ:tnant in the i.nt.ern{i.tional 'dorld was power. 1'1

Sine.a

the Monroe Doctrine ·was not a par·t of inte:cnational law but a
pi"onou:n.c:c~r;·;ent

of a policy and this could be 15nored by anyone wl:o

chose to do so, 1 ts exist,ence only had mean:tng as so as the Uni t_ed

states t::ould doal f1~om strength.118

In effect, the 1-fonroe Doc-

trinG emoux1t.ed to a policy conceived and maintained for its own

we1fo..:ce; in reality, it was a defensive policy of the United
states • 1 19

'I'hc:i.:·e ~·::.:;.s a b:".sic truism in the statement "our forei5n

policy is the !-Ion.i·oe Doct1... ine.

What.ever our foreign policy hap-

1

pens to be for the moment, it is c~.lled the Monroe Doctrine. 11 120
Du-c'l:r43 thj.s pe'.!."iod one of the focal points of .kmerican for...:

eign policy
ovc:i.~sb.:'.dow

1-1a.s

the Ca.r:tbbean.-

all others.

Its importance was thought to

Charles Evans Hug.hes said of the Carib·-

bean.
If we had no gonroe Doctr:tne we should have to create one.
And this is not to imply' any limitation on the scope of the
doctrine, as originally proclaimed and as still maintained,
but simply to indicate that new occasions require new appli-

cations of an old principle which remains completely effective. vrnat has taken place of late years in the region of the
Caribbean has given use to much confusion of thought and misapprehension of purpose •. As I have said, the Monroe Doctrine
as a particular declara.t+on in no way exhausts American rig..1-:i.t
-----------------·---~

117

George E. Mowry, l.Phe Era of Theodore Roosevelt, Harper
Torchbooks (New York: Harper and Row, 196-2), p. 148.
118
Chadwick, p. 118.
119
Norton, pp. 85-89.
120

Hiram Bingham, "Should We Abandon the Monroe Doctrine?,"
in Latin America, ed. by George H. Blakeslee (New York: G. E.
Stachert & Co.,. 1924), P• 131.
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or policy. The United States has rights and obligations
w:11 ich tl1at doctrine does not define. And it has been necesso.r·y to assert these ric;hts and obligation~ as well as the
li81ted principle of the Monroe Doctrine.l~l
Roosevelt stated "the 1-:oDroe Doct:r>ine is necessary today to

the United States.

The Caribbean Sea washes the coast of the

richest part of the United States,_ and it is necessary that it be
dominated by them in order to e;uarantee the independence and security of' the United States. 1!122

The acquisitlon of the Canal

zone and the construction of the Panama Canal w1de the Isthmian
a.re:J. one of the greatest of strategic significance in the American!
defense system.

Its importance prompted a move to secure the con-1

trol of bases rcquisi te for the defense of the canal by the Unit·-

ed

sto.tes and the exclus:ton of any rival great power from obtain-

ing a foothold in the vicinity of the canal or on the approaches
to it • 12 3

Such feelings were voiced by Elihu Root, "In V1at re-

gion (the Caribbean) the United States must exercise a dominant ,
influehce.

It is there that the justification and necessity for

the l.:On:coe Doctrine is found.

We must control the route to the

Panama Cana1. 1112 4

It was contrary to the Monr•oe Doctrine, Roose--·---------··---------------- - - - - - - ----

I

i21

14

Charles Evans Hughes, "Observations on the Monroe Doctrin1
The A0erican Journal of International Law, 17(1923), p. 620.
122
Roosevelt, 11 South America and the ?-~onroe :Goctrine, 11 p.584.
123
Julius \'l. Pratt, AmerJ,ca' s Colonial Exneriment (Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1964), pp. 116-117.
124:i.:unro, Intervention, p.

J

113.
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for any non-A:nericG.n power to have any control over the
Istbnian canal. 12 5
1

include

'any

Lodge was l~ter to extend this principle to

J.1(~:cbor

or other plLtce in the

:~rnerican

continents that

is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military
purro:ocs mi5ht t'rn·Ge: .ten the co;1rnunications or the se.fety of the
1

,_ d
lJniue

,_,_""S 11126

Q ....

ul,<.-.L..v

•

:S.cosevelt 2.nd the nation were prepared to support the 1'·1onroe
~'·.nd

Doct:c1:-1e

curity • 127

<ie:Lend the C2,r-i bbean on the grounds of national seHe fi:cmly believed American rights and interests were

deeply conce:cned in the maintel'\ance of the Doctrine so clearly 2.s

hardly to need arv1ment.

This was especially true in view of the

co::Lstruction of the Psnama Canal.

"As a ;.nere matter of

self-~de-

fense we must exercise a close watch over the approaches of thi~

can2.l, and this means that we must be thoroughly alive to our in-

ter·e~3ts in the Caribbean Sea. 11128
th::i.t :tthe i:nr:;vi table effect of

Root was cognizant of the fact

our building the Canal must be to

req_uire us to police the surrounding premises.

In the nature of

thin:;s, trade and control, and the obligation to keep order which

---------------·-----------------125
3emis, p.

144.

126

T. A. Bailey, "The Lodge Corollary of the ?-Conroe Doctrj.ne ~·
Poli ti cal Science (;uarterl_y, XLVIII (1933}, P•
233.

127
?oster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to 't'lorld Poi·Ier_ 182_2-

1254, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), P•

76.
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For~ign_Relations,
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1

129

In i'csar•d to a proposed J.oi1n to Costa Rica, ne noted the
United States :cequi:ccd the rn:;:ct door nei3hbor of 1-'anaman to be
unC.er the fin2. ncial cont:c·ol of the United Sto.tes rather thnn h.-c'.Ve

it ve ;..;tod in any forelgn PO'.ier.1::50

'l'he d.cfon~oe of the Po.ne.~aa

c::i.nc"l dominated our Caribboc.i.n policy w:nich rested on the p:c:l.:"12.cy
of the United States and its inter·ests w:riich we:ce :"'oster·ed
. cx:i s t,:-nce of the Canal .131

11

Roosevelt :cec>.,li zed

PY the

t:1e contr·ol, in

the lntercst of the com.;nerce and traffic of t'ce '\·"'i",ole civilized
world, of the :means of undisturbed t:cansi t

acr·oss the I str.mus o:'

ho.s become of t:co.r,sccno.ont ' Lni)o:ctD. nce

uO

,_

.. .
0ne uill· t e a s+va0~s.

.l.•

I
I

exe:ccl sed this control by intervening in the

I
l

course of domestic discussion, and by protecting the territory
from foreign invasion.

111 2

3

The

~-:onroe

alY'..de oy the Zonr·oe Doctrine 2.nd

'.,

Doctr:i.ne :12"d se1-·ved in . .

ftmction and was endorsed by the citizens.

"Cur people intend

'111'
1

c~o

to visit upon it as the one sure

I

securine; the peace of the v-.'estern Hemisphere. 11 133

cc;.:>x1s of

Roosevelt's strong av:areness of manly virtue carried over inlf

to his consideration of relations between nations.

I

In foreicn affairs this country's steady policy is to behave i
toHard other nations as a strong and self-respecting wan

129
Jessup, p.

471.

130
Ibid.

131
Thompson, p.

f

132

?orei~n

L_.___ ._:33!."_oreir;n

I

155·

Relations, 1903, p.

. I

i

XX:XIX.

134

?e:J-..§.tiops. 190J..i~2.Q'.XVI.Jbe ·--

_Omit.

I'
l
·-------.. ~l

.':6

I
I

should beh:1ve toHs.:cd the other men ·with vrhom he is brou5ht ·
ir~.to contact.
In other ·Ho:rds, our aim is disinterestedly to
:-ceJ.p other nations ~..rhere ~-n1ch help can be wisely given with- f
out t:ie appearance of meddling with what does not concern us;
to bo caPeful to act as a 3ood neie;hbor;. 2,nd at the same
in 6oocl--natured fash:ton, to make it eviC.ent. the,t we do not
j_r1tcnd to be iriposed upon.135
.

t:'Lnl

;~e

c<.wit:i.nued

011

th:ts t:i.·c=dn of thought in a letter written

le.. te~.

I

!·

In short, ray belief is that this nation should judge other
n:•.tions each on its conduct; a,nd that it should fearlessly
<c.nd 1·1}1c1·e pos8lb1e effectively talrn r~ction asainst w:con5d()5_ng; that it should prepare itself so as to w1ke it unsafe
fo:c r::,ny other l~,2.tion to do l'ff•ong to it; ond that in its tu:cn
it should_ scrupulously do justice to every nation that act~
ric;htly.l3b
RooGevelt of 1901 to 1909 had greater wisdom and more

~hG

.discretion thc,n the Roosevelt who had in 1896 pronounced his

theed.cs on pat:ciotism.

In r-eality he had aba.ndonded none of

nI believe '\'tith all

ti,0::1.137

my

heart in the J,~on.:coe Doctrine ~:nd

have, for instance, for·mally notified G-er1:!lany to that effect. 111 38
In a speech in Chicago on April 2, 1903 he again voiced his sentic.ents and gave birth to the title of his policy.
am convinced that the immense majority of our fello..,,.,.countrymen so believe in it, but I would infinitely prefer
J.:.o see us abandon it than to see up put it for\·12.rd 1.=md bluster about it, and yet fail to build up the efficrent fi5ht1.ng 1
Hhich in the last resort can alon~ make it respected by e:,,ny

I

135
Forei~n
136-p.

Rela~ions,

1907, L.XI.

Roosevelt to B. Dernburg, Dec. 4, 1911+,

861.

137
Pringle, pp.

.i'~orison,

VIII,

279-280.

138
p.

Roosevelt to Spring Rice, July 24, 1905,

1286.

~·:orison,

IV,

2: '(

!
'

"t:cong -:..~orei[-;:n pN;er 1-rhosc interest it may happen to violn.te
11
1.t. 'l'hei-•e is a homely old adae·e
uhich runs:
Speak softl~· 11
.,;
1I
~~d carry a bi3 stick; you will go far.
If the American
I
0~tion will speak softly and yet build and keep at a pitch o~
~-,;·co hle)lest tra'Lninc;s ~~ tho:ecuc;hly efficient navy the l,:offC08
roctrino will go far.159
=~~s
;

~of

the

speech was pronpted by the realization that the efficacy

~ohroe

lar5e ceasure, upon the :rw.ta1·-

Doctrine depends,

l

I

I ; ::.1 power of the lli1ited States.140
f
l

~od

cc~:;t

I::..cies,

'rhe Chic2.go address also ser·-

him <-1s a typical repre,sentati ve of j_r;-1perialistic j:JolI

for he sy:2te:J1e.tic2.:Lly expressed natiorn~.l C'.:nbitions, ofi"'21·ecll

I

I

I:?. clobal comprehension of what was to be accomplished, and
o..cco:rd with the elan of luis people • 141

j co:·_,)lcte
..:~: 1J

'

1,

-~:vo

,:;h, the :.:cnroism of Hoosevel t :::md

1'
, -- 01~
._u ·'-0..:.oz.1.

j

....t.,~1e
,

._p_f">j.. L'll
. • ,_0.L
.• ve ,.i:;~onroe
r

!

A:·.crj_ce.n :1ef,<.::nony '..rith its

O':m

l·~ahan

had

W2.S

in

The basis of tJ:-:e
terminc-~ted

t;1e

n ~c.rine
.
.ucc
an d resu lt e d i n an

conplete nationalization.142

The ure;e to increase A_nerican influence in the iJOI'ld i.·:as

in part et least, to Roosevelt's desire to extend Anglo-Saxon

Ii<ier:.:'.'.'.,

practices, and virtues throu5hout the world. 1 43

In bj.s

' ,;jn:nJ.nv of the ~'Test he implies that the Anglo-Americans enjoyed a
!: ---·-·· ·-----·----·-----.---------------~
, --- --~-39
j

.!
I

Joseph 3ucklin Bishop, T!1:}eoc'1~Q.l. . .Q... r:'..Q_Q_~~§Vl~lt and Eis ·~~j .::e
<::ew Yor·k: Cho.rles Scribner's Sons, 1920), I, pp. 239-22~()"~-·-- --

140

Perkins, Hands Off, p. 86.
Carlos Pereyra, Lg.__ Jo_g_t1. . ip.a de lfonroe: El Dcstino :-~:'.ni1I~e_~Q...Y.3..:1-..Jw">l._eria).ismo T?-:exico: J. Balles ca & Co~-T9-68l-,-:p-.--57.
142
Ibid. p. 131 ..

i

141

143--

Williams, p.

57.

,·o
11U

o,s well as

ci.

cult:u1•<J. l

sup:cemo.cy .14-4

by others only by being able to 2cestcr them·-

need

C'f•;r

to

kec~p

in mi.nd the..t among the uc.ny qualities indispos-

able to the success of a sreat denocracy, and record only to a
}1j_sh a::1d stern ~;cn:~e of

duty of )"loral obligation, are self-know··
The white r2.ce was destined to· sprea'
Defined by Euro:x::;n GGO[£raphy, the

Chri~-,tj_.'.:'rl

:celi3ion, a cultural link with Greece

(~nd

Rome and a

kinship of b1ood, they \':ere the superior peoples of the modern
f;J.'P-.

T)ir.:;y 1:0:ce o:edc.:i.ned to rule be cause they -;-.'ere endowed with

.t}:e cnc~r3y o.nd ability to cont~ol other races.146
bccc.u~::e

This was so

a ne.tm·al process had best fitted these people for expan- .

sion und self··e;ove1·1r,1ent.

It wo.s they who would control the

ward regions of the world.

b"el'4

Pro-eminent among this select few

t?1e ::nglish- speaking 1'2,ce s. ~ 4 7

wei'e(

'· "In the long run there can be no

justlfic;::,-..tion for one race ·managing or controlling another unless • • • in the interest and for the benefit of that race. ul48
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John :-:orton Blum, ::Pl1-.~_Republican Roosevelt(C~:r;,1)ric5.0e:
1 1 -:~.:cva:ed University ?ress, 19541, p.
28.
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:David H. 3urton, 11 'fi1eodore Roosevelt 1 s Social Darwinism
1i
0.nc. ~!icws on Impe:eialism, 11 Joµrnal of the }i_istor.y__Q)~_ Ic,ea~, 25
( ....
lC...-c::;)
11 6 •
_; G ..-1 ,
p•
11~6

David H. Burton, "Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Irape:r·iali : -:;·
of Politics, XXIII(l961), pp. 360-361.
147
~·
. '
_iOlQ.,
p. ~--;58.
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t
i4s
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Darwinism,
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:~:<.turally,

the :c-:nzlish spe8;1dng races could car1"y out this task.

~\cosevcl t'

s doctrine wc.s compounded by a sense of the super-

1 _\ ori ty of the :cD. ce,

I

11c:1inate c.nd his

! ti'-~

Ii .;-,;~,~

i;;

by

An5lo-A~J.ericans,

the guardians

The influence of the 'de st was seen in the urge to

J of deL";ocracy.
i

P<~rticularly

der.;ir~~

to be the preceptor of lesser civiliza-

and the champion of unfortunate peoples. 14 9

Ee contrasted

successful democracy of the white race with the chaos of S3.ntoi

.

::,,,;1~_nc;o.

11

I

A hundred years of fr•eedom so from tee.chine; the Sar:to

!

I

i

'~o;':in:_:ans

how to enjoy freedom. and turn it to good account, hs.s .

.'.'·~=::,_;ltc;cl so badly that society is on the point of dissolutioD. 11 l50
·•

.-,• .;..·-....<..
- rl

~

,_..,.
·Y•OV""
"'·E~l-1t
J.,_;
. . J;)....
!;_.;~~

'-"""""
~1.1..1.......

Of

t'ne lo-'-y

01"'

""'1e
ina.~~- Vi Q~Ual • l5l
Ltl

;,; ·u_:;i(ic:ced in 8,n a1!.10st Neo-Lamarckian sense.

~~term~ncd

action.

~2~onstrated

I0

I

In the race of the Latin

':Chat :ts, t1-1e c:_c-

A~ericans,

this was

by their weakness and inability to rule the·nselves
Kost of the Washington officials were of ~he 3·_~9

fectively.152

Latin American :cepresentati ves were "Dagoes 11 while 'Sur-

09:1 nion.

' c:oe ··:c:. s t'l:e c:radle of culture and civilization.

':'he inevitable

----------·--------

149

----·-

II

Burton, Confident Imperialist," p.

116.

150

Burton, "Social Darwinism," p.

114.

151
Ibid,, p.

118.

Beale, p.

29.

152

-,

....... ,.,-~.~-"
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'
<

r
~'

'

11cvcs that his southern neighbors are trivial and childish peo~
p1cs, o.nd above all incapable of maintaining a proper self-sover'.1·-

~nen t." l5 4

na v1~

':l

Root went so far as to sa:y, "All of the Latin Ameri cf,ns

genius for 1ni srepresentati on • ., 155

Roos eve 1 t 1-.rrote to Eay

·"it v1i 11 do ai.·;ay with the foreign nations having any pretext for

interference on this side of the water, and in the next place it
, ~6
'-'Ti 11 shoN those Dagoes that they will have to beh8.Ve decently.",__,,
With such a

batt~ry

of intellectual assumptions it is quite

e.ssy to see how Roosevelt was convinced that the United States

wo11ld nev0r act unjustly or wrcnglj.
f,!·~,; ci ca took was right .157

vt:ntion" was born to
~c'~,

Hence, whatever position

Thus, the systmn of "prevention in'~er·-

substitu~e

orderly democratic processes ror

o1t in Latin Arneric8., especially the Caribbean and Central

ic0n stotes. 1 58

Ame~~

The decision of the arbitration tribunal was

thought to put "a premium on violence" and, therefore, the United
St3tes sought an alternative to European naval demonstrations in

--------------153
Sl:1.tr~s,

--------- l

Wilfred Hardy Callcott, The Caribbean Policy of the Gnited
1890-1920, (Ealtimor~: The John 1~opkins Press,1942)-~·p:]iJ

15+

Alejando Alvarez, The Monroe Doctrine (New York:
University Press, 1924), p. 264.

155
156
157
158

Jessup, p.

289.

Roosevelt to Hay, Sept. 2,
"3eale, p.

Oxford

1904, Morison, IV, p. 91?.

25.

Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Poli..sL
(Xew York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), p. 413.

r
~·

"Sooner or later it seems to me inevitable thgt
the United States shoUld assume an attitude of protection and regulBtion in regard to all these little states in the neighborhood Q
160
the Cnribhean."
It was America's duty, when it became absolute
lY j_nevi table, "to police these countries in the interest of order
9 .ncl

civilization."

161

Roosevelt :nc..de the distinction between civilized and barbar0

us peoples or states.

The civilized or white states were subjer::;t

to different criteria for the p8rformance of duties and rights,
"~~rs

with barbarous or semi-barbarous peoples come in an entirely

differ~nt

category, being merely a •most regrettable but necessary

~ntcrnational

police duty which must be perfo1 med for the sake of

t11e welfare of mankind."

4

162 Where Cari bbeR.n stntes were s t2.ble

And prosperous they stood on a footing of absolutely equality with

nll other communities.

But some of them were prey to such contin-

1;ous revolutionary misrule as to have grown impotent either to do
th8ir duties to outsiders or to enforce their rights against outsiders .163

It could not in the long run prove possible for the

TJnited States to protect delinquent

&~erican

nations from punish-

·-------------·--..;...-----------·---159

( 'i\ ew
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York: Chalres Scribner's Sons, 1963), p. J86.
160
Roosevelt to T. R. Jr., Feb, 10, 1904, ~orison, IV, p. 724

161
162
163
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Roosevelt to W. B. Hale, Feb. 26, 1904, Morison, IV, p.71.i.
Foreign Relations, 1901, p. XXXVI,

Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt: ~n Autobiour0phy
York:
Chalres Scribner's Sons, 1920~, p, 506.
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tncse 1·:ere ·\'Teak and incompetent nations which could not protect

rights of foreigners against their own citizens or vice versa.

In

.such c'J.ses, it bccaJTie necessary. for some outside power to interv 8 ne.
th.::• t

165

As to actual intervention, noosevelt was of the opinion

"nine-tenths of 1·1i sdom is to be wise in time, and at t.he

right time; and my whole foreign policy was bnsed on the exerci88
of intelligent forethought and of decisive action sufficiently for
1n advance of any likely crisis.to make it improbable that we ~auk
j_ nto

serious trouble. 11 166

";o nqtion (;ould claim rights without acknowledging the duties
that ~o ~ith the rights.

It would be a contemptible thing for a

crcat nation to render itself inpotent in international action,
'':hethcr because of cowardice or sloth, or sheer ina bi li ty or un-

willingness to look intb the

future~ 16 7

This look into the future

included a belief that civilized peoples have definite obligations
tmrnrd the backward tribes or races of the earth.

168

Concern h'o.s

_______________

rr"isr:-d over South American nations who "will be happy • • • if
.... . _ _ ..
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Ibid.,

165-

pp. 511-512.

Ibid., p.

166--

533.

I bid • , p. 508 •

167-

Ibid., p. 502.

168--

:11 11 ' p • 2 04 •

onlY they will be e;ood. 11 169

There will be no peace until the d.v-

ilized nations had expanded in some shape over the barbarous nations .170

Accepting as he did the equality of nations, Roosevelt

emphasized the bel:l.ef that membership in the family of nations
carried with it duties as ·well as rights,. and that nations can enjoy real liberty only if the exercise~of their rights takes the.
consider2.tion of the rig,.1-its into account.

Thus, the rights. of

sovereignty which a state enjoys cannot be separated from the dut··
ies touching the rights of life and property of citizens of foreisn states within their borders.171

Failure to perform these
duties could result in interventio~ for a number of reasons. 1 72
I.
A.
B.

c.

D.

Policy

The right of self-preservation.
To uphold the balance of po1·rer.
To protect neutralized states.
To protect neutralized canals or other works of man
affecting the world in general.

II.

Legality

A.

In pursuance of treaty agreements.

B.

1

C.

.·lhen acts are committed against the principle
of international law.
To prevent or abo,lish another intervention.
III. - Non-political

A.

Protection of citizens.

169
Pringle, p.

170

294.

Beale, p. 32.
171
Jones, pp. 463-464.
172
Hodges, pp. 23-80 passim.

r

54
B.

c.

Denial of Justice
Protection of Missionaries

IV.
A.
B.
C.
D.

•

Conditional

Collection of contract debts
Protection of humanity
Intercession for persecuted Jews, etc.
Right of 2.sylum

A:nericans had previously maintained that they had no

respon~

sibility for the conduct of Latin American states Europeans.
juclc;cd them liable to supervise. 1 73

By refusing to acknowledt;e

its cluty to establish law and decency in South America, the Unite
ste.tes 1-ras according to some critics responsible for the anarchy
e.nd bloodshed that plagued the area•.174

'l'his ~·;as in part due to

,the Horkinss of the :Monroe Doctrine which prohibited Europeans
from extracting Latin American dictators from power.175

nany critics assailed the :t.t,:on.roe Doctrine because

11

Bence

it was never

loc:,ically defensible, for the right to protect any Power when
threatened involves a ce:r:•tain responsibility for the acts of that
Fower, and

vla~3hington

responsibility. 11 176

173

persistently refuses to acknowledge the.t

Thus, the .United States had to either to

'

Sydney Brooks, 11 Euro-oe ·and the New Monroe Doctrine, 11
a;rner Is \"feekly, XLIX (Feb. 25, 1905)' p. 276.

174

An American Business Man, "The Monroe Doctrine A Bar to·
Civilization, 11 North American: Review, 176(April, 1903), p:p.527-52 •
175
Stephen Bousal, "Castro: A Latin .American Type," North
AlliericP.n Review, 176(May, 1903), p. 747.
176
11
American Policy and the l.(onroe Doctrine, 11 Living Arze,
225 (June 2, 1900), p. 587.

.. -·- ,.,. ,..

fight for or e;i ve up the :.:on:coe Doctr1ne.

The belief that no

European should be allo11ed a lod;ynent in the Hemisphere and the
p:cccipitatod by constant debt default would eventually

1ea.d to a cor1frontation.177

The Ea3ue Count decision of Feb. 22, 1904 which sanctioned
military means to collect defaulted loans was not necessary to
convince President Roosevelt of the need for intervention by the
U!litcd States.178

11

If we <ll,.e willing to let Germany or .Ene;land

act as a policeman of the Caribbean, then we can afford not to
interfere when gross '\v..C'ongdoing occurs.

But if we intend to say

" then sooner or later
'Hc::.nds off 1 to the powers of Europe,

i·ie

rnust

J:eep order ourselves. 11 179 ·Europeans had always felt tho.t the
United States could not enjoy the advantages of the r-:orrcoe Doctrine if it do not assume the responsibilities entailed.

Si1:ce

the Americans insisted that disorder should be punished only in a
uay that is satisfactory to tbem, they should be.under an oblie;atlon to pr·event disorder.180

Ei thor the United States had to re-

cosnize the sanctioned right of intervention to collect debts and
the responsi bill ty entaile<:l for intervention by the United Ste.te s

177

Ibid., P•

586.

Bemis, p.

155·

178
179

Roosevelt to Root, June 7, 1904, Mor'ison, IV, pp. 821-

822.

180
Brooks, P•

293.
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itse 1 I•
~

181

The 1cQPdQD:__]2Q._..th.Er:ss~ remarked that "the United States has
.,,cc.:urJ.cd ·paternal
responsib:UJ.ty for the 1Jhole of the l"lestern Her.ni·-

'""""';:,) ~...

~

sphere resenting any outside interference in the affairs of any.

pe.:ct of the te:critory cover·ed by the f.'Ionroe Doctrine.

They must

accept responslbility for the maintenance of civilization within

the compass of their claim. 11 182
sa1~e

r::entiment.

The 1,ondon Times voiced much the

"It has beon askE;:d Hhether the American people

are to become the debt collectors for Europe.

Certainly not, so

lone; as they do not interfere with other people who want to colle"'
"
their o'.-i11 debts for thenselves; .but· it for their o;·m ends they
three.ten a war against a European nation collecting its o·\\·n debts,

by the only means at command among South-Amerlcan republics, than
they must play the policeman of the civilized world in a much less

respectable part. 11 183
Roosevelt was convlnced that the 1-!onroe Doctrine could not be

used by southern Republics to shield them from the consequc.::nces
of their

01·m

torts .184

His passion for law and order was of great

importance ln formulating his policy as regards the Caribbean.185
181
Bemis, pp. 151-152.

182

183
184

135·

Hodges, p.

.
Current Literature, XXXVIII (1905), P•

Jessup,.p.~

185
Hill, P•

108.

496.

197.
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5'7
of law dopended upon a competent judge and a responsible offi.ct::r to carry out the judgment, if neccss2.ry, by force.
-ocr·'et t~1.bly

J:•

er

~

this Has not the case in lnternational affairs.

to depend upon 1 tself for its. orm protection.

E2..ch

Thus,

m1i_tod ;3te:'.tes needed to ac1o'pt ·a. policy the.t ·would enable it

p:.:·otcct ourEwlvcs against the strong and as l'ec;ards our duty
a.lwe.ys to act only justly 1)Ut generously toward the weak. 11 1~6 Due

of an effective or3anization in_ j_nte:cna.tional law,
judiclal we..y of enforcing a right.

When one nation

another or 1·r.con5ed many others, there was no tribunal be-

1.1ron5ed

~

fore 1;hich the u.t·ons(1oer could be brou5ht.
:~1;_pinely

to acquiesce in t_he w1•ong, thereby putting a premiu,11

upon brut:.111 ty and aggression;
American,

Either it was neces-

~ltornative

The other, c.nd more typically

was for the aggrieved nation valiantly to

stand up for its rights.187
1-~onx·oe

The

Doctrine itself lies outside of international law.

Since it was the cardinal principle of American policy, the only
difficulty in maintaining it arose when American power ·was proven
1·:eak and delinquent in foreign affairs .188

Roosevelt went on to

state the logical extension of such a position in his annual sesOf 1904.

186
Roosevelt, Autobiogranhy, P•

384.

187
F:)reign Relations, 1904, P.

188

.
Roosevelt, Autob:tor.i.:raph¥, p.

XL.
506.

Therefore it follows that a self-respecting~ just, and farseeing nation shou1.d on the one hand endeavor by every means
to aid in the develO!)rnent of the v2.:rious moveriients i'rhich ten"
to provide substitutes for war, which tend to render nations
in their acti6ns toward one anDther, and indeed toward their
01m :;;ieoples, more :cesponsi ve to the 5eneral sentir.J.ent of
l:.u.:'11.ane and civilized mankind; and on the other hand that it
should keep prop2,red, ·while scrupulously o..voi.dlng wron5doing
itself to repel any 1·1rong, c::~nd ln exceptione41 caDes to t<?.ke
~;.ction which in a more c.dvanced sti:lr:;e of :i.nte:cnatlonal relations 1..'ould cor;ie under the head of the exercise of the
inter·national police.189
"'.f·he e:ffectl ve power of civilization must be put back of civilizo.tion in collective purpose to secure reasonable j us .....
vice be;;.

tuecn nation and nation. 11 190

Thus, even the weakest nations were

as safe from insult and injury ·at

~~perican

hands as the str·ongest ..

For l:'oth possossed a knoulcd5e that the United States possessed

ooth the will and the a bill ty to guard its elf from w:C"ong or insult c~t the hands of· anyone .191

In Ol'"der to be a e;reat pow·er,

Roosevelt was convinced that the United States must act accordin5
ly.

It was, therefore, his duty to take any action that seened

necessary for the security of the United States,

althou&~ su~h

action could disregard the rig...h.ts of another nation.

After some

time, he felt the United States must insist on honest and decent
relations between all natlons.192

Thi;3 was especially true in

urecis of strategic significance, where the major po"Wer would

in~

189
Foreiri:n Relations, 1904, pp.

XL-XLI.

190
George H. Blakeslee, The Recent Foret,s_n Policy of the UDi..tf'~2.tes (New York: The Abington Press, 1925), p.
25-.
191

-

Roosevelt, Aut9b1ography, P•

192

:,:unro,

Jntervention, p.

65.

538.

59
force, assume real n.(lministrative functions, and irnpcoe
order from above according to its own rather thc:m to indigenous

193
cri +vCl·•i''
. '··· •
In tlie Caribbean the United States was the major power.

Tl:'.e

of e.n :1 nternntional police pol-ier was never to be considered

1n co...se:s of prosperous and stable nations, ree;QrdJ.ess of their

size or strength. 1 94

"This Ng_tion's foreign policy is based· on

theoPy that ri2)1t m.ust be done betlreen nat:tons precisely as
betv;een individual.

We have behaved and are behavlng, to\mrds

nations as in private life an honorable man would behave t9his fcllm·:s. 111 95

~

Due to the lac;k of sufficient internation-

aJ_ controls to che cl>;: 1Jro11...g-doing, Roosevelt felt
e.nd an evil thing for

~

11

it would be bot'

great and free nation to depPi Ve

the pouer to protect its own rights. 11 196

This was not

, the sole consideration in resard to the action he espoused "in
asserting the Monroe Doctrj_ne, in te.king such steps as we have

in regard to Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama • • • we have o.ctour own interest as well as in the interest of hU:.'";lani ty at

193
Blum, P•
194
Ibid., p.

195

131.

132.

James D. Riche.rdson, A Compilation of th?_)ie§_S.0.£.e_s. __ara
~'lners of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of Natione.l Literature,
Inc., 1910), pp.

196
Blum, p.

-e-

7230-7231.

137.

60
ie.rse. 11197

Intertuincd with this concept ,,,as the feeling that

II

we

' of the 5reat republic of the, no:cth, should make all our sister
na.tio:'1s of the A"TiericD.n Contlnent feel that

>1hcnev«~r

they will

per;1it it He desire to show ourselves disintere8todly and effecti

VG.1 J.

_,_,,,
~~r J.
·"'rieY"\d
v~.C.l.
•. u
•

11

198

The c:ctual Roosevelt Corollary was a for:u.ula ar:ci ved at over

of years.

It was the effort of both Roosevelt and· Root.,

a question remains as to

~rho

its prime e..uthor was.

The

first inkling of such a policy is found in the a:nnual message of

1902.
~

.

It is 00.r-nestly to be hoped that all of these countries ·will
do o.s :Jo::r1e o:f them have alr.:;ady a.one, will signal success,
o.nd will invite to their shores co1ur2erce and improve their
:::::.:",terial conditions by recognizing that stability and order
o.re the prerequisites of successful development. No independent no.tion in .Airrorica need have the sligll.test fear of
aggression from the United States. It behooves each one to
:112.intain order within its m·m border and to discharge its
ju:Jt obligations to foreigners. 1'frlen this is done, they can
rest assured that, be they strong or weak, they will have
nothing to dread from outside interference. More e.nd more
the increasing interdependence and complexity of intornation
al political economic relations render it incumbent on all
civilized and.orderly powers to insist on the proper policin,
of the i·rorld.199
.
·

In a speech given to a Cuban group in New York in 1904, he
stated
If a nation shows that it lmows how to act with decency in

19T
Forein:n Relations, 1904, p.
198
Foreign Relations, 1902, p.
199
Ibid., pp. XXI-XXII.
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61
industrial and political matters, if it keeps order and pays

its oblie;ations, then it n0ed fear no interference from the
United States. All vle <J.sk is that they shall govern themselves \·:ell and be prosper·ous and orderly. \'lhen this is the
cn~rn they will find only helpfulness from us.200
In a letter to Root on May 20, 1904 Roosevelt states almost
what is

1~.'!ter

to be enunciated in his annual messe:,ge late_

yeD..r •

.All that we dcsir·e to see all neighboring countries stable,
o:cde:;:•ly and pr·osperous. Any country ·whose people conduct
thu1;t::el vcs well cc:.n count upon our hearty friendliness.
I:f
a nu.tion sho·l'ls that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political matters, if it keeps order nnd psys
its oblie;atlons, then it need fear no interference fl'.'om the
Uni tcd States. Brutal wrongdoing or an impotence which re·sults in a ceneral loosening o~ the ties of civilized societ,y, may fi:ri_ally requ:tre intervention by son.o civilized nation, and in the ·western Hemisphere the Uni tcd States c:ou1.not
ic;nore this duty; but it remains true that our interests,
and those. of oul" southern' neighbors, are in reality identical. All that 1·1e ask_· is that ·they shall govern themselves
well, and be prosperous and or-derly. \·rne:ce this is the case
they will find only helpfulness f1--om us.201
Roosevelt 1 s now famous Corollary to the Monroe Doct1.,ine is
fom:d in his nnnual ncssac;e of 1904.

A quick glance at the L:os.-

sa5e of 1902, the speech to the Cubans, and the letter to Root
show a continuity of thought on this matter which has previously
escaped a great deal of 8.ttention.
All that this country desires is to see the neighboring
countrien stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whos
people conduct themselves \vell can count upon our hearty
friendship. If a nation shows that it lmows how to act with

200

Current Literature, XX.XVIII (1905), pp.

107-108.

201

Roosevelt to Root, May 20, 1904, Mor•ison, IV, p.

___,. .. .,.&11111-•----~••

----------,--~-"..,

l

•'"'

801.

--Eawrre-·ot----·-•--<·

e-...._,.___~--~--r~o

t2
rcasona.ble efficiency and decency in social and poll tical
matters, if it keops ardor and pays its obligations, it need
fear no interference fr•om the United States. Chronic wrongdoinz,, or rm jmpotence i;fhl(;.h rt::Tults i.n a general loost:m:tn5
of the ties of civilized s0ciety, may in America, or elsewhere, ultimately require ~-ntervention by sone civilized nation, <3.nd in the \'!estern Hemisphere the adherence of the
Un:tted :3ta tes to the I•1onroe Doctrine nay force the United
:-3t::o.tcs, ho'\·1ev ..n· reluctantly, in f12,gr·2.nt ct:1scs of such irC'onsaoing 52r inpotcnce, to the exercise of an lnternc.tional poll
p01·:er. c02
.
13oth Roosevelt o.nd Root 1·1ere later to state the America's
to the rfonroe Doct:cinc required the formulation of
At Chautauqua, Roosevelt noted,

11

:~uch

inasmuch as by V1is

doctrine we prevent other nations from j_nte:r•fering on this side of
1·r.::.ter,

1;1e

sl1all ou:L·selves in good _faith try to help t:ho•Je of

sister republics which need such help upward tov:ard peace and

or•clcr. 11"03
c:

Root held the position that if wron3s by a Latin-

Ane:cict:'.n sta.te 1·10Pe unredressed, "we ourselves will see that it is
redressed • • • •

·h1hat ·we -..·rill not permit the great powers of

Europe to do, we will not permit any ft..merican republic to make it
necossL:i.ry for the great Power of Europe to do. 11 204

A cont1·oversy

has arisen over the actual authorship of the Corollary with \·Jilfred Callcott holding Roosovelt resporrsible-- 11 Roosevelt practicGJ....
202

Foreign Relat:tons, 1904, p.
203

XLI ~

Po..rker Thomas !-fonn, 11 : 1 Self Defense• and 'Unselfish Service' in the Caribbean," in 'fhe United States and the C;iribbean
by Chester Lloyd Jones, Henry Kittredge Norton, and Parker Thomas
Moon (Chica30, The University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 162.
204
Van Alstyne, p. 168 •
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1

f rem

the State Department"205---and Dana Munro hinting, at least, oj

I

th::1t Root played an important role in its development.

1 ,,::~o

1

"Root,

c1J_re:cted Latin American -policy in Roosevelt's second admin-

istration had helped to formulate the President's Corollary to
i,>c :-:o:c-u'oe Doctr·ine and believed ln its validlty.

112

06

Dexter

Pcrklns, the dean of Monroe Doctrine scholars, re121ains uncommittc:d.
::~s to its source.

"It is not possible to state with certainty

where the Roosevelt Corollar·y with re3ard to the lv~onroe Doctrin(~
actually originated.

But there· are clear sig._rJ.s that an assistant

:_:ccr•ctary of state had something to do with it. 11207

For my

01·m.

r;:'1't, I am inc1iEod to think that. Roosevelt is prh:s:cily 1"1c;Sl)On'-

I-~3~ble.
l

The continuity of thought and language in the four ex'1:n-

plcs cited are difficult to overlook.
2.

Root most certainly played

role in its formuL3.tion '.rhile the influence of an assistant

secretary of state remains to be demonstrated.
Assuming that intervention was legiti::ne.te and necessary,
?..oosevelt felt morally bound to use .America police power since
European force was forbidden by the Monroe Doctrine.208

The doc-

tri.ne of police power was but another derivative of the concept

01

----··-----·------------·-·205
Calcott, P•
206
207

201.

Hunro, Intttverition, p~

532.

Dexter Perkins, The_Ame_rican Approach to For>eign Poli_g_y
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 196~p. 181.
208
Albert K. \'leinberg, Manifest Destiny, Quadrangle Paperbacks (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1963), p. 431.

1... '"if

e~t :~ stiny~ ~·m·~:. :~~~··:~~c::e,::~~o~ld-~~-:a~~~::~~d-·~~i;
......

11 ts :3pc:cial p:i."erog2.ti ves derived from specicd duties involved
lt::e p0cul1~r mission of a nation with preeminent capacities.

in

20 9

A ctu:o..lly,

~ceri

can intervention was not limited to legal self-

p:cotc cti vo r,1casures.

Since it was fo:cr..nJ.1<:•.ted as "police power"

it offered nny remedy short of complete takeover and less of independence.
~

The use of broad moral criteria sanctioned inter-

ic:n.ticn not only in cases which had a le13al justificci.tion but
A,lso in any case that the United States disapproved of.

Vlhat ho.d

teen co.lled "international police power" 1-ms in reality the use o
·,r:cI'iCc'.n force solely in the V7este~rn Hmnisphere. 210

The use of

}:,id. s pouer was prompted by the dofaul ting of debts and arbi tral
a~~rds

on the

pa~t

of the lesser states to the south.

Force be-

c;'Te a major int_s:cedient in the relations between them and the
Colossus of the :t-:orth. 211

The I-lonroe Doctrine ( orie;inally in-

tended to prevent European intervention :tn Latin America states)
1ms adapted by the United States into a corollary that justified
and even sanctioned American interference in the control.of the
aff<:drs of the Latin-American republics. 2 12
As it stood at its enunciation the Corollary was successful,
209
Jbid., p. 415.
210
Ibid., p. 428.
211
Jessup, p. 493.
212
Dexter Perkins, A History of the 1-'fonroe Doctrine (Boston:
Little, Bro\·m & Co., 1955), p. 230.

cnsendered no new hostility, and was more or less accepted at
ho:::e and a broe.d. 213

11

The United States \ms bound sooner or latE!r

Ito accept the exercise of police power as a Corollary of the Xon1
roe Doctrine. ri 21 + It was natural for the United States to initi. ~te
t

such m policy.

Thi• resulted in part from the actions of

nur:erous i:c:eec;pon;:>i ble mj_li tary dictators who had used the United.

I

.stmt:: to exempt them from action European powers wished to exeh

1, on

t,icon:i

to make them co:nply with their obli3ations. 215

?1--ior to

that time, the United States had been in the unenviable position
. of c~1oosin3 betueen repeated interventions on the part of Euro-.

Ii~er'.n

M:o~oe

po-;-:ers in vtolation of the

Doctrine and assuming re-

.:;ponslbility for the actions of the Latin Anerican states, whicJ'l

th.ey we1·e un\·1tllin5 to do. 216
'· :':...::::-:noillcclsement of the

In effect, the new policy was an

Au~.;ric:.:,,n

responsibility to European 5overn-·

n:cnts for the conduct of certain Caribbean states in respect to
European nationals.217
Prior to Roosovel t' s administration the ?fonroe Doctrine \'ms

regarC.ed by the Latin-American states as solely a protective pol-

213

Perkins,. ~ionroe Doctrine. 1867-l-2.Q1, p.

455.

214

Horton, P•
215
Ibid., p.

216
217

91.

89.

Perkins, lfonroe Doctrine 1867-1907, p. 363.
-----------Rippy, Caribbean Dane:er Zone, p. 36.

r
C6

1

II c.-n:·onco..n

~

intm:·fcrcnce with the do"ncstic policies of these states ~i,

1;0 r~sulate

the conduct of states in regard to Europeans and them-

1selves, was

the price responsibility of its Corollary.

The Car-

i ')bc8.n countries 'ilere warned to act decently in their foreign

. r~l~tionships, pay their debts, and maintain order.

Their ovm

~,ore

1

"'"'urity ilnd independence hung in the balance as weil as, and

1

iD:)ortantly for Washington, the security of the United States. 219
The Corollar·y prompted many criticisms Loth ccntew.porary
e,:,1d

scholarly.

11

?4!'.

Rooscvel t in laboring under the delusion

t:12.t this country has a di vine mission to keep order abroad, whlle
it can not keep order at home; that

i~

is obligated to compel for-·

e,i;_:;n states to pay their debts, altho it can not compel the

ostic States to pay theirs.

do~-

The Roosevelt doctrine is the Uonroe

Doctrine turned inside out and E\tood on its head." 220

The Cor-

ollary wo.s prompted by fear, just:i.fied or not, of possible European takeover due to chronic disorder in the Caribbean.

Such a

takeover raised the specter of permanent European occupation of
some strategic spot in the Caribbean.221

Revolutions and bad

financial p1"'actices were to be abolished and general economic nnd
nocial were to be inproved, so as to eliminate the causes of in218
Latane, The U.S. and Latin America, p.

326.

219

Rippy, Caribbean Danr:er Zone, p.
220

451.

"How the Message. Is Regarded, 11 Literary Digest, XXIX (I:ec
17, 1904), p. 830.
221
Perkins, The_ United States and the Ca:ribben.n, p. 134.

stability in

~ose statcs.222

Although it was not probably that

;c):ropcan 2:C "-._-:_:r·nments irould deliberately set out to conquer a
cnrib1:can state such instability could offer the pretext for an
intervention which could jeopardize a country's lndependence.223
Sose scholars, however, hold that Roosevelt and Hay did not
".
1yc;_!.r10.l

s h t'.c.e ~onroe

Doctrine, the Americans did.

nothing else was necessary. 22 4

In their opinio9

EJJhu Root in an article :tn'Inqg_:::

r1:;_IlQ.?Pt reco5nlz0d the.t "the Cox·o11ary is clear.

If we will not

allow transatlantic nations to become masters of recalcitrant
A ;;,eri C['.n :riJ1tions we

r:ust collect the debts

. i>:d.<1; '.-:e

foai.'Y we 11mst
~'Uc}t

must see to it that their obliga tlons are
ourseJ~ves;

whore for•ce is ncces-

use it; we must control, if control is necessary; we

he the polj_conian, we uust wield the 'big stick'; t1:ere is no

. other elternative. 1122 5

Thus, the Roosev~lt Corollary altered the

Ifon:roe Doctrine from a policy denying the right of European inter
vention in the Americans to one sanctioning the process when con-

r.ucted by the United States.226

Europeans-"'.'"far from being ad-

verse to the new interpretation were actually quite disposed to
it.

11

The Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine which Mr.

---·------·--·--·--------------~-----

222

:1-iunro, .Intervention, p.
223

224

I.hJd., p.

531.

5.

Rippy, CaTibbean Danger Zone, P•

35.

225
11

Elihu Root on the Monroe Doctrine," p.

226
Mowry, p.

159.

1514.

Roosevelt

C8
just devised, must if adopted as a standing
rule of Arr;erican po1icy' enormously lighten Europe Is difficul-

I\i:copenns cci1:3idered the policy to reflect a chan5e of
:ie:irt in the United States, for she became the policeman rather

thGn the

i.
jl_

2~cttor

~·c-n ctot~n

:'!lf'3 .l

..1-

ct

>...."J

L..._

•'

t.,:,..:;. e

of the so-called criminal activity of the South

228

Reaction to the new

policy~

.r.ccorcl with Hoosov2lt 1 s lJOsition.

however, was not completely in
11

It is not the duty of the·u-

ni t2d States to police Latin AL1e1•ica, and the sooner we get that
idea spread broadcast not only in South America, but also in North

,1~;:12rica, the better it be for our i:iternat:lonal repute. 1122 9

Many

l•t home and mbroad felt that the new interpretation rather than

I

being a pl'otcction .'.lf:;ainst "the burden of militarism" invited it.

1An effective Doctrine depended on the American preparation for a

lpossl.ble confrontation with one or more of the strongest powers of
:Europe. 230

The London Outl_gok questioned the new policy and 1 ts

1,extent. 11 If the Americans ~nswer, as we suspect they will, that
1the :.Conroe Doctrine includes the whole of both the Americans and

l

their adjacent islands, and that if they deny that it carries with
·-- ----- · - -

-- ---

227

Brooks, p.

---------.---

293.

228

J..pid.
229
Charles H. Sherill, "Moµroe Doctrine: South American ViewjPoint, 11 in Latin America, ed. by George H. Blakeslee (Kew York:
G.E. Stechert & Co., 1924), p. 125.
230
Brooks, p. 276.

(9
it any responsibilities, we can only hope, by way of reply, that
theY uncerstar:rl what th~y are about. 112 31

The .Eta~_fu.:r.-_t5?_r ZeituQD

noted that the Corollary marked a significant depa:cture from pre-

vious Araerican policy.
rcn-;1ect the

:r.~onroe

"Roosevelt says:

We require forei3ners to

Doctr:tne throu£5.hout the whole of .America.

Therefore, it is only just that He, aid the fore:tgner in obtaining
his rights when those rights are disregarded in k::er:tca.

mc<.ns that just now the

1~onroe

This

Doctrine is not conccJ.-lcd in this

- it • 11232
sp 1 .C

Eoosevelt went to great length to demonstrate to the Latin
~

A:no~ic:c_:.ns

that they had nothlng to fear from the United States.

"·It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or
entertained any p:rojects as re3ards the other nation of the ~'lestern :Iernisphere save such as one
for their welfare. 11 233
...

"The

United States have enough to care for without appropriating tropical territory. 11 234

In his annual message for the next year,

Roosevelt again disclaimed any sinister designs on Latin American
territory.

11

In the first place we must as a nation make it evi-

dont that we do not intend to treat it an any shape or way as an'

-·-----------··-- 231

"Can the United States Save South America From Europe,"
636. .

Lit£ra_cr_J2.~st, XXX (April 29, 1905), p.

232

"President Roosevelt, Santo Domingo, and the Senate,
era:r.-_y__pigest, XXX (April 8, 1905), P• 515.

233

234

xxrx

11

.

Foreign Relations,· 1904, P•

XLI.

·

"President Roosevelt's Table Talk," Review of Reviews,
(1904), p. 364.

Lit

on our part
at the expense of the r,~pube:{cuse for acgrandizcrnent
o
_
~
In no uncertr-dn terms, Roosevelt stated

lies to the south. 11 235

''It r::w;t be u..ndcx·stood.that under no eireUJ'J.~1t2..nces will the Unite
sto.tes use the r~~o:n.roe Doctrine as a cloak for terri torfal aggres1

,........

SJ..C1.L.•

'Y'6
'--:J

II

Althou5h America's relations w'ith Latin America have been
charactcr:lzcd by a high degree of altruism, the Latin Americans
h::tvc a

1:11.J.ch

o-1._ffercnt view.

In spite of the fact that United

states atte1ipted to be just and upri13li.t and for the benefit of

her neie;hbors to the South, its actions have been suspect.
1-F:J.S

This

due to a failure to ta.ke into account the view point of the

·Latln Americans.

No consideration was given to whether our ac-

tions plcc:. sed him or whether our suggestions were formulated in
o.ccordonce w:i.th his views.237 ·our no-transfer principle and the

Cor·o1lary itself seemed to cause increased disquiet in the Southe:cn continent.238

This was in part due to the advantages to alie

investors rendered greater by the application of the Corollary to
defaulting debts.

The people and their leaders prefered that for

ei<:>ners be left to shift for themselves.239

They further resente

--------235

Foreign Relations, 1905, p.

236

.
):bid., p.

237

XXXIII.

xxxrv.

Sherrill, Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine, pp. 53-54. ·

238

C.H. Haring,

11

South .America and our Policy in the Carib-

bean, 11 Annals, CXXXII (1927), P•
239

147.

Rippy, Caribbean Dana:.er Zone, p.

227.

71
o. t te;.1pts to IJana3e their n.ffairs in possible cases of failure o'c
violc.tine; the sovereignty of independent sto..tes and the senerally
21 0
<.cccpted principle of nonintervention. +
This rc~j(-:::nt::1ent and

suspicion was in part due to the Monroe Doetl"1ne itself.
-if

''

,;

~·

It had

been so ei,fecti ve at el~i.Dlnat:ln3 E~1JroJ;c:an intel."V8ntion that Latln
A~ericans no longer feared the

Europe.

military and expansionist powers o

Tb.e United States was the natural heir of a:ny suspicion

wh1ch remained in the Southern.continent. 2 4-1

Many of the leaders

of these states interpreted the 1·:on:c·oe Doctrine implication of

"A-.::1e1'ica_ r'or ftj_nerico..ns" as denonstratin3 the United States in..

tcntlon to t~ke possession of thoir t~rritory.

211.2

-

240

Blakeslee, PP• 109-110.
241
Ibid., p. 148.
242

An American Businessman, P•

526.
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PA~T II
THE

SANTO DOMINGAN RECEIVERSHIP: BIG BRO'l'H;..:R?

The first practical application of Roosevelt's policies was
assumption of the Santo Domingo Receivership in 1905,

•

Through

its history the Caribbean i~land republic had deuonstrated
that "chronic wrongdoing and impotence" that were apt to initiate
the 1.Jse of "police power to protect civilization and its princi-·
ples."

'rhe years of Santo Domingan •rule had pointed up its great

difficulty in establishing an effective democracy without resort
i ..

to dictatorship,

Whe:n the occasion arose for the overthrow of

these dictators bloody revolutions frequently broke out,
From the earliest moment of its independence the island was
racked by internal disorder and conflict,

President Baez in 1869

attempted to have the United States in tm person of President
Grant annex the Republic to the United States.

Such action was

defeated by the United States Senate and the Republic was left to
fend for itself.

The period from 1874 to 1882 was another era of

interparty conflict:

1882 marked the beginning of the rule of

Ulises Heureaux who ruled the island with an iron hand until 1899
when he fell to a revolutionary's hand,

This rule was marked by

an ever increasing system of financial irresponsibility.

It was

during his reign that the San Domingo Improvement Company began

_______________fu.1oe2-+------------·~"'- __

g _ _ _. .

.r:~s

·•

-~--·-·~-·~-.,,~.,··"'·~

•., _______ -~ ··"·" ····-

····-"••····--.

-~.-,.~ .... ,...,......~~--.,--~---~-~-~·-----··-~-"-"~~-- ". -=,~--·

-

···@1

ever increasing influence on the affairs of the island in

1895. 1

. I

By 1899 the intensified financial difficulties and growing

Af'.lerican interest due to the Improvement Co. proBpted Heureaux to
pr·oro:::;e a secret treaty with the United States.

The substance of

its intent was the assurnpt1on of an American contractual protec-'
torate over the Dominican Republic, 2
The ascension of the Jemenez

govern.~ent

following a brief

p~riod

of political reanuvering did not ease the desperate financial condition of the country.

In the face of possible French interven-

tion for defaulted loans Hay sent the following message to Powell
'
rec:;,;Tding American claims, especia:t'ly
the Improvc::raent Co.' s as of

Fehruary 15, 1900.
~~ing to the difficult situation which confronts the
Dominican Government it is not to be pressed for
immediate payment of American claims, although the
American Gover:nment is necessarily insistent t~t all
rights of American citizens be fully protected,

The Improvement Company itself was the subject of much of the
bla.rne and disgust of the people.

Rumors were circulated that it

was responsible for undermining the credit of the government by
mqking unfavorable appraisals of the Jimenez administration,

The

entire controversey was laid at its feet because the agreement

-·-·-·-------------------..--------------------1
1

Sumner Welles,
18h4-_1924 (N'ew York:

Vineyards The Dominican Republic
Payson and Clark, Ltd., 1928), p. 508.

Nabo~h's

2

Ibid,, p. 533.

3
-..--~-.-.,._..

Ibid., p. 558.
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I

entered into by Heurc:,_nx provided for company pnyment of

4

cJ:lounted to the French claims. ·

The Company had now become so en-

trenc.hed that it was next to :tmpossible to re:rnove it, especially
since the government was unable to repay the company's original
investment,5

i

As a result, a new contract was negotiated providing

for the relief of the GovermJ.ent' s financial needs, its settlement

of the nation's public indebtedness, and ellrnimation of defaulted

.loan interest.

To this end, the contrast of Xarch 20, 1900 pro-

vided that customs revenues up ·to

$2, 000, 000

except the export

duties set-aside for conversion of the paper money issued by the

.,

Ya.tional Bank be used for such liquidation,

6

Such an agreement

later proved unsuccessffil and on January 10, 1901 the Improvement
Co;'"lpany was at once excluded from further participation in the '
collection of the public revenues,?
The ouster of Jimenez and the

assu~ption

.

by General Vasquez

in Xay, 1902 marked any shift in the dealings with the Improvement
CoYDpany.

The company's claims were recognized to the amount of

.$4,500,000, $2,000,000 of which resulted from the values of the·
national bonds held by the Company.

$1,500,000 in claims resulted

from its interest in the railroad from Puerto Plata to Santiago

4
J_bid., p. 560.

5

Ibid,

6
.IJ21.d.

7

Ibid !.l-P ·- .i~)_:,_,~~-~,,~-=~-;·-·----------~-----.1

nnd

:;n, 000, 000 from the shares of the bankrupt National Bank and

other cl3ims and accounts of the Company.

This brief survey

s•"Tves to demonstrate both the incompetence of the Santo Domingan

£Sl)V8L'n~ncnt
The

and the complexity of its financial problems. 8

outlii~e

of Do;11Lngan financi es given above serves to i 1-

iust:cate a commonplace occurence in that country and many of its
La.tin American :neighbors.
a~ea

The history of public debts in this

shows a surprisingly long list of failures of these govern-

, 1 :~nts

to meet their financial pledge.

~hese

failures were demon-

strated in many fashions ranging from payment of obligations in
debJ.scd or flat money to open repud'iati on of loans contracted wit'

citj_zens and foreigne:rs.9
lnte£~~~~i_on_~]:_~

Amdreades in Las controles finencitious

deinonstrates that these young states have practi-

ced nearly all the fOl!llS of bankruptcy in the history of finan- .

ces.

10
'rhe governrn.ent of President Woss y Gil ·who succeeded Vasquez

rnn into further financial difficulty.

The customs revenues whic

were the major source of national wealth were constantly dimin)She:i

8
Ibid., p. 586. For a more complete treatment of the history
of Santo Domingo see Summer Welles' Naboth's Vin~_lard.

9
Chester Lloyd Jones, Caribbean Backgrounds and Prospects
D. Appleton & Co., 1931), pp". 237-2'.fB .-

0\ew York 1

10
M. de J. Tromcoso de la Coucha, La Genesis de la Convencion
Dominico-Arr,eJ±gn (Santiago1 Editorial El Diario, 1946), p. 59.
(hereinafter referred to as Tromcoso, p.)

-~ ... ~,.,.-~"""'--·----~---""~---·---------------------------

~·~xcriptions granted to merchants loaned money to the Government

v:ere the prime cause of this loss of income,

Furthermore, the

export tax or CffaO had been mortgaged to the Italian Government,
specific revenues alloted foreign creditors as security had fre~
quently been repledged to others,

The defaulted interest of the

Belgian and French bondholders ~lone amounted to more than $600,

ooo.

The Santo Domingo Improvement Company's claim had alr~ady

been recognized as $4,500,000, in addition other /unerican cl;::i.ims
totnlled $1,000,000,

The debt was growing daily and the Govern-

mcnt had no credit with which to stem the tide,

As if to add more

fuel to an already brightly burning•blaze, the revolution of Jimenez from Oct, 24 to Nov. 24, 190J increased the debt by
$700,000. 11
The continuing unsettled political state resulted in the ascension of Carlos F, Morales to :power with American assistance,
'

According to Captain Dillingham, "the placing of .Morales in San
was my doing.

1112

Morales while admiring American in-

stitutions and desiring its political friendship was strongly opto any policy that would render his land a political depenof the United States, either in the form of annexation or a
protectorate,

He was firmly convinced of the ability of the Dom-

to administer their own affairs, if his gover11ment were

-----------------------·---·------

11
Welles, pp, 604-606.
12
,J. Fred Rippy,

"Initiation of the Customs Receivership in
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~Jn in: CUIJ4 ~epubli
c' .. m spsntc Ameri
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??
·given time to institute the ne~essary reforms and to straighten
1
the complicated financial situation it was in. 3
xorales, however, was in difficulty due to an qccident of
was a mulatto.

His great fear was that the United States

deal with him but confer its affection on a 1·1hi te nan.
Although he previously felt that the mulattoes were the best of

people, because they possessed the best qualities of both white
·.and black and would attempt to prove it so in his

govern~ent. 14

feeling, however, was not shared at home or throughout the
One visitor to Santo Domingo noted that the antipathy of
for white "is res·ponsi ble for J/4 of the offenses against
~ 11.L::ci

cans and Europeans, ignorance of the duty of a government

professedly civilized being the remainder.

111

5

The large public debt was partly funded, partly floating, of
a nominal value in excess of its real value, bearing a high rate

of interest, in default both as' to interest payments and arnortiza-

tion provisions.

The origin and growth of the debt was due large-

ly to:

A.

Periodic accumulations of floating debt owing toz

1.

13

Political instability, requiring large outlays

Sigmund Krausz t "The Si tua ti on in Santo Domingo," _9utlook,

78 (Sept. 17, 1904), p. 192.
14
Troncoso, p.

15

26.

William Throp, "Santo Domingo, the 'Isle of Unrest'," Inde£enient, LVI (~arch 3, 1904), p. 468.

2.

3.
B.

for soldiery, for bribery of potential revolu~
tionists, and for the suppression of actual rE·:'volutions.
Corruption of officials.
"Asignaci ones" or pens ions to mollify enemies
and to reward friends of the existing regime.

Usurious interest
1.
2.

c~mputations,

on account of:

"Bonus" in principal.
Extravagant interest rates.

c.

Interest default and compounding accumulations.

D.

Recognition and liquidation of excessive or illegal
claims as a condition of further advances. 6

$40,269,404J8.

T:1e actuc'1.l debts fell into five categories and total
/

Bonded debt
Liquidated debt
Floa.t:l.ng debt
Declared claims
Undeclared claims
Total indebtedn2ss

$17,670,312.25
9,595,530.40
1,553,507.79
7,450,053.89
__1!, 000 r 000. 00
$40,269,404.J'B"
Bonded Debt

/unount

Date

1869

757,700
770,000
900,000
2,035,000

1888
1890
1893

1,250,000
1,250,000
1,750,000
2,736,750
1,500,000

1893

1894

1895
1897

Interest

6

6
6

4

4
4

4

2 3/4

4

%

Term Years

25
30
56
66

Name
Hartmont loan
Westendorp loan
Railway loan
4% consolidated gold
bonds
4% gold debentures
French-American
Reclaimation consels
Obligations
Dominican unified
debt

66
66
66
102
83

--16
Otto Schoenrick, Santo Domin~o:
A Country With a Future,
(New Yorks The MacMillan Co., 1918 , p. 352.

Liquidated Debt

san Domingo Improvenent Co.
consolidated internal debt
Internal d2bt held by the Vicini heirs
old Foreign debts
Sola claim
Vicini heirs
Italian protocal
sp 3 nish-German protocal
B. P.ancalari
J. B. Vicini Burgos
Ros claim
THO cacao contracts
B::i_ncalari Lrunple & Co.
28 minor contracts

$4,403,532,71
1,737,151.35
l,598,876,04J65,183,20
356' 314. 20
242,716.32
186,750.36
100,0J4.0J
175,000.00
55,500.00
39,967.78
68,296.16
16,733.19

. - __?:..~_2_, l+ 7-5..!4,=2

$9, 595, SJ0.<+0 ·

Floating Debt
Registered doferred debt
Registered floating debt
Privileged revoluationary debt
·certificates of co~ptroller's office
Certificates of treasury offices
Open unsecured accounts

$

587,710.24
140. 8 50. 27
79,812.12
633,124.60
Jl,771.07
<l'- ______8 0 ,.?_3 9. 49
.;;il,553,507._79

Declared Claims
Internal revolutionary claims
II
II
American
II
Spanish
II
French
"II
II
Italian
II
German
"II
British
"II
II
Cuban
Font c1aim
Heureaux estate claim
National bank notes
Luberes contract
West India Public Works Co. claim
Vincini heirs claim
II

$

8 8 5 • 2 58 • l 0

71,000.00
40,000,00
190,000.00
40,000.00
10,000.00
5,000.00
35,000.00
186,643.00
3,100,000.00
1,574,647.00
250,000.00
250,000.06
8~0_5.00

$?,1rso, 053-:139

Undeclared Claims
American claims
British claims
Ita1ian claims

$1,000.000.00
50,000.00
200,000.00

........ •' . . . ,. , . '""'""" .·~··-. ";ib
I
I

200,

sp:;tni sh and Gt::c1~an clEl ims
other foreign c.airns
oorninican claims

/

ooo.Vo

50, 000. 00.

. 2..L~_Q_o,000.00 17
$'4,000.000.00

The debts just listed were the results primarily of 1) the
accumula.t:ton of current obligations in consequence of revolutionary disturbances and civil disorder; 2) the extravagant
terms upon which such temporary.loans have origlnally been obtai
and have s1J.bsequently funded;

3)

the chronic default in the ser-

vice of the debt funded and flo~ting, and the consequent rapid inprincipal.

18

The problem of the debt was compounded by

' Domln~an instability and possible f9reign intervention to enforce
· their claims.

The fact that Wass Y Gil sought G.nd :cecei ved refuge

German warship

demonstrat~d

her desire to neutralize the wa-

and some of the parts of Santo Domingo in the event of war.
action proved provocative to the United States for it viola~
ted the Monroe Doctrine. 1 9
America had established a basis for its intervention in Santo
Domingo by the Roosevelt Corollary.

America's desire to safeguard

its security and realize its wishes had been demonstrated in the
Parhma incident.

The Krenz Zei t~mei ominously pointed out that "the

-----·----17
18

Ibid., pp.

Eassim.

Jacob H. Hollander, "The Financial Difficulties of San DoAnnals, XXX (1907), P• 93.

19
21.cl!'~st,

353-365,

"Peril to the Monroe Doctrine in Santo Domingo," Literary
xxvrrr (January 2, 1904), p. 24.

L._,_~----~------~

l

!subject of the Powers~ especially of Germany, have claims to make
L:;,,od in Santo Domingo. 1120
the

gro~ing

Domingo."

I

The Journ21

f:.<?~

Debats also reflectec

European bellicosity regarding their claims in Santo
Even in Washington they are noting that European Po;.,rers

ore not disposed, out of consideration for the Pan-American hegc-

Lr;ony to which the United States pretends, to allow their interests
to be compromised by

~n

American state. 1121

This growing European animosity towards Santo Domingo caused

various reactions in the United;. States.

1
1 American

1

commenting on the

1 ~;:1-·;he -:rusier }";:;;.~~.C:.£•

murd~r

of J.

The Philadelphia

c.

~_?rth

Johnson, the engineer

noted, "If those rebels had killed

Ject of some European Power," the incident would be

rn~.::.de

a

sub-

the "ex-

cuse for assembling of an unwelcome fleet in ':!est Indlan waters,"
1·i'

·and we in the absence of ability to guarantee retribution, nor
prevent recurrence of the outrage, could not justly object.
~2ny

1122

felt that the United States was under moral obligations to

<:i.ssist the Santo Do!ningan people or else abandon the Monroe Doctrine and let them seek assistance from any power that was Willing
20
Ibid.
21
"President Roosevelt's Fear of France," Literary Digest,
XXVIII (January 16, 1904), p. 89.
22
"American Interference in Santo Domingo," Literary
Digest, XXVIII (February 20, 1904), p. 249.

1

l

Ito

IDs,

n~su~e

the responsibility o f ass i

i i ng

s~.

1-1,,

~c1em.

-2 3

Scholars, such

John Bassett Moore, were opposed to all attempts to secure

, Ip;:,y::ient

on <iefnul ted 1o:?. ns.

'::nen citizens of a country go abroad and engage in business,
they must be held to assume all the risks of disorder and
injury in the country to which they go, and can look to the
local authorities only; no matter how inefficient or malevoJ1:::nt they may be, for protection; but it suffic~s to say that
no respectable government acts on such theory.2'-+'
'~l-wodore
t;:_:_ bL3

Roosevelt as the leader of a self--acclaimed respec-

,sovernoent and the fo::c1,2ula tor of a poll cy -;~hl ch sanctioned

intervention could not overlook the developments to the South.

In

a letter to his son Kermit he related the events taking place.
·•
S:cJ..n Domingo is drifting into chao-s for after a hnnclred years
of freedom it shows itself utterly inco•npetent for govern·~ental work.
Most reluctantly I have been obliged to take
the initial step of interference there. I hope it will he
a good while before I will have to go further.
But sooner
or later it seems to me inevitable that the United States
should assume an attitude 'or protection and regulation in
regard to all these little states in the neighborhood of
the Caribbean.
I hope it will be defe~r ed as long as
possible but I think it is inevitable. 5
In a later letter to his friend J. B. Bishop the inevitable
has happened and Roosevelt is caught on the horns of a dilemma.
I have been hoping and praying for these months that the
Santo Domingans would behave so that I would not have to
act in any way. I want to do nothing but what a police~an has to do in Santo Domingo.
As for annexing the island,

23

Edwin Maxey, "The Future of Santo Domingo," Ar~, XXXI
(1904), p. 480.

24
Munro, Intervention, p.

25

Bemis, p.

155.

13.

I h8.Ve about the same desire to 2.rmex it as a gorged boa
constrict or might have to s1:1allow a porcupine wrong-endto. Is that strong enough.
I have asked some of our
people to go there because, after having refused for these
three months to do anything, the attitude of the Santo
Do'Tlin2;ans has become one of half chaotic war to':rards us.
If I possibly can I want to do as little as possible.
Their government has been bedeviling us to establish some
kind of protector2te over the islands, and take charge of
their fi~ances • . we have been answering them ~h~t we could
not possibly [:50 into the subject now at all. 2
Some of the Santo Domingan officials who were bedeviling
Roosevelt >·re re aware that they were in great d'.ln2;er.

The European

bondholders, Belgian, French, German, Italian, and Spanish not fo
mention English, since their interests were in the hands of the
United States Governr1ent would
?he

t~enty

promises.

get~tired

of waiting for payment.

five million dollars due could not be paid by mere
The threat of a possible c6mbination of these Powers to

force the Do;ninican Republic to pay which require the United S-.ates
to enfurce the Monroe Doctrine.

If the United States refused to

terfere to assist the Dominicans or resist a possible European intervention, a violation of the Monroe Doctrine would result which
could impair the security of the United States.

27

The Dominicans

felt that "in the proposed treaty with the United States lies the
only hope for peace and prosperity in Santo Domingo.

A rejection

of the treaty would result in international complications for the

26
Bishop, p.

27

431.

General Juan Francisco Sanchez, "The Future of Santo DoJ, 1904), p. 477.

l'lingo," Indep0r:dent, LVI (March

"'~•oo'·"~-,,.o·,.,,.,.,,...,,.
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. I

..
..28
"United St a \,es•
A:neri can observers ·..:ere well aware of these complications,.
wrote to General Rodriquez,
snd

~n

opponent of Morales

1n~o-German sympathizer, "the revolution must close and that
he more than anyone else must think for a

~oment

that Ger-

any other foreign power could be situated in any portion

of the Dominican territory;
.a

i:Jo;r:·.~nt s:::i.nction it. 112 9

that the United States would not for

Rear Admiral Wise in appraising the sit-

. ·ua.tion car::e to the conclusion that "eventually the United States
have to assume grave responsibility on the island in order to
out the solution of a stable g6vernment."JO
On June 19, 1904 Morales succeeded in postporting the Belgian
French claims to revenue the customs houses at Santo Domingo
~acoris.

The Italians were granted 1/10 of all customs reve-

nues of the Republic and specific hypothecation of the Samane cusAn arbital commission for the claims of the Improvement
consisting of

J~dge

Co.

George Gray of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Joh

and Don Manuel de Jesus Galvan granted a decision of
a $1},500,000 claim to be paid at

4%

per annum.by monthly install-

rnents beginning September, 1904 from customs revenues and port

of all the ports of the northern coast of the Republic.

28
~Hnthrop Packard, "New Conditions in Santo Domingo,"
Outlook, 80 (May 13, 1905), p. 124.

29
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Rippy, "Initiation," p. 4J2.
Ibid. , p. 426.

dJes

Ii

Judge Abbott, the Financial Agent of the United States, was

!:3.ut'nori zed,

in the event of the failure of the Government to make

I

: u~e p<1ynents due each month, to take possession of the customs
I

I 1-:o1)ses

at PUt?rto Plata and

I

there.

lifor

I

u~1dertake

the collection of all revenues

In the event that such sums should still prove insufficient

pqyment of the amounts due the award, he was to undertake the

collection of all customs duties in the other northern parts of

!

Puer~o
Republic forfeit~d

the 2epubli c with the same righ,ts and privileges 9_s :in

IPlata.Jl

When the inevitable happened and the

its obligations Abbott conducted himself according to the provis~cons

of the agreement.

1
i ~~L-i.nce,

Ithe

The other "foreign bondholders namely

Belgi 1Jtn, Italy and Gennany protested the infringement oq

provisions for their pa;y-ment.

The Italians sent their minis-

1ter Orestes Savini to investigate the developments,

lpre~idency

During the

of Noss Y Gil he had paid a similar visit.and with the

ass1stance of the crusier Giovanni Banson had concluded an agree-

1
, r~:·::;ilt }{nown as the Italian Protocol,
regulation of

pa~nents

Its provisions v:orked out the

of debts contracted by the Republic and

1 those Italians who had claims during the Hcureaux reign. The Giof
i v::inni Bans~<2.!! remained in the Caribbean while Bartolome Bancalari,

1~:-old

friend of Heaureaux, was placed in Sanchez and Samana to

1rcgulate the shipping houses for the Italians and to collect the

l·d~inistrator's debt by regulating the
IThe French government threatened to do
Jl
Welles, pp.

614-615.

customs houses.of the port
the same thing at the capi-

!

to nn:· . s~n:-~=~·,::~:···~~ ;·~·-:·~~: r:-:~··· t~~-:~:~~~~~:··~:·::a:
l

'its d<'::n:Ands.

The German crusier,

.Y..t~-1'2.<::~ta,

was also in Caribbe2n

f ,,s it ho.d been two years previously i·1hen it participated in the

I~o::-1l:i8.rdn;ent
'

~;.:1ny

'~cbts
s.r:i;ne

of Mnracai bo.

This occured when England, Italy, Ger-

<:',nd Fi· an cc a ttc=mpted to use force to col le ct their defaulted
from Venezuela.3 2

The stage was set for a replay of the

situation in Santo Domingo unless the United States int.;er-

vr;ncd to head off such a disaster.

To avoid the possible development of what would in effect be
an j_ndefinite occupation of Ame:r;-i can territory by non-American poJ.:it~_cal interests,

the United States~ inqul:ced as to the d isposi ti on

, of the DonJnigan goverr1:nent to accept Ar;ierl can coopC;rati on. J 3 Inf . .
•8Ct1on at this stage of developments, Roosevelt realized would re-

'S'.J.lt in a violation of the l'f;onroe Doctrine by what could amount to
l;e a

permanent occupation and control of the Republic by an Euro-

. r:ean poKer or a combination of European powers.3 4

American action

::c.s complicated by agc;ressi ve intent and action of Germany most

notably of all of the powers i~volved.
October

I' CJU'.1.inted

Minister Powell noted on

J, 1904, "I find that the German Goverrnnent is fully acwith all my movements. 1135

The obstacles confronting

32
Troncoso, pp. 30-Jl.
33
Jones, Caribbean Backgrounds and Prospects, p. 258.

J4

Latane, American Foreign Policy, p. 546.

35
Rippy, "Initiation," p. 4Jl.

.,

i t ,.

I;-,·

,:J.·j i::;;:rn

nc

.1904.

t t>ie

1~cople

ti on prompted Cn.ptain Dillingham to report on Dece;1ber

"'.1e must govern the country as well as its finances,
of S::into Domingo can learn to gove:cn themselves." 3

'r:i.n r..tttcmpt to s.:cronge such an Ai"nerican
'~·::i:·ote to C:::-~,..·son on Dec en ber 28, 1904.

6

cont1'ol of the island Hay

You will sound the President of Santo Domingo, discreetly
but earnestly and in perfect friendly spirit, touching
the disquieting situation which is developing owing to.the
pressures of other Governrr.ents having arbi tral PJ.Kards in
their favor nnd '•~Lo :ceg<=ird our award as conflicting with
their rights.
ALce<J.dy one J'.:uropean GovernJnent strongly
intimates that it may resort to occupation of some Domini can customs parts to secure its own payment. There
appears to be a concert among them. You will ascertain
h'"hether the Government of Santo Domingo, would be dispo~>ed to 1·equest the United States to take cf121.rge of the
collect1on of duties and effect an equitable distribution
of the assi~ned quotas among the Dominican Gover~ments
and the several claimants. We have ground to thin~ that
such an arrsngement would satisfy the other powers,
b2sides serving as a practical guarantee of the peace of
Santo Do:rrdn;:;o, from externfll influence or internal disturbances .Jr
The agreement settled on was amenable to both Presidents in-

:valved as they urged their respective Congresses to take action.
President JV:orales told his Congress on February

27,

1905, "The

,protocol is the result of necessity and means. the reaching of an
l3greement which mqy place the cbuntry in a position to solve the
problem of its debt.
~m

I

confident that your

In submitting it to your high appropation, I
patrioti~m

• • • will gather inspiration

from the reality of existing circumstances.

37

Ibid., pp.

436-437.

The only kind of

pa-

l

'
'trtotism
which is useful is that which shows results in works of

I

practical utility."38

His counterpart in the United States,

Roosevelt, urged his Congress to action far but for a different !
rec.son.

"Santo Domingo grievously needs the aid of a powerful &.nd

lf£ic~dly nation.

I v:i 111 ng,

to bes tow.

lof~frle~~hl~
, il:•;nt

This aid we are able, and I trust that we are
She has asxed for this aid, a.nd the expressicn

repeatedly

sanctioned~

the people and the

Goyer~-

of tne United States warrant her in beli cving that it wi 11

not be withheld in the hour of her need ... J9

In a letter to a high

Stqte department official he stated the justification for his po•
. sition:
"the treaty now before.the 'Senate was conc1uded with

lsouth

Domir.go at Santo Domingo's earnest request repeatedly pres:;ed

0

11'pon

us and was subm 1t ted to the Senate be cause in my j ude;me n t i t

,~~s o~r duty to our less fortunate neighbor to respond to her call

for aid, inasmuch as we were the only power who could give this
aid, and inasmuch as her need for it was very great.

1140

The United States was to assume control over the customs
houses of Santo Domingo in order to render the debt amortized.
This action was initiated in rnid--March and Minister Powell reportect.

"According to your instructions the President agrees to

plG.ce Custom Houses in the custody of the Government of the United

J8

Welles, p. 630.

J9

Bishop, p, 4J2.
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I

j ;-;tr1tes. 1141

'f'his n.ction was not undertaken at the mere whim of the

I

p 1-.::sic':.ent but only after serious discussions with his most trusted
"Y·~orales

c«lvisors.

asked us to take over the custom houses pencl-

ing action by the Senate.
·>Y:;::;uJ. ted

Spoone:c, Foraker, Lodge 2.nd Knox.

t:--n. t it w.-:is
to

I~y,

I decided to do so, but first of all

:ceccc~sa:cy

All heartily agreed

for me to take this action. 1142

In a letter

Roosevelt noted

In Santo D0~ingo we have taken the necessary step; but it
·,:as one of those cases, whether from action or from in8 ct ion.
I felt that much less trouble would come from action; but
beyond a doubt we shall have flurries in connection with
revolutionary uprising and filibustering enterprises, as we
ossume the protection of the customs houses.
I do not think
,.hat Santo Domingo itself wilr give us much trouble, but
f
~he fool vote and the timid vote-Will both be greatly alar~8d
at home, and.divers knavas will play skillfully on this
a 1a:cm from time to time. 3
f
The Xonroe Doctrine, especially Roosevelt's interpretation

01

1·<hich required European abs_tinence from Ar.lericAn affairs nece-,
ssitated the United States to exercise its "police power" in regard to these states.

In a letter to Spring-Rice on July

24, 190

J he stated his position regarding American action and intention in
the Caribbean.

"We must make it evident on the one hand that we

do not intend to use the Monroe Doctrine as a pretense for selfn.1~grandizcment

at the. expense of the Latin American republics, an

41
Rippy, "Initiation," P•

443.

Roosevelt to Hay, March

JO, 1905, Morison IV, p. 1150.

42
43

Roosevelt to Hay, April 2,

1905, Morison IV, p. 1156.

;

on the other that we do not intend it to be used as a warrant for
letting any of these republics remain as small bandit nests of a
wic~cd and inefficient type,
' .

This means that we rust in good

f~ith try to help them as we are now trying to help S8nto Domin30,
~,nd be ready if the ~':orst co.mes to worse to chastise them."

L14
r

In

~ speech at Chautauqua he reiterated that the United States did

not intend to let the Monroe Doctrine be used as "a shield to pro
t0ct that republic from the consequences of its o~n misdeeds

asainst foreign nations."

l} 5

In his annual message for that year, 1905, Roosevelt made an
·•
sppcal to factors other than the Monro~ Doctrine in the case of
th:; proposed action in regard to Santo Dori1ingo.

1n her turn,

"Santo DornJ.ngo,

has now made an appeal to us to help her, and not

only every principle of wisdom but every generous instinct within
us bids us respond to the appeal.

It is not of the slightest con-

s0quence whether we grant the aid needed by Snnto Dofuingo as an ~
cident to the wise development of the i'!onroe Doctrine or because
we regard the case of Santo Domingo as standing wholly by itself,
and to be treated as such, 2nd not on general principles or with
any reference to the Monroe Doctrine.

The important point is to

give the. needed aid, and the case is certainly sufficiently pecti-

Roosevelt to Spring Rice, July

24, 1905, Morison, IV,

p. 1286.

45

Rippy, "Antecedents," p. 267.

_________

~ ...........

..

..

-~-------·---·---"--------·-----,------~---

w.<."'~''"""'""~

...

,,... .,.

.,,,,,,~.

~,,~·,,,

.. .,.,,.,. ...,,,~ ... ,

,,1,.#('1

,,,.., ..

""''""~Z.'"'<t'.M1"~--"""-'"'·~~· ... ·""""~"'-"""'-·;,,·""-''-• ...... ~.,. ·---~

.

..,__,.,...._.,,,,:,.

,,,~..,..; .. ~~·J.Jr""'~··" ,;,1c,,.,. ..,,,~-91"'·~~

46

j ii:e:r

t,o ·1ese1·ve to be judged purely on its own merits."

I

The ovenidfrg consideration, however, was one of fear of a

. ;,ossi ble Europeun t·:ikcover in S2.nto Domingo.

In the Protocol

' ...

i2oosevelt points out that "in view of our past experience and our

t ~~r:;y,>Jlf:dce
of the a.ctu:J.l situation of the Dorni:ni can Republic, a
~

.

I definite refusal of the United Stg_tes Gover:cJ:icnt to t,'}ke ~":lny effe
itive action looking to the relief of the Dominican Republic and to

lche dis~harge

of its

ow~

duty

un~er

the Monroe Doctrine can on1y

, [.e co~1s1dered as a acquiescence in sorne such action by another
,5overnment.·"47

?or "in the case of one of these nations, only the

,.,ctugl opening of negotiations to ttlis end by our Government pre-

!

I vt::r-: ted

the seizure of terri to:cy in Santo Domingo by a Europer:tn

';,c.~·:er ..,48

The proposed agreement with the United States would

~void any such possibility for ~it is for better that this co11ntry

i:::hould put through such an a:crangement, rather than.allow any

I

foreign country to undertake it," 4 9
'.:OO

Root shared this concern and

stated in a letter to Lodge on December 7, 1905.

"The impor...a.n

thing is that a request from the Congress of San Domingo should'be
inserted
condition to
________
_______
.._,__
1-:i.s a
,

46
47

Foreign Relations, 1905, p. xxxv.
Ibid., p. J40.

48
Ibid., 9. xxxvi.

49

the general sweeping power of interfer-

.

C3llcott, p. 208.

!

The unco~ditionn.l power of intarfcre~ce would practically

!.;nee.

liiestroy Dominican sovereignty which, of course, none of us

!to
f

wish~s

do. 1150
Opposed to such an occ.nTence, Roosevelt remarked in his ann1 1

rr1~:--;::>:::ige

f

"under

':,·.<~JJ~·tsrc:~~·epu~J-You.ts},LYe

l'1 1 1
-

-

-

I

l

nt :rfcronce

l~~t

1

th.~

proposed treaty the indepe:nc1.;nce of the island

respected, the danger of violation of the Monroe
intervention or foreign powers V8nishes, and the

of our Government is minimized, so

th~"lt

>·Te sh:::ill o:rily

in conjunction with the Santo Domingo authorities to secure

I:': :,~:::.:: t:d::n::::A::::so:n:h:0:::o::: :::\::::: ~::e : m::::re
f

;::::,:inst d:.::rne:-:.nds for unjust debts."5l

!~·::<S

l

·c;_;;d

to do three things s

doJY.f~s tic,

ding claims;

In effi;;ct, the United StB.tej'

( 1) to adjust the Domini can debt, foreig.,

n.nd to as certain the validity and <.1.r,10un t

of all per.-

(2) to administer the Dominican customs houses and t

ci011 ver 45;'& of the receipts to the Dominican go•iernment, applying

the net remainder to the interest upon and the amortization of th
t

i0bts and claims so adjusted; and (3) to afford the Dominican Re-

I
1

public such further assistance
·?

f f i ci <mt government, 5

50
Jessup, p.

51
52

I

Forei~n

9.S

needed to maint.9.in orderly and

2

546.

Relations, 1905, p. xxxvii.

Jg_cob H. Holl<tnder, "The Convention of 1907 Between the

:~~ni

ten States and the Domini can Republic," _A.2Yleri can Journal of I:r.. !
tr~-;-n2tional Lqw, I (1907). pp. 289-290.
i

-,~,,__,,,,.,.~··-------"""'---~·-·-----------------------~-~----.i

T t scr:::ms c 1e:lr that neither Roosevelt
'>:ork

·::;1.S

in p~1rt rc.spo:nsi ble for the action, thought the U:ni ted

states should intervene more than was absolutnly necessary for the

:nn i :ntr::n9nce of stable government. 53
of

Roosevelt could h:J_ve had one

possible reasons for intej_'Venti on accordJ.ng to J. Fred

:;<'01;r

(1) fear of European intervention of a more or less permanent nature in the Dominican Republic;

(2) the desire to pr?tect

lives and pronote as well as protect the economic interests OI

1 ::: citizens of the United States; (J) willingness to gratify cer
tain expansionist influences; and
'~he inl1abi tan ts

i: »;;;re

(4) a disposition to give aid t

of t!1e Dominican Republic, :i'any of whom desired o-;.

.

51'

supposed to desire the assistance of the Fni tcd States. ,,,

1:ould tend to dismiss the third reason and minimize the

! ·r.2

first ·was, in rny opinion, the overriding consic.cration.

,~3rrl

I

1 terest
~ith

I_.

YG

~onroe

Doctrine in the in

of the United States, in the interest of all people dealin;

Santo Domingo, and above all, in the interest of Santo Domin

itself."55
Root stated in

53

rei:;a1~d

to the proposed action, "our treat:nent

Yunro, Intervention, p. 531.

54

I

In

to the fourth, Roosevelt himself said of the action, "it vras

strictly an instance of working out the

c'"0

second~

I

55

Rippy, "Initiation," p. 419.
::loosevelt, "South Ar:terica and the ffonroe Doctrine," p. 58)
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...

.......

··9rr~j

i

is but a p8 rt of the

~·Ior:.::::tng

out of the

pol\cy of pe 8 .cc and righteousness as the basis for wealth and
p r·o"n'"'·.L·,
. ".t· ~ .1· ty
,
'
~~est,

1·

n~_:J.ce of

n

....

the policy of force, of plunder, of cot.-

.

~6

the n:cans of acquiring wealth."../

9.S

'.l'he chief :oaterial

'-1

The United States would gain some indirect advantcses by 2nking the comnunities to the south stable and pro~perou~
snd "tLe:rcfo:cc :not merely in name, but in fact ind epcnd.ent and
., .P
.
• • ·.-.·11' • ...,1 ·~
S2.:_J.-S0\'el.i
1 G•

~he
0

"57

specter of an unfriendly European nation entrenched in

ne of the Cari~bean islands haunte~ many Americans and made them

.

:::,nx i ous for

.S\

58

q u:t ck set tlernent of tl1e ae;rce:;;ent.

Tioos 0vel t

held

to !ii s principle tr:a t ".9.n ag.:;rieved nation can K1 th out interferi nr,
~ith the

ronroe Doctrine take what action it sees fit in the

~,,st;:.ent of its disputes with Ar:ierican States,

a~-

provided that ac-

tion does not take the shape of interference with their form of
._:o':e-ct.rr: ent or of the despoilment of their

________ ___

,;ui se. 11 59

____

...

terri toJ.~y lJnder any dis

Threatened European military action, however, prompted

·-------·--------·

,,,

~6
_.

-~~lihu Root, Latin Arr:erica and the United States, ed., Ro":.J,·:rt ?-n.con and J 3rnes
Scott (Cambridge 1 Harvard University

B-rown

Fr e ~ s , 1 91 7 ) , P • 2 7 7 •

57

F'orsir:n Rel9.tions, 190.5, p.

342.
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Henry J. Hancock, "The Situation in Santo Domingo," AnnPls,
( 190 5), P. 52 •

59

?oreivn ReJ.9ti~, 1905,. p.

334.
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I t:w
1

;'i-,i L-E::d St::.tes to assume

8.

.

r"ew position.

'T'he United States

1 t!ins bcca':.e n. p:-=i.rty in interest, bec. ,use 1mclc;r the
0

~·:onToe

Doctrine

it c.ould r:ot see <"!.DY :2':uropeon po':ler sei. «:e ··n:d lX<c;11r;,ncntly oecupy

the territory of one of these republics, and yet such seizure of
L<o c1·]_

tory, cHsguiscd or undisguised, offC:.L'Cd t!w only ~·;ay in which

tr 1:::: :i)C~\er in qliestion could collect any debts, 1;nl;.::3s ';.;{~ere -,.;as ir:

terference on the part of the United States.
i ;~cr1

th'.! t

60

Thus, it 1-:'as real-

the United States Government could not in te:cfere to prc-

1ver~ t such sei zurc <.1nd occupa tl on of Domini can terri tor·y

vJi th out

eiti1er itself proposing some feasible alternative in the way of.

I

, "'etio:r., or else virtually s;;:,ying to 'European governments that they

;·';";ld <"•ot be allowed to

1

I

fore,

!~~fringcment

61

Roosevelt therc-

of the Konroe Doctrine or we must ourselves agree to

such arrangement that nerewi th submi cted to the Senate."

~herefore

r:y

their cbims,

concluded that "either we must submit to the likelihood of

I

~'o::ne

collc~t

62

"this protocol affords a practical test of the efficien-

of the U:r.i ted States Government in m8.intaining the Monroe Doc-

63

~
ic. "
•-r-·i·r-"'

The

~onroe

I:< s ::1c3ni ng two things.

Doctrine mentioned here can be interpretated
First, the Monroe Doctrine refers to the

i! ---------------------------------·

60
Ibid., p.

:335.

61
Jbid., p. 337.
62
1bid.' p.

63
!

I'oid., p.

341.
J42.
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. Sf6'~1
)Olicy of opposition to European control of Arno:cic~0.fi

Second, the Monroe

~octrine

I

I

can also refer to the

::ioo:::
~ vc 1 tir.:in concept of the policy of "police poi·;er" in cases of
,_.
wro~cdoing,

such as Santo Domingo, whose efficacy was also being

u:s:J(l Ly the crisis.
''he long standing fear of possible American t:::ikeover and
"':·;::-J~~·::-:._tion in Latin American countries had to be once more dis-

"It can not be too often s.nd too emphati cglly ·asserted
th~t

i8 l

Lhe United States has not the slightest desire for territor,..,:;grandizernent at the expense of any of its southern neighbor~

,-._:id w·i 11 not trF.:at the Monroe Doctrine as an excuse for such

.

;. s.ESl''.:;t:dizei':lcnt on its part. 11
J. i\'. Lee; er on :.:arch

64

5, 1904.

Hay received this letter from
"In the course of the interview you

did 'r:t: 'chc honor to grant lile on the Jrd instant you were as good

as to tell me that the lh1ited States had no intention to take ad-

van:asc of the events now taking place in the Dominican Republic
el t'1•::r to ?.nnex that Repub1i c or to force a protectorate upon it,

65
or to 3cquire any part of its territory, Samana in particular."

PRrt of the objection to the protocol itself would have been re~oved

if the obligations were more rigously defined and a demon-

str~tion

that no annexation of the Dominican Republic was contem-

64
Ibid. , p. 3 34.

65

Foreign Relations,

1904, p. 371.

·~ne

control of finances was pG.ssed to the United States.

-,-., s ':..:o collect the principal reveni;cs of 'che ::cpubli c, arrar.e;e the

I:

3 ;tt'..,

1 /.

0

rnent of the national debt and readjust the tAriff.

~c;t::ri cans 1;~ lL-::ved

1107
1 ~-he State.

U:a t

"the

:?ovw1~

0 '"'

~;,~)...LJ.1

t

!..

;

.

!

that con Leo ls the purse rules

Eence to them the U11ited States ;·:-as j_n control of

!all of the affairs of the Republic.

I__

L'l.tin

Loomis, however, was q1:1ick t

o-.i.
.....
Lt,,a

'l'}1c,re is no thought or possibility of the o.r·Lt;).n_-c1on of
Santo Domin~o to the United States, in the Dinds of either
the Ad1r1inistration or of the representatives of Santo Dorni~so, now in ~ashington.
It has not come into considerstton :-'J1d will not.
It 1s'simply an effo:ct which is being
!:":.:;de to a1:rive at some iJl:an "h'hich shall saf1,;s·1"s1~d all in-~- "- ...,o:tci·o the CS
01.i.-'--A
?<:>o•·s L..J.vi::J..L..t:::
,.;-~.,_·,,, of ...,-r~. i· -~c:
\._~1.::"':Lc:~~'.!-:-···'d
. :.!- i•11i. . . . _v_~a ...'"·'--op
,,L. • ....,""...
t. . . .L8.b-.......
•.::;.L..L.l2...
..L ......
6
r.o.<J t:XlS G.Lng in tnose l::>l~nds.
i..-l

~~e

!; PoKell

corTcspondence between the State DepartQent and Xinister

will serve to demonstrate how meticulously the question of

S8nto Dominigan sovereignty was discussed.

Loomis to Davrson Jan. Jl, 1905
You will substitute for the second cln.use of the preamble
sent you in our draft of protocol Jan. 25, beginning,
"Htereas the Government of the United States of America,"
the following, which is to take the place of the parac;r·iph of the pree_mble containing the territorial guaranty:

Ii

19 0 5)

66
f

''The Santo Domingo Affair," Harper's Weekly, XLIX (Feb.11,
po 197
I

l'
67 ''When is a Protectorate pot a Protectorate?," Review of
J ~eviews, XXXI (1905), p. 118.

!

l

I

J

!

68
?r2r:cis B. Loomis, "The Administration and Santo Domingo," .
4
.
1
(il'.arch 3, 190 ) , p. 467.
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the Gove:;:n.r;;ent of tr;e United St9tes, vie~'.'ins any
on the i)FJ.rt of the EOVerrmont of this hemisphere
~J) opp1·css or control the destiny of the Gominic~::i.n I:epublic ::~.s a :~;o.nifestation oi'' an unfriendly disposition to1'lard
~he Vnited States, is in compliance with the request of
the ~onin!csn Goverrunent, disposed to lend its assistance
to1~ard effecting a satisfactory a1"ran,•-::-egent with the
creditors of the Dominican Goyern::nent, 11 9
"'.!)-,t.:'eo.s

~:.~.;t.,:-:i::pt

DaKson to State Depart:'nent,

~;-cb.

lJ.,

1905

Kinister of finance insists on insertion after the word
"3ssesslng," in the first paragraph prearr.ble, of t)ollo~·r
tn6 "the territorial integrity of the Bepubli.c, 11 7

D::i.w·son to State Department, Feb. 5, 1905
':orninican Government insists that suggested guaranty is
::;ffecti ve only agair..st European power and not against the
Pnited States itself.
The Vice-President has received a
i~2 lep;rs,m f!'.'o:n DoJY·ini can co:risul.:[-'.;eneral at l!ew York, which
co~vinces him that that change in pre2mble means ulti~8te
·•f:nexation,
Do:•j_ni.cC1.n authorities suspicious and alarmed
~s to our intentions.
They insist 0n inserting at the end
of second pnrasrG.ph pre2.i'Tlble:
"agreeing to respect the
7
co~plete ~erritorial integrity of the Dominican aepublic. 11 • 1

lhy to Da·.irncm, Feb, 6, 1905
You cay add at end of second paragraph of preamble the words
"0.greeing to respect the coL1plete territorial integrity of
the Dominic.s_n Republic. 11 72

Eay to Dawson, Feb, 6, 1905
8

he President regrets his inability to consent to any
changes in protc,col, The •·:ords "without the
of the President of the United States "at the

f~Jrther
~onsent

r -··---·-------·---

-·-------·
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Forei<3n Rel.ations, 1905, p, J20,

70
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end of article 6 are 1nd1sp.ensable to the success of the
plnn to relieve the Dominican Republic from its hopeless
financial conditions, which ls rapidly growing worse and
·threatens serious disasters.
Other e;overnments have repeatedly threatened to intervene and the United States
can not extend financial p~otectlon unless it can have the
confidence of the Domini can Government o.nd of other parties.
~oncer~ed, so ~s to en?~le the United States to carry out
the plan succeasfully.
.
In the case of Santo Domingo, the United States intervention

/.

was n modenJ.ting elemen't to the European claims and the pressure

due to its debt the occupation of its custom houses resulted 'in

en
Am~rican

responsible clerks distributing the income among the creditors

the agreed

~rorated bas~s.7~

But in accordance with the

Constitution.the treaty had to be submitted to the Sennte for its
Approval.

Dawson proposed a

~eans

which eluded a treaty and its

requirement to be placed before the Senate of both the United

[ .

i.·

States and Santo Domingo. 75

i

The mcaris arrived at for circumventing the Senate approval of
i

the proposed agreement would be a Presidential resolution to use
the good of'fLc_eJL to attain their ends.
..........

-- ----

The need to adopt this

-

E].9.~-\~ v:\_~Jend.l.

was even more pronounced after the Senate

of the treaty form.

This particular aspect, however, will be dis-

cussed at a later time.

The E!.£C}.us viviendi r:md the treaty were

pr8ct1cally alike with two e·xceptions.

73

Ibid., p.

J2J.

71}

Pereyra, p. 121.

75

Troncoso, p.

rejecti~n

35.

The American collectors of

-

I_

,

)~~fices

jzoo1

to rccor:L11end, and our warships mglr,tainir:,cr,

1""

I,' -,,. , ..·'

c;c 11.ec tors

;

in the custom-houses.

Secondly, i:r;stcad

r

1.-, ... -.- 2nt of the revF::r~l,;_e going to creditors it
~ -

i

~: r; t; i Ofl.E l

I(;.,.,_ , , ty.
!

I

City :S::rnk of :Kew

I
credi~ors a~I

to a1\"ai t .Senate 8..pproval ;:, fter

YoJ.~k

At such time, the money would be paid to the

oritir.ally intended, otherwise i t would be retumed to tbe qomi

;

c~Jl

Gov2r:r1Inent. 76

Root noted

II

the modus vi vi en di • • • cons i

· l:.erco1y in a plan or way of getting along,

t-(:rl.
'
I._..

:

.

~1th

xnoffi cial good offices of the I-resident." 77

by the
the

8

r.i-!

r

ts

~ov2;-,·:c ~

acq~ie~ ·~nee·

Dawson no'!:;':,-"

1

'. ,:.;.:;

tl:n: "for tr.e present at 1east, abpolutely elimir.::i"._;es Snntc
.-,q
q

v

pursu~d

Domingo on its own responsibility but

i~f Ss~

!'

deposited in tf:e

w~s

:~•--!-

potentially disturbing internationsil factor."

1

:~cc.::;a-:

·

(

'h'r:ite to the Secretary of the Navy on Sept. 5, 1905, "tel:!_
Bradford to stop any revolution.

!

r

I intend to keep the is-\'
I

_?t.gtu

~

unti 1 the Senate has had

ti~~:e

to

:~ct

on the

and I shall treat any revoiutionary movement to upset
l~0dus

!

t"'..ere may b e s om e · t ec h n 1 ca 1 or ,__~c.d
t."'_ pe difficulty.'-' 7
,_.

!1 -:.'.10
' ,.... .s..
- ·.,. ,

;
,.Io~-k,

.I
I'

That this is ethically right, I am sure, even

viviendi.

:-··-·---

G

9

u,..,n~,'
_

-------------l

~:.:'.ugc::,e P. Lyle Jr., "Our Mix-up In Santo Domingo," World's
10 (l905), p. 6748 •

77
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of the major problems facing the Dominigan people

of violence to resolve differences.

~inister

1'73.S

the. growth

Velasquez noted in

hiS ~nnual·report of 1906:

So contrary to order are the customs, so inveterate in
Beneral has become the habit of disorder, that many of
the men who theoreticaly express enthusiasm for the
establishment of regular and systematic order understanding that only in_ that_ way in the salvation of the
possible, when i t comes to actual practice, when they
find that such a state of affairs would be imposed
.
upon them, subjecting their life to certain limitations
not in acco~i:'d with customs already rooted, in opposition
to certain interests created, rebel against the saving
reform, accusing the person in charge of its execution
8
for his perserverance and faith in executing the same.·O
Goerge Colton remarked that "these conditions as noted are

-.

rHc·:itive of the apparently fnsurmountable obstacles wrlich have

in~

c.m-

fronted these patriotic Dominicans ·who seem 1-;ow, 'N"i th the 8.Ssis-

to nee of the

rrJC?~l:i::.1.§..

:;r_i vi~ndi, ab9ut to place their country perma.-

r:ently upon a safe footing. 1181
critics to realize that the

These tendencies prompted other

wea~ness

of Santo Dofuingo was its

strength, since to attack it seems the part of a bully.

The

soci~

environment was primarily.responsible and it must be changed if
£.OOd gover:nment were to prevail.

President Morales believed this

to be true and spoke {or many Dominicans.
I believe it the only successful method under the existing

80
Foreign Relations, 1907, pp.

81
Ibid,, p.

333-JJ4.

334.

82
"Santo Domingo," Independent, LVI (February 28, 190l.J.),
p. 4 54.

Gondi ti ons, of up~·10 ld ing my government or P..ny go,vern,11ent
1·1hi ch aspires to a decent and orderly administration of
the republic's affairs.
If it fails anarchy and warfare
~ill

inevitably ensue.
This country will accept the
convention. I will see to that,· With the exception of
n few disgruntled political leaders, professional revolu-q
tionists, all the intelligent peoples are in favor of it.~·3

Others, however, were of a different mind as early as 1904 de
'?osas in

Stntes.

L~-~~

S8id of possible financial control by the United

"The Do:ninican government attempted to escape the

qucnces of the sentence:
:;i_n

anned interventlon. 1184

~onse-

for a diplomatic intervention s;Jcceeds
For the majority of the people the con-

vention was· a disgrace and united the patriot1~ interests of ali
':tLd

the political interests of most. • Those opposed to it, a ttaclro

.

it as an infringement on Domini?an sovereignty.

Those who defend-

ed it called for the avoidance of circumstances that would lead to

its extension or repetition.

8

5

The outcov.ie ·was attributed to thelr

oNn rris::ldventures, the ambition of the United States, and a serfes

P.6

of their own sorrowful and irreparable errors, mostly financial.The Nueno Paris ext6lled the virtues of the modus viviendi

"the Fnited States will guarantee the Dominicans protection agairst
thomselves and against foreign cupidity.

83
Packard, p. 122.

84
Troncoso, p.

85
Ibid., p.

86
IbiQ,, pp.

62.

55.

39-40.

Now they may indeed boast

tho.t they

a1~e

on the road to civilized existence. 1187

people would be in

s~1pathy

t•:any felt th:·

with the agreement because it provided

f

for the integrity of the territory of the republic and assured

J

pc3ceful conditions under which thei could work and prosper. 88
1'P}-tus,

I

in conformance with the decision and advise of the governmmt

the

i'·~inister

~.~ini

ster of the Commerce House,· Federic Velazquez Hernandez,. hgd

of Foreign Relations, Juan Francisco Sanchez, and the

signed the agreement to establish the assistance of the United

.

States in the form of a loa.n and regulation of the debt.

89

In the main, the reaction throughout the world was one that
i::~~:ted the tenets of the Roosevelt Corollary and there was no

l'.,dc,,pread or flaming indignation, 9 o.

Las

Ultima~

Noticias apprais-

· ed the Roosevelt corollary and the action in Santo Domingo as fallows:
It is in our hands to avoid this intervention, but it is
not a menace to the established governments which take part
with pride in the concert of nations, That intervention
refers only to those republics which are in a perpetual
state of HYlarchy, which disregard international laws, which
do not meet their monetary or other obligations, which have,
in fhct, done everything possible to los~ their character as

87
Francis B. Loomis, "Attitude of the United States Toward '
Other American Powers," Annals, XXVI (1905), p. 23,

88
J.M.F. Schiess, "The Situation in the Caribbean," Harper's
(February 25, 1905), p. 271.

~eekll, XLIX

89
Troncoso, pp.

34-35.
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Perkins, History of the Monroe Doctrine, p.
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91

It quoted Roosevelt as

~aying

"It is regrettable that all the
I

~outh

American republics do not. have, like Chile, a suitable foim

of government, 11hich might give guarantees and be able to inspire
i

tne respect of the 1·ihole 11orlC. • • • •

If all the Sou th American

countries would follow in the footsteps of Chile, we should have
no reason to regret the events which on several occasions have
forced us to intervene actively in the p6licy of our continent.••9 2

Thus, it concluded that "the peril of the North is only a myth if
the .South d'oes not provoke the North with interval disturbances or
f-.

.

.

•.:iol9.tions of international law and break its word in financial

L~~ tters. "93
Laneta, the Argentine Minist~r of Foreign Affairs, had thi~
9.ppralsal of Roosevelt and his policy. - "In regard to the United
States of .Mnerica, they are for ,us an example of peace and progre.%
The Nonroe Doctrine I have understood in no other way than as a
doctrine of friendship between the republics of this continent and
our great model of

th~

north, which has reached its place - I

say

it with American pride - at height of the most powerful nations of

91

"Aspects of the Santo Domingo Protectorate," Literary
Sip;est, XXX (February 4, 1905), p. 157.

92
Ibid • , p • 158 •

93

Ibid.

It had been charged that. the agreement reached between Santo
:Jo1riingo and the United States was one contrived by the Americans
for their own designs.

It was, indeed, forced on the Dominicans;

but by circumstance rather than by any imperlalistic program of
·

the United States. 95

It was, as Melvin Knight pointed out, "A

free and spontaneous decision • • • for avoiding the dismem'Qerment
of the Republic." 96 ,
Critics of the policy attacked the plan on various fronts the
?oston Herald felt that the si ti:'iation should have been left alone
for ''the still disturbed countries Are paying for the penalty for
their folly in being shunned by . foreig.n capital." 97
n>:·:are that to many Latin Ameri earn the difference

Others were

b~t1·1een

territory and controlling the finances seemed iffimaterial.

annexing
The

A~

erican attitude of _dismissing them as "lesser breeds" who lived in

o.

Henry called the "banana-stand republics" 11ho had to be
. . 98
supervised was also assailed.
Thus, many Latin Americans felt

;·:hat

94
Foreign Relations,

95

Troncoso, p.

~

f'

~-

(~arch

98

p.

49.

Jones, Caribbean Backgrounds, p. 258,

96
97

1905,

37.

"Shearing the Santo Domingo Treaty," Literary Digest, XXX

18, 1905), p. 387.
Arnold Whitridge, "The Monroe Doctrine," History Today, VI

(1956), p. 386.
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1

they had no

ro-

course but to follow the slogan."Against foreign interference let
c<r:;

oppose domestic virtue." 99

Thus Elihu Root Nas prompted to

·,ccite Senator Ben Tillman on December 13, 1905.

l

"The South ftJTieri-

cci.ns now hate us largely because they think we despise them and

try to bully them.

I really like them and intend to show it.·

I

think their friends hip is reall:y important to the United Sta.tes,
~.:nd
,

the best way to secure it is by treating them like gentlemen •

If you want to nake a man your friend, it does not pay to treat
.
1.,
Jnm
lKe a ye 11 ow d og. .. 100
Ex-President Jimenez struck anc1ther note in his letter of
Jan., 1906.
"The present historic epoch peremptorily demands that
•
the United States the only protector of these small nations, dec'ide
to exert their influence over them, for the role of civilization,
2.nd lift them up from the anarchy and prostration in which they
,

Jie. 11101

'

He found a responsive 'Roosevelt who adopted much the

same attitude in his annual message of 1907.
The United States are now, and will be for .a long time,
the natural protectors of the weak Spanish-.Ameri can republics, and in the hearts of the patriots of those
countries there is a wound ·that bleeds when they remember the humiliations and impositions inflicted upon
them whenever that protection has been diminished, or

99

Richard J. Alfaro, "A Century of the }~onroe Doctrine," in
The Sentenary of the Monroe Doctrine a supplement to Annals, CXI
( l 9?h) t p. 28.
,
100
Jessup, p.
101

469.

Rippy, "Ini tiB.tion," p. 445.

r

,,

'

~hen

.

'!'he wounds seemed healed, at least
his visit to South America.
~oo~-will

1

it could not be requested or grAnted.-

02

tenpor·~;ri

ly, when Boot rra:t:

The journey was the cause for much

and praise of the United States and Roosevelt's policies

Jose ~0rcelino de Souza on Ju1y 24, 1906 at Bahia made this stateLent.

"'::'his policy of concord, therefore, 3ccompli shes c;ood.

repeat, America must prosper.

I

It is necessary that the Xonroe D

•trine triumph, not to the exclusion of the civilization of the Old

~: orlc~., but to the benefit of all humc-.;.lli ty. 11 l03

Luis DrG.go on Aug.

17, 1906 made his contribution to the outpouring of faith and
trust in the United States and its a*bi li ty to 11 ve up to its po terr-

tial and promises.
It is consequently our sacred duty to preserve.the integrity
of Ar1eri ca, r.oa terial and moral, against the menaces and
artifices, very real and effective, that unfortunately
surround it. It is not long since one of the most eminent
of living juris consults of Great Britain denounced the
possibility of the danger. "The enemies of light and
freedom," he said, "all neither dead nor sleeping; they a.re
vigilant, nctive, militant, and astute." And it was in
obedience to that sentiment of common defense that in a
critical moment the Argentine Republic proclaimed the
impropriety of the forcible collection of public debts by
European nations not as an 'abstract principle of academic
value or as a legal rule of universal application outside
of this continent (which it is not incumbent on us to
JT:aintain), but as a principle of American diplorlacy which,
whilst being founded on equity and justice, has for its
exclusive object to spare the peoples of this continent
the calamities of conquest, disguised under the mask of
102

Foreign Relations, 1907, p. J54.

lOJ

Arr.erica

S eec~es Incident to the Visit of Secretar Root to South
Washington: Government Printing Office, 190 , p. 31 • .

financial interventions, in the sam~ way as the tr~ditiona~
policy of the Vnited States, without accentuating superiority or seeking preponderan6e, condemned the oppression of
the nAtions of this part of the world end the ~gatrol of
their destinies by the great powers of Europe.
Lisentiate Kanuel Calero on Oct. J, 1907 pointed up
i::,portGnt aspect of "Rooseveltian policy.
n~tions

anothe~

·"The integrity of the .

of this continent is of vital interest to all, collective-

ly, ::-ind not alone to the country immediately affected.

Any' attack

on this integrity should constitute an offense in the eyes of the
other nations of America.

1110

5

The European effects of Rooseveltian actions were mixed and

•

enphasized different aspects of the poiicies as they changed the
course of European affairs.

Economically, the bonds j_ssued by

states bordering on the Caribbean rapidly increased in value.

As

en after effect of Arr:erican att;empts to determine. the validity
~any

[

European creditors protested as they felt such action endan-

sered their just claims.

106

Th~

J2nd A.nnual Report of the Counci 1

~

r

of British Bondholders best summed up general European economic

;·

reaction.
It beca.me evident that in order to evade payment of their
ob~_igations the dishonest Republics were taking deliberate
advantage of the hostility displayed by the United States
Government towards the attempts of European Governments to
obtain ~edress fo~ their subjects. It was contended,
104

Root, Latin America and the U.S., pp~ 95-96.

105
Ibid., p. 172.
106
Talcott Williams, p. J5.

therefore, that our responsibilities towards those to whom
interference they were so strongly opposed, that this contention was well founded. has been admitted by 5be present
distinguished President of the United States.l l
Strategic and hegemonic con~ideration prompted the Kreuz Zeito note that the new American policies mean "that the Union
up a claim to suprGmacy over all Central and South Americi:;.n
republics ;-:i thout having made so much as
108
atta.in it."

a

thrust of the sword to

The ,-\i"'Uerican reaction to the custotls receivership was divided
each side as bitter in opposition to the other's conclusions.
The I\ew York Evening_ Post noted. "the. Monroe Doctrine is too _much
a great swelling word of vanity,
for doing whatever we wish9

11ihich

we utilize

HS

an ex-

When the President says thA.t it

is the Doctrine which inhibits foreign governments from demand-ing
p.syn1 cnt of Santo Domingo, he actually means that he does not want

them to do it."

109

The opposition. of the Senate to the proposed

;;,greement ·was assailed by the Hartford Times.

II

It is

a

narrow

vi eK which shuts the eye to the _manner in 1\'hi ch Panama was detach
from Columbia, and.the way by which American rule has been started

-------107
J. Fred Rippy, "British Bondholders and the Roosevelt
Corollary of the Monroe Do,c-f?rine," Poli ti cal Science Quarterly,
XLIX, pp. 200-201.
.:.
t
108
"l•.'ashington Diplomacy and the r~onroe Doctrine," Literary,
Digest, XXX (February 18,, 1905), p._ 250. ;

109
"Santo Domingo Customs and Senate Customs," Literary Di-

" · f~~. XXX (February 25, 1905), p. 271.

Snnto Domingo, :::<nd praises the. President as safer, saner, or
n:ore p:::.triotic than the Senate, 11110 The Ne~r '(ork Press was even
1n

more vehement in its denunciation of the opposition to Roosevelt's
policies.

"Any club to hit President Roosevelt is all right for

the Senate to use.
blo~

It is all the same to the Senate whether th~

hurts the cause of world peace, but leaves the President un-

hr'.r:ncd, or whether the blow puts the life of the ?>':onroe Doctrine

in 1~nr:2;er if it is armed at the head of.the Ser.ate's o:rpor.ent.
If

c\'flr

ever comes with a European Power in Santo Domingo the U.S.

Senn.te v-:ill· be to blame.not President Roosevelt. 0111
to~.

.

.

In a letter

G. Tiffany Roosevelt sought to explain his position.

Under the proposed protocol we could collect debts only in
the sense that Collector Stranahan in Kew York collects debts
for the ere di tors of the U.S. All th.Ht would be done would
be to put I'.len that ~\'"8re honest and capable Within their spf-ece
into Santo Domingan parts, honestly to collect the custom
dues in accordance 'with the request of Santo Domingo; to turn
over half to help run the government and to turn over the
other half to a commission of high-minded men who :·:rm ld examine into the claims ot the various creditors and oppositions
them on their merits. It wi 11 indeed be f::?n infamy if a majority of the Senaie, from purely partisan reasons, refuses
to do its clear duty and grant the relil~f to Santo Domingo
1··hi ch Santo Domingo needs. : Every man who votes against this
treaty by his vote invites foreign nations to violate the
Monroe Doctrine, and refuses relief and protection to a
stru~f~ing American republic which has appealed to us for
nid.
110
"The President and the Senate," Literary Digest, XXX {Februnry 25, 1905), p. 267.
111
"Senate, President, and Santo Domingo," Literary
(Xarch 25~ 1905), p. 420.
112

llJ9.

Roosevelt to

w.

Dige~t,

G. Tiffany, March 14, 1905, Morison, IV,
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The Senate, however, was determined to control in "n ever more

In~e~

.effective manner the foreign bolicy of the United States.ll3

'feet, the President's action had prompted the Senate into asserting
fmore strongly the right of

de~ision

fo~-

in regard to question of

feign policy granted it by the Cons ti tut ion. n4 · The most caustic r
1:-:iarks opposing Rooseveltian policies were made by

rl'h~

l'!ation which

!kept a string .of tirades against Roosevelt which ranged from judg-

f1ng that "too much Vionroe Doctrine hath make him mad. 11115 To exte
'ting the concept of adopting the Monroe Doctrine to keep it

fr~

being "foss-ilized" to conclude "the Doctrine is a conjurer's hat,

l

'out of which anything he pleases may be pulled." ll6 In addition it

ljudged American action was used to

f;n power. 117

ke~p

a compliant Morales regime

His present action was deemed inconsistent with his

'performance in the Venezuela

~ri.sis

of 1902 and the whole concept

of Monroeism was assailed. 118 ' He was charged with attempting

------···---------------·-----------113
I?-rY

"Europe's Discontent With the United States Senate," LiteXXX (March 11, 1905), p. 370.

Diges_~,

114
"President Roosevelt and the Senate," SEectator, 94

(February 18, 1905), p. 242.
115
,i.

Nation, LXXX (February 2,1905).

116·
Nation, LXXXI (August 17, ·1905).

118
Nation, LXXX (February 23, 1905).
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to stir up an emotional reaction in his
'.:;·;_me

f~vor; 119

'••

--~ ••,,~,~..,~--~~~·.. _...}"\

l..lc..

while at the

time running of risk of possible confrontation with Europe.'3.n

,po~ers

over ''
enc va l'd't
1 l Y. o f

120

th·i
J ·
e r c_a1rns..

first swing of the Big Stick has simply
121
1<Jielder."

ban~ed

It cone 1 u d e d "t'ne
the shins of its

There v:as, however, much support for the rccei vership as proposerl by Roosevelt.

~any

extolled the virtues of any agreement

, G.-Juld promise to effective word off a possible European interve!:.tion with a subsequent violation of the Monroe Doctrine and solve
t!--:e rising prob1em of the Dominican debt justly.

122

The action

•

8fforded a demo~stration of what hoped_ to he a new snd dramatic
,:~pproo.ch

to the problems of Latin American states.

Such a new po-

J.j_ cy would be of a predetermined consistent nature as opposed to a

previous policy that had been accidental and vacillating. 12 3

This

new era of policy would be marked by the Rooseveltian interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, "police power," and its tenets would
serve as deterents to possible threats which could result in
119

~ntion,

LXXX 0·1arch 23, 1905).

120
Nation, LXXXI (August 17, 1905).•
121.
Na ti on, . LXXX (Y.arch 23, 190 5).

122
Hancock, p.
123

51.

"A :-.:otion to Take from the Table," p. 507.

...

124

The Senate's failure t~ ratify the treaty was viewed a~

unfortunate, its failure to consider the restrictions and limita125
tions, however, 'We.s tragic.
Santo Domingo itself was to maintf:lin the statu~ .9.:1::..2. not the United States "so th.tit if the treaty
126
be r~tified it can be executed."
The policy included American

intc1·cst and self-protection over and above· its humanitarian as-·
This concern for the material well-being of the Unit~d
was vitally conceined with the passage of the agreement.

12

7

Acturi.lly, Roosevelt was merely using his good offices to assist
s~nto

123
Domingo rather than operating in opposition to the Senate.

The supporters of the agreement felt the Senate ~hould be called

special session to notify an amended agreement since they earli
12
rejected what \·<as coYisidered to be a vital docunent. 9
In a letter to Jacob H. Hollander, Roosevelt made note of the

cn·dtion with which he had to conduct himself in these matters,

124

"The Santo Domingo Treaty," Independent, LVIII (Febru8ry

1905), p. 448.
125

"Santo Domingo's Debts," Independent, LVIII (!!:arch 23, 190_,,

p. 682.

126

(April

"Mr. Roosevelt and Santo Domingo," Independent, LVIII

6, 1905), P• 792.

127

Hancock, p. 127.

128

"Yr. Roosevelt and Santo Domingo, .. p. 792.

129

~·· p. 793.

1cst he be accused of backing the "money interest" in its dem3nC:.s.
"I

8 ;;:

alwriys afraid of seeming to back any big company which hA.s

fino.nclal interests in one of

thi~se

I

South i-l.meri can states, and c".an

only do so under the narrowest restrictions and most sharply definGd conditions.

On the other hand, there are real advantages in

not having a treaty but some such arranr.:;ement

HS

·we suggested." ],JO

Root in his speeches on his Latin A.inerican term made two positions very clear.
WctS

First, the use of force for debt collection

a serious cause of possible trouble in the relations between
131

the nations of the Old and New Worlds.

Second, he reiterated

the Rooseveltian position that Amefica sbught no territory aggranrlizcment in the Hemisphere to the detriment of any of the States
to its South.

"No act of unjust aggression by the United States'

8E:;ainst any smaller.and weaker power would be forgiven by the peo.
132
pl.e to whom the Government is responsible. 11
Senatorial critics rejected the Roosevelt-Root interpretation
of Latin American affairs.

Santo Domingo was the representative

case of all of the South and Central American Republics.

were inclined to violence and
lJO
lJI

~iporder

Most

and used the Monroe Doctr'

Roosevelt to J. H. Hollapder, Morison, IV, p. 1259.
Speeches Incident to the Visit of Secretary Boot, p. 158.

132

Ibid, pp. 206-207.
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s!1i~ld

, ti on.s.

133

L)

their repudiation of their financial and other obligaAmerica's historical tradition repudiated the use of

force for the collection of its·· debts, contending that American

citizens who made foreign investments surrendered himself to the
pro tee ti on of that country and could rely only upon Ameri C8.n good

.

.

offlces in attempt to secure Just treatment.

1J4

Senator Rayner

felt that such notions should be made to "realize that they must
r;,•rform
-

~-

the obligations of a ci vi 11 zed society, and that if their

property is rightfully seized upon their failuri to do so, we do
not intend to intervene unless an attempt is made to subvert their
ins ti tu ti on • • • •

We repudiate t'he doctrine th8.t the flag fol-

lo~·Is a contract.,. l3 5
The

American people would then declare that the Monroe Doc-

trine places upon them no obligation to protect such states when
they have arbitrarily done wrong to foreign countries or their citiz8nS.

::Iovrnver, when the action taken by European powers to re-

dress such grievances took the form of territorial occupation or

6

8cquisition the United States was opposed to its continuation. 1 3

1J3
Ar~eric8n

134
135

Francis G. Newlands, "The San Domingo Question," :t-Jorth
Review, CLXXX (1905), p. 888,
Ibid., p, 893,
Randolph G. Adams, "Santo Domingo: A study in Benevolent
South Atlantic Quarterly, XX (1921), p. 20,

Imp~rialism,"
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~!ewlands,

p. 895.
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1.rhe treaty proposed by Roosevelt according to Senator Newlands ~in

valves a new departure in our policy and active pRrticipation in
t~1e

a ff8 i rs of the 2epublics of South and Central America and of

t!1c Caribbean Sea - a protectorate over all of them." lJ7

In plai-

i-,c,r }3ngue.ge Senator Tillman of South Carolina evaluated the trea-

ty as saying, "Here we are, your big brother; you are not behaving
right, you have got to settle a·nd if you do not settle, we viill
1~hip

you and make you se ttl e.

11138
.

Additi
. ona 1 opposition was

~oun-

Led because Roosevelt attempted to eliminate the Senate as much as

possible from regulation of the' conducts of foreign affairs.
!.~r.ds

:t-:rew-

"

feared "if we once entered on a .policy of active intcrven-

tion, we might become involved in such intervention perplexities
8.S

to d1~1 ft us away from the domestic problems that concern us :·139
Roosevelt complained to Steffens, "the treaty is so obviously

in the interest of the United States 1 in tl:e interest of Santo Doi:~1n.:;0

1 and in the lnterest of the entire civilized world that no·

;:.:u.bs tan ti al

opposition could by any possi bi li ty have been aroused

save on purely factional grounds."
:

e·::>ck

140

Later ~epresentative Bab-

related that Roosevelt confided to him that party lines had
1J7

Ibid., p. 888.
,'.:'

1J8
Adams

1

p. 20.

1J9
Newlands, p. 886.

. .
'~

lLJ-O

Roosevelt to Stephens, February 6 1 1906, }'orison, V,

r.
~

'

L

. '.,,,·.r··r·
... , flrnwn in the .Senate on the treaty and the dcfirint attitude of
T/e:nczuela could be attributed to lnck of senn.torial support of l1is
rolicies. 141 The entire Roosevelt Corollary was to be disavowed
by the Senate's erasure of the Santo

to

r2

ti fy even its arr:ended form.

142

Domi~go

treaty and the fail·

He wrote to Carnegie.

"Grad-

t::::.J.ly we are coming to a condition which will insure permanent
peace in the Western Hemisphere.

If only the Senate.will ratify

S::mto Domingo treaty, we shall have ts.ken anot!:er stride in
this direction. 1114 3 Later in a· letter to Taft, he confessed "the
L '.w

opposition to Santo Domingo is opposition to Panama. 11144
ter to James E. 'llatson he elaborate~ on this point.

In a le

"The opposi-

!)on to the adoption of the tre0-ty by which ou.r rip;ht to build the
1Pan8ma Canal was secured, a part at least of the opposition even
now being made to the ratificEttion of the Santo Domingo trea.ty,

which is one more step in the effort to make peaceful and secure
the waters through which the route of the canal leads." 145

----·-------------------------------------·
141
(~arch

"The Situation in Santo Domingo," Independent, LVIII

30, 1905), p. 688.

142
"1·:here the Santo Domingo Affair Leaves the President and
the Monroe Doctrine," Harper's Weekly, XLIX {April, 1905), p. 457.

143

~oosevelt

144

145
p.

374.

to Carnegie, August 6, 1906, ~orisqn, V, p. 346.

Roosevelt to Taft, August 17, 1906, Morison, V, p. 365.
Roosevelt to J. E. Watson, August 18, 1906, Morison, V, ·

I
I

In answer to critics of the Constitutionality of his

f

actio~s,

; Sooscvelt was quick to point out "the Constitution did not explicit ly give me the power to bring a bout the :necessary G_greement
vi th Santo Domingo.
, ,:"wt I did,

0146

But the_Constitution did not forbid me to do

Reflecting on the di ff'i cul ties he faced in secur-

- J_ ng

the passage of the treaty, he recognized one of the fundamen-

t~l

choracteristics of the American people who "will, for instanc

flame up about the Monroe Doctrine the minute they think it men·:-;_ced in the concrete. but will be utterly indifferent while·

r

am

struggling to get through arrangements with Santo Domingo, or the
Central American States, which, if

~dopted,

would put the Monroe

Doctrine beyond the possibility of jeopardy, because they would
enable us to see that no

.t

1

•

It

147

~ossible

excuse existed for violating

Ee o.lso stated to Taft, "it took me two years to c;et

through the Santo Domingan treaty - a treaty which was of unlimited benefit to this country - simply becau_se the people as a whole
would not bother their heads

ab~ut

the situation. 11148

The eventual successful passage of the treaty in 1907 was due
in large measure to thi efforts of Elihu Root.
him, "it

'i~as

Roosevelt wrote of

he who finally got the Senate to accept the Santo Do-

146
York:

}~elvin M. Knight, The Americans in Santo Dominp;o, (New·
Vanguard Press, 1928), p. J2.

147
Roosevelt to A. H. Lee, June 27, 1911, Morison, VII, p.29c

148
Roosevelt to Taft, August 21, 1907, Morison, V, p. 761.

rl

~ I.~:nco

1

I

treaty, which secured an

oxtraordina~y

increase in peace and

p1·osperi ty in Santo Domingo and may prove 11 terally invA.luable in

'pointing out tte way for introducing peace 3.nd order in the Caricl'c;ins and around its borders.

1114 9

.rart to the rnutunl respect and

His success was due in lArge

coop~ration

he

~sintained

with the

lccislature and the Senate Cornmi ttee on Foreign Relaticns in p9rti-

j°1118r, l50

Passage of this policy

was

due in part to the Progres-

• sives who failed to cast a single dissenting vote ag9inst the

L__ _ i51
~t·eaty.

The Progressive, li~e Herbert Croly, felt the first

task of a truly national foreign policy was to develop hemispheric
,solidarity. 1 5 2
:::;;:~ge:cent

Roosevelt evaluated ~is policies at a speaking en-

at the Howard Union,

.

P~bruary

13, 1907 •

I was immensely amused when at a p:rofessiorn1l peace meeting
the other day, they incidentally alluded to ~e as having
rr:ade "war" on Santo Domingo. The war I have war made
literally consists in having them a collection of customs,
at their request. We now give them 45~ of the customs to
the Government, and the other 55% is put up to pay those of
their debts which are found to be righteous. The Rrr8ngement has gone on for two years now, while the coordinRte
branch of the Government discussed whether or not I had

149

Roosevelt to Carnegie, February 20, 1909, Morison, VI,

p. 1539.

150
Donald M. Dozer, "Elihu Root and Consular Reform," Missis0ippi VR~ley Historical Review,: XXIX (1942), p. J49.
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Hi lli::'l.rrr E. Leuchtenberg, "Progressivism and Imperialism:
The Progressive ~~ovement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916,"
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Review, XXXIX (1952), p, 488,
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I

usurped power in the matter, and finally concluded I had
not, 8nd ratified the treaty of the 55% we have been s.ble
to put $2,500,000 toward paying their debts; and with the .
l~ 5:.~ thri. t we collected for them they have received more money
th8n they even got when they collected lOO;'b therr.selves; and
the island has prospered as never ~efore. I feel like paraphrasing _Patrick Henryi "If this is war, ~ake the most
of it."I53

~Qoscvelt

-

.

.

.

wrote Lodge and expressed himself in the same vein.

~e

have interfered any at the request of the Santo Domingo
people. We have interefered with the hearty approval of
the foreign debt holders, because our interference benefits them sorr,e1·;hat, although it benefits the Santo Domingo
fPople much more. Its benefits are chiefly by preventing
chaos and misery in an island so near t~c:ps that its welfare must always cause us some concern • ../}

~oot

h'Tote to Hollander concerning t.he treaty on ~·~ay 7, 1907.
'
The present tre~ty •• ~ contains;
not only a proposition
that t~e United States shall ensure the service of the
debt by collecting and applying the revenu~s, but also
that the United Stat~s shall adjust the debt to which the
revenues are to be applied.
·

The question has arisen in my mind 1·1hether the two questicns
could not be separated, the debt being adjusted on a feir
snd reason9ble basis by someone actj_ng under the authority
of Santo Do~ingo, and making the adjustment conditional
upon the United Sta~es ens~ing the service of the debt
substantially as provided by the pending treaty. We would.
have a different pr_oposi tion to present the Senate; tl".v~ t
is, the simple proposition-of answering the service of
the debt already adjusted. This, perhaprr, might be free
from sooe of the objections which are made to the pending
trcaty.i)5
.
Root at the Jrd Conference of American Republics at Rio de

253·
Bishop, pp. 434-435.

154
Roosevelt to Lodge, April 30, 1906, Yorison, V, p. 256.

155
Jessup, pp.

546-547 •

:-rr:·~iro on July

Jl, 1906 rcitE:rated the !-:.ILcric;_,_n l)osition rec;nrct-

its southern neighbors.
1 :~0

Hish for no victoi·ics'but those of p2,,,c,e, for no terriLory except our own; for no sovereignty except sovereicnty
over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights;
nf the smallest and ~eakest member of the fanily of nation~
entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire,
:::nd '·~e deem the observance of that rcspGct the chief sue_rFtnty
of the ~eak acainst the oppression of the strong. We neither
claiE1 nor desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that
1·;e do not freely concede to every American Republic.
\·~e wish
to j_ncrease our prosperity, to expend our tr~!.de, to e;row in
:·:c:Jlth, in wisdom, and in spirit, but otT eonception of the
true l-!AY to o.ccomplish this is not to pu11 c'l o~,,n others and
T,rofi t by their ruin, but to help all frier1ds to a common
prosperity and a common growthi that we may all become
greater and stronger together. 56
Roosevelt voiced much the same sentiments in a letter to

Carne~ie.

With Santo Domingo we have just negotiated a treaty especially designed to prevent the need of any intRrference either
hy us or by any foreign nation with the i:nb:)rnal affairs of
the island, while at the same time securing the honest creditors their debts and to the govenllient of the island an
assured income, and giving to the islanders ther.r1selves the
chance, if they take advant:;i.~e of it, to achieve the internal
peace they so sorely need. ~ .·

r::he powers ere_nted the United States by the above mentioned
81istoms Convention of 1907 did not con-sti tute a greater infringe-

on the sovereignty of the Domini"can Republic than when Heurhcd first alienqted the cuE:inms houses.
t-:;l'n_nted the protection of the modus vi viendi

This action still
from European

vcntion and thus continued Dominican credit and revenue.

inte~
i

Such ac-

also abolished permanently the danger of fnfrir:gerlent of the

156

157

Speeches Incident to the Visit of Secretary Root, p. 12.
Roosevelt to Carnegie, April

5, 1907,

~orison,

V, p.

640.
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'.'onroe "Goct:cine by

i~uropean

1

to collect their clRims • 5

8

... ~·"'·~1·;;•21

The con-

vention 1·10.s different from the •)ld agreement that United States du
. !~.ot 11.Ldertc~~\:e to cdjust or determine the Dominican clebt but r.ierely

to administer the customs of the

t loan.

~epublic

for the service of a new

':'he proceec1 s of the customs were devoted to the a1210rti za tit'l'

,of all the recoenizcd debts and claims at a level acceptable to
The responsibility for such ~c-

hath republics and the creditors.
ti on

•·~as

limited to fifty years o.:nd could be ended earlier incid _;

to the [illortization of the debt.
2~plhlic

~uties

was not be

increas~

During this period the Dominic0n

its public debt nor modify its import

unless Agreed upon by the

U~ited

1

States. 5 9

After his presidency Roosev~lt maintained his interest in {he
cond'Ll.ct of Latin American affairs~

He voiced hope that "all of

self-coverLlnent, of material prosperity, of potential strength,
end of political and social conduct as to make the Monroe Doctrin
in the sense of bei:r;.g merely a unllaters.l doctrine, a thing of
past 3nd to substitute for it a conrnon agreencnt among all the f
republics of the New World. 11160 • _At Rio de Janerio he reiterated
his desire that Latin American nations "sufficiently advanced"
should pnrticipate on an absolute equality in the responsibilities
and development• of the Monroe Doctrine and that it must be made a

158

Welles, pp. 918-191.

159

Hollander, "The

u.s.

160
Blakeslee, p. 82;

and the Dominican Republic," p.

295.

conti:ncntal and not a

'
unilatera~·-

c.octrine.

161
If

In Uraguay he add-

ed:
It is in no sense a doctrine of onc-si~ed 8dv0ntage; it is
to involke only in the interest of our com~onwenlth of the ;
;:es tern Hemisphere. It shonld be invo~ed ~-,y all our natiors
in a spirit of mutual self-respect end on a footing of com~
plete equality of both right and obligation.
I congratulate
the eountries of South l0crnerica tr.at I have visited th8.t ·their
prosTess is such in justice, political stability and natiocal
prosperity as to make them also the sponsor of the Monroe
Doctrine, so that, as regards them, all that the United
States has to do is to stand ready as one of the great
brotherhood of American £iz1-~ions to join with them in uphold•
ing the ~onroe Doctrine, 0
In a letter to A. D. White Roosevelt evaluated the

~:onroe

Doctrine as having done "more for the peace of the Western IIemis:_

.

phere, ond if lived up to will do more· in the future for the peace
~f the Western Hemisphere,

than everything done by the ultra-peac

at-sny-price men during the last sixty years taken together.••

16 3

The Administrations immediately following Roosevelt adopted
hls general policies,
r:~or

The period was marked by an ever incressing

th2t the ls.nds bordering the Panama Canal would fail to meet

their obligations and fall.prey to European interventions.

164

A.rn-

161
1

r.1. Stull Eol t, "The United States and the Defense of the
'.·:c:s ~·1rn Ecr::isphere, 1815-1940," Pacific Historical Review X(l941),

p.

3 _.,.

162

J. VarelB., "The Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine to the Republic of Uruguay," in The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine a supplement to Annals, CXI. (1924), p. 23.
163
Roosevelt to A. D. White, Nov. 2, 1914, :Morison, VIII,:A82A

(~oston:

D3na G. Munro, 'T'he United Stn tcs c-.nd the Cori bbean Are:-i,

World Peace Foundation, 1934), p. 216.
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,.

cr:i ·=··i.ns dcsir,:-d to pror:~ote public order, alon3 1·:i th sound econo::iic
''

pol:i.ticnl dcvelopment.

d 1d

16 5 The 1Jomingan formula was expanded
166

to ot'hcr of the f.:'3.ribbean states with equ9l
8

SllCCC~SS

Te ft' s

•

;J>r,inistration w-::.s narl{ed by outright military intervention to

safccuard the security of the Can8 l ree;i on.

167

T:"' ft fe 1. t

c<::->::ntial "th:qt the countries within that sphere sh:?..11 be

rer:".OV(~d

fro:-:1 the jeopardy involved by heavy foreign debt and chaotic nat:i

0n:J. l

finances and f:com the ever present cl2,_nger of international

co::1plications due to disorders at home.
tion

~lso

11168

The \r!ilson ndminist

accepted the principles of the Roosevelt Corollary.

16 9

~!hi le both the T<J.ft and Hilson o.dmfnistrations 0-dopted the R·oose-

',:eJ. t

~orollary

they did 11 ttle to rtdapt it to thRir oHn si tua ti qn

is to say, the Corollary

w~s

used exactly

cl'i bed by Roosevelt r-:J.nd the succeeding two

as

it had been des-

ad~i:r.istrations

offered

r.ew interpretation ·of the :Monroe Doctrine and are not sufficie

significant to merit further discussion.
The Rooseveltian interpret:;i.tion of the Vionroe Doctrine gave

165
Jones, The

166
167
168

u.s.

and the Caribbean, p. 77.

Perkins, Ap;p:ro3.ch, pp. 58-59.

Bemis, p. 164.

Weinberg, p. 432.

169

r.i:unro I Intervention, p. '331.

I
. ~:(

"

I

t~c D~ited

Stntes a hegemony over the ~estcrn Hemisphere. 170

In

~1ir0ss delivered on April 2, 1903, Roosevelt referred more.to
)>:~··~·-nny th.:in the Vonroe Doctrine when he ::;::-,id th~t it is only 8.

;·,1·iLG~ ple ·:rnd exprr~s.sed the hope that

I:

of international lsw.

171

some

day it

1•TOUld

be a pni·t

Both, however, are recognized lines of

l

co~i11ct respected by the States and, despite exceptions, have been

cor.s tcJntly applied B.l1d have force behind them, 172

Root was

·co;>~

o~ the fact that tho doctrine l'Jas not international law but:
rcste~ upon the right of self-protection which was so reco3nized.

a derivative of the concept of sovereignty and was recog-

extending beyond the lir1it.S- of the ter:citorigl jurisdic173
of t~c strite exercising it,
If the doctrine h8d never

~~clared, however, limitations would still have been placed
on the activities of the Americap states by each other.

Such re-

str:i.ctio:1s devo1~1e from treaty obligations to which states are stit
jcct ::1i>.d the duties irr..posed under inte1~national law.

174

The Vene-

~ucla crisis offered an example of both the obligations involved

170
Blakeslee, p,

77.

171
Alvorez, p. 228.

172
~·' p. 172.
173
. ~

'nPrn Root, Adresses on International Subjects, ed. by
· r:o1:;crt Jo.con and James Brown Scott (Cambridge:
}!arvard trni versi ty
Press, 1916), p. 111.
2 71~

-Ibid.,

po.
115-116.
...

~ ~ci l11;.

175

The richt of cvel'Y sovereign state to

p::.~ot2ct;

itself by pre-

venting a condition of affairs in which could injure it was also
~·,_::

,

I

co1_::::ii zed by internati on1.;~ 1 lr.:ii·;r.

·..:is ;::ffecti ve as

Such action, ho\·Jever, 'ilould be

the po·,; er behind it • 1 76

Th:l. s rL:::;i1t,

just

'3.S

the

:~onroe

Doctrtne, did not impose. any respcnsi bill ty on the l!ni ted

St:~tes

or any other country to exercise it,

Therefore the Unitdd

States did not have a need, other than its own co:1Sidcrations, to

int,::1·vene .on the behalf of European Powers to collect debts, coe
, ecmduct, redress wrongs, ·or

reven3~

1
I.of the le.tin American s_tates. 77

injuries suffered at the [\.snds

The ;:onroe Doctrine did not

cssert, imply or involve any rights on the part of the United

St::>ctcs to impair or control the independent sovereignty of any
/l__r:-ierie9.n state as this sovereignty is the bs,sis of international

,

i:-:1~r.

178·

Root noted that:

A false conception of what the r.-:onroe Doctrine is, of what
it demands and what it justifies, of its scope and of its
limits, has invaded the public press ond affected public
opinion within the past few years. Grandiose schemes or·
national expe.nsion invoke the Monroe Doctrine.
Interested

175
Elihu Root, The Military and Colonial Policy of the United
S t::-d.:es:
A<idresses and Re orts, ed. by Robert Bacon and James
Brown Scott Cambridge:
Harvard University _Press, 1916), p. 107.
~

176

Root, Addresses on Intern::2 ti onal Subjects, p. 111.

177

Ibid., p. 119.

178
p,id., p. llJ.

__ l_, I

:~otives

to compel Central or South Americ8 countries to do1
or :c2frnin from doing sonething by '•lhi ch individual Americ::i.113
~ny profit invoke th~ ~onroe Doctrine.
Clamors for national
clory from minds too shallmi to grG.sp at the sm:1e time a
scDse of national duty invoke the ;ton1-oe Doctrine.
The
intoler:,:.nce -::·rhi ch de1riands tha_t control over the conduct and
the opinions of other peoples which is the essence of tyranny in•:okes the Monroe Doc~rine. Thou,o;htlcss people who see
no di ffe:ccnce between lawful right and physical pm<Jer assume
th~t the ~onroe Doctrine· is a warrant for interference in
~~he intern-:iJ. aff;:1irs of all weaker Y'l.Gtions in the J'!ei\ World.
Apqinst this suppositious doctrine, mRhy protests both in
the United States Hnd in South America h8.ve been m8_de,,8nd
jnstly msdc. To the ;c;0:al ~1onroe Doctrine these protests
'n'-,v
a ~ye no 8.pp l'
-<. •
1
1 (9
_ _1.C8-vlo.1.
The Roosevelt Corollary 1;;-as no inevitable deduction from the

lnnr:;uo.ge of President Monroe according to Perkins.

He goes on to

~8Y tlmt it was revolutionary for 1t transformed the doctrine i6-

l

"~nnded

for the protection of the New World states

~gainst

inter180
vcnti on by Europeans into a doctrine of J\mer i can interventions.
rcr~dns

~"'"_1

criticized Roosevelt for adopting the principle of inter:-

ti on~ 1 poll ce power as a general principle and to rel8 te such a

0bli.::;3_tion to the Doctrine.

He based his opinion on a belief that

the United States must not be tied down to :--my such generaliza-

tion.

181

Other critics had noted that Roosevelt made two assump-

tions not found in Monroe's message; first that the doctrine prevented other nations from interfering in America, secc:nd, that
b'.lc1n·;8rd or impotent countries must be policed and helped by some

179

Jessup, p.

561.

180
Perkins, Bist6ry of the Monroe Doctrine,
181
IM_ d. , p.

464.

1867-1907.

r
r··~>--·-··~->-·~r·--·· <"·"~·"'" "

< .". ·-•"

-~_.··-~·-·~·''°«"o-'•-•••:-·,,NW~<-· ,,,,.,,_"'""-·-~"'-"--'~-·~;<_.,~_,,

f

'.,.-iv,n:ced n:_:i.tion.

!:oon concluded the first

~_1ssvJ11ption

is fBlse
182
the second is the fund::tment8l dogma of modern imperi8.lism.

~,nd

Jn the movement toNord the reversal of the Roosevelt Caroll-

,; ry, Surrirner Welles, outhor of the fam.ed work in S?cnto Domin,s;Bn ·

r,,~f;:;irs, N'."lboth'~_:.i[ineyard,

i'ias

one of the pri:ne :novers.lSJ

Eis

inflw:;nce in the State Department was still felt when he published his book two years previous to the time the elark iv:emorandu.in sig-

nnlled the

rep~diation

of the Roosevelt Corollary.

According to

Cl2.rk "the so-coJ.led 'Roosevelt Corollary' was to the effect, i:;.s

.

cenerally Understood, that in case of financial or other difficult:ies in weak I.a tin Aw::;ric'?.n countries! the United States should
?tt<)'"ript an adjustment thereof lest European Governu.ents should intervene, 1-Jnd intervening should occupy terri tory--'.:'tn G.ct i:ihich
•
·
i p 1 es o f t'ne 1i·:onroe
n.;octrine."
«;ou l .d 1.)e con t rary t o t h e princ

184

The Doctrine Clark holds "states a case of the United States vs.
185
Surope, not of the United States vs. Latin America."
Therefore
1.1e

co~cludes

t•y t~'1c

"It is not believed that the Corollary is justified

terms of the

l~onroe

Doctrine, however ,much 1 t may be justi-

182
J\":oon, p. 162.

18J
Perkins, Approach, p. 182.

124
Clark, p. xxiii.
lP. 5
~·,

p. xix.
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':'ivJ f:lc1rk !·:ernor,-,.ndum nar1<ed the repudiation of the ?.oosevclt Coro-

11nry and sign8lled

was later to develop ns the Good Neighl)or

~hat

Policy.

'l'he h..,sis of. this policy

1·ras

the

of the United States and

th~t

r~rt

ag:c8e:nent.

the abstinence from force on
its action should be con-

187

at the Special Inter-Americen Conference for the :·".ainte-

eo~c1udcd

r:·-,nce of rcace at Buenos Aires in

1936.

It provided that:

';'he High Contracting Parties declare ino.dmiss9ble the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, 2nd for
~h2tever

reason, in the i~~grnal or external
nny other of the Parties,

affoi~s

of

.

'.'.'he
~or
t:~1sn

)oli ey of intervention i;.·ras 18.id to rest by the Good

Policy.

v. :cn ty

It was to be resurrected in spirit, at least, less

In Cara6as, in

~~Pt ~ould

form of forci gn intervention, Com-

A new

ye:3rs later.

L':'-mis:r, now th:cc::i.tened to
ritory.

:l\'.ei~-

initic~te

an alienat.ion of American ter-

1954, John Foster Dulles sounded the call

mean an adoption of Roosevelt's principles to a new era

"':'he doninci.tion or control of the political institutions of any
(

J.,.cJ.::ri c~:i.n state by the ir: terna tional communist. movement • • •

186
Ibid., pp. xxiii-xxiv. ·

ie.7
Dexter Perkins, The Evolution of !irr:ericnn Fo~eign Poli cv.
Oxford University Press, 19&8), p. 12b. ·' ·

York:

188
Pratt,

Aneric~'s

Colonial Experiment, p.

323.

c;oi-::c.ti tutc a thrc8t to tt.e soverei,snty and political indcpendenqc
of

.

t~·1e

Ar.tci.'ican stn.tes."

~]crican

139

The result of th:ls new concern for

sscurity in effect broke up the f8mily of nations concept

thqt was the basis of the Good Neighbot 'Policy.

The entire con-

cept, l10v:ever, ·;·;::,_s not de:=-tr to the hearts of L::o.tin ADerico.ns to

'l'>.e often-used metaphor of: an inter-Ameri ce.n "family" ·
p~::r!ni

tted. the United States to consider itself as bis

brother, rich uncle, or even head of tl::.e f9mily.
~1is
toricRlly, we asserted, 11nder the Monroe Doctrine, the
right and duty to protect the junior members of the
f:iJ:',i ly, end tmcler the Theodore Roosevelt corolls ry, to

ch:'"'sten them os necess9_ry.

Such an attitude 1'!:.=i.s perh::i:ps

~ccepted

•

in the early ye~rs, hut it becaree increAsingly
~alling to junior ~embers ~s the disperity of ~ealth and
pov:er -;·:idencd D.Yld as the Uni t,-;d Stgtes gTe"':I norc pat1·onizing
':-:r-•:1 ,,~::;s01·ti vc Di1d t}~:P. LR.tin Americc,ns :norc sensi ti \iG of
their l.'1.G• This sensitivity was s.gc;ravo.ted by suspicions

th~t--contradictory but ~lltually reinforcing--on the one
11~1nd that ]'forth .11..meri CRD exp.1.)ra. t]on was to 1::1 "!me for the
slower progress of the I"~tin peoples, and on the other--th:-:it

they then;.sel ves had failed, t~q·5 perhaps in some way they
~ere inferior to the gringos. '
'T'he Castro 2·evolution perE3onified the specter tha.t had h.<;_unte:i tl:e ).r.lericans.
nirn:~ty

A corrurn.mist regime had been installed a mere

miles off the American coast.

nific;o.1!tly alter American policy,

·::ere

:·:_ssurr.:ed

This revolution was to sig-

After Castro·_all insurrections

to irivolve automatically the danger of a communist

tal:c-over, 3nd thereby required direct mill tary intervention by
t}1e

1in2- tecl States.

The equ..o:i. ti on "insurrection

189

Ronnld Steel,
1967), p. 202.

190
I bi ri • , p •

193 •

P8.X

Americana (New York:

=

comprnnism "" peri 1

The Viking Press'·

~~o

t::--

Pn:i_

ted Stn.tes

K'J..S .9.

direct conscqnencc

of

•r
•
The abortive Bay of Pigs 1nvas1on to rt::nove

r-~,r,:~iir:-nt Kcnnc:;dy

Cn_stro' s take-·

c~1_stro

prompted

to make this appraisal of America's position in

L· '.:in Arr:eri C8.

Our restraint is not inexhaustible, Should it ever appe9r
that the inter-American doctrine of rion-interfercnce Derely
conceals or excuses a policy of non-action--if the nsticns:
of this hemisphere should fail to meet their coTcrdtt:nc::r,ts
2gninst outside com~unist penentration--then I W8nt it
c1corly understood that this govcr:r1r1ent will not he~.>i tri_te
in meeting its £:;i:::.~mary obligations, which are the security
of this nation. ';)
'i':ennedy was later to state:
l:.::;0

"We in this hemisphere mvst also

every resource at our command to prevent the establish11ent of

:•hoth2r Cuba in this

h~misphere. "l93

His successor phrased the

s:.::rt:e sentir·;ents in a rwre homely fashion.

"He don't p:r-opose to ,

3i t 1·1ere in our rocking chair with our hands folded and let the

cor:,sr:.uni sts set up any government in the western hemisphere ... l94

:Coth those administrations paid little more th0n lip service to
the ideFtls of the Alliance for Progress,

It h2.d been their policy

to oake formal avowals of anti•communism within the context of the

191
Ihid,, pp. 219-220.

192

Ibid., p. 234.

193

Lyndon Johnson, "U,S. Acts to Mee·t the Threat in the DomiLII (May 17,
196 5), p. 746.

nic~n Republic," The Department of State Bulletin,

191}
Steel, p. 232.
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~'-32

i• 1:-1-:::r::c-."...ru~ri can

"fa;;·,i ly," of good neighborliness, c::.nd the princip]ss

The instruments it used however, held been based

'of the OAS.

fl•S..[~

•

stick, the

f~onroe

Corol1~ry--the

cvelt

Doctrine, e.r.d its oi·m refinc:1ent of the BcosJohnson Doctrine.

Ironically, it Kas
1~ecl8ration

on·~

th~

195

Dominican Republic which prompted the

of the Johnson Doctrine,

just as, it

~ad

provided the

I occc:si on for the fi ::cs t. appli ca. ti on of the . Roosevelt Co:toll.'.'rry.

!The o"L1t1:,reak of trou1Jle in the

~ay,

f enrly

~ominican

Tiepuclic in 1n.te Apri 1

Plrt

1965 served as the vehicle for a re-Rffixmation of the

policy of intervention by the United States to prevent the take-

. over of s. L'ltin Americ:.:i.n country by forces hostile to the interests
()f

t.hr_: l.'nited States.

A subtle change hBd to.ken place, an j_dealo-

regret that we may have to impose a military solution
to a political problem • • • • While leftist propaganda
i·:ill :fuzy this up as a figh.t behreen those who want a
Castro-type solution and those who oppose it.
I

I don't ';•:rant to overdramatize, but if we deny the com:-nYYli.cations equipment, and if the opposition to the leftists lose heart, we may 9e asking in the near fpture for
a lq:nding of marines to protect United States ;L:r1terests

195
Ihid., p. 2Jl.

·-::.nd for other purpose:s.

Vhat does Washinzton prefer?

196

Other sources indicated t(1n.t captured d oc1Jrients and various
:;0crct reports in the h:1nds of the C. I. A.

sho~·red

the crisis t?

r·e L:crely the first on a long Corr1munist timet9.ble for the t8.keoYer
'cf I.ntin Arnerica.

Ito

~~bassador

197

Senator Clark Kas sure the junta sent word

Bennett that "you hG.d better send P..:ncrican troops in

1

8

beco.use a Communist takeover threatens. 9

President Johhson reacted in a series of speeches on April JO

to

r>=1y

2, 196 5.

In the Apri 1 JO speech he first intir::ated that

thn revolutionary struggle was more than a civil upheaval.

11

TI1ere

are sicns that people trained outside the Dominican 1epuhlic are

.

seeking to gain control.
~o~inican

Thus the legitiEate ospirations of the

people 2nd most of their leaders for progress,

nnd socigl justice are
inter-American system."

threaten~d

199

de~ocr2cy

and so are the principles of the

The Kay 1 speech linked the responsi-

blli ties of this inter-P.nerican system and its adversion to com-

i::unisrn.

"Today, forced with a threat to the principle of the In-

tcr-Aneri can system and the pe2,ce of the hemisphere, the OAS acted
decisively."

This action was due to the fact that "neither the

Theodore Draper, "The Dominican Crisis':

A7:':erica1~ Policy," Co10mentary, h~ (December,
\

197

Ibid • , p.

47 •

198
Ihid., p. 50,
, 00
- . / _,

Johnson, "U.S. Acts," p. 71~2.

A Case Study in

1965), pp. 45-46.

·' j

St:::;.tcs,

r..01~

I

ony nation, can want or per:ni t a return to th'"t

hrutql and oppressive despotism which earned the condemnation and
f-'l~~i shT!1ent

of this hemisphere 'and of al 1 civilized humanity.

i11tcnd to carry on the struggle
5_.'Jcolosy it clca:rn itself.

a~ainst

W€:

tyranny no matter in wh~t

This is our mutual responsibility un,..

dcr ',:he '..lg1~eements we have signed and the cor!";mon values i.·1hich bind
,
1•.::>
,~

toc;ether."
The

~ay

200

2 speech was very much pointed and more

of the President's previous

?DY

state~ents.

Co1:n'.'lt.mist infiltration was age.in voiced.
: ~r1t. 'Sook ::i_ tre.gic turn.

'
Conn;u:i!ist

-

b~llicose

t:

The allegation of

"The :revolution<=i_ry T'.!Ove-

l~aders,

mnny of then trAi:r.ed

in Suba, seeing a chance to increase disorder, to cain a foothold,
~oin0d the revolution.
12~?n

They took increasing control.

And what

as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy

:>:J.d social justice, ve-zy short1y moved an1 1·:-as taken over and real1_y ~10izcd and placed into the hands of a band of Communist con.:1)i1~0tors."

201

Although "revolution in any country is a mo.tter'

for thqt country to deal with "this overriding circunstance mr>.de

it

:?~

"mo..tter for hemispheric action only ·when the object is the

,::::3tablish:i1cnt of a co;:1munist
:3;-:;ve1.op~:ient

200

di~te.torship." 202

The fear of such a

prompted Johnson to formulate what has been called his

Ibid., p. 7L1-3.

201
Ibid·., p.

74S.

202

Steel, p. 232.

I 1·:r'.:'nt yon to knol'I', and I -i:·I,Jnt the vrnrld to know, thn.t
:!.S long as I '.J.1'1 President of this country, we are going
to defend ourselves. We will defend our soldiers against
attackers. We will honor our treaties. ~e will keep our
commit tments. Wc wi 11 defend our D'i ti on 8.L;;Ji nst all those
\:!10 seek to destroy not only the United States but every
free cm1ntry of this hemis~1ere. We do not ~snt to bury
...,11yovie f CC'
"'S I UV.•c.,,; d u 0 .0:'.3 ny
P
. 11t
',·.'t~• t".o
r•ot
- ·ti·. ·l!<· es 1~-"·"'c'r-"'
-'--~ t
'•
• •
.J
-•
2
intend to be buried •
'"

'

0

ll

P' 0

1

Jt;.L

.Johnson's actions and just-ifica.tion for tl!eEi p1'0:.:-:pted both
~;o_·,~i:)? and
~>le;

critic1sB as had Roosevelt and on much the ssy:c :p~ci:nci-

Ancrica's right to intervene in another State's affciirs.

rtc::sr::crct~,:ry of State Ball

t:'n-

justified such action as it was design-

cJ. "~o cr-1rry out the f;_mdc-•Gental dc~ision of the A:':erics.n st0.tes
~'1:~t

the extension of Yarxist-Leninist power is inconp.qti ble i-.ri th

:-.:i.c inter-A.merj_can systcm."204
·.:i th Johnson when he had
Lents.

Senn.tor Eussell of Georgis ne;reed

cons~lted

him regarding Don1inican develo1

Russell was convinced Johnson "had no alternative other to

proc0ed to send the Armed Forces to Santo Domingo to avoid anothe~

, -

C1 l Cf;~_ •

II

205

Senator J. William Fulbright led the opposition to American
intervention.

He based his dissent on the basis that the justifi-

,·:'.3.tion for United States rested on "cinbiguous evidence, assuned

203

·.Johnson, "U.S. Acts,'' p. 747-7L1-8.

2011-

Georce Ball, "The New Diplomacy' II The Department of st~tE~
(June 28, 1965), p. 1046.
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1 :co" t i'rom the be rel nni n,s that the revo 1 u ti on was Communist domi-

::~'J.tecl

or v:ould certainly become so."

to 1Jrotect

1~J:Jericon

206

The sending of the troops

lives was dismissed in turn as being a ploy .to

.: -. se home reEcti on to the troops' invasion.

11

In mid-afternoon of

April 28, Col. Pedro B. Benoit, head of a junta which had been
~~stily

assembled,

~sked

again this time in

w~iting,

for U.S.

troops on the ground that this 11as the only 1-·ray to prevent a. Comr:Y:nist t::i.keover;·

no

T!J.erition Was l'Qede of the junta or inability to

.

protect American lives."
~':-'.s

207

Fulbright continued that this request

rejected by 'dashington and Benoit informed that the U. S, woul1

r::ot intervene unless ?.merican liveS' ·were endangered by
:H:t,Lor..

9.

continued

'T'hus, if he clalmed that American lives were in danger,

the U. S. would intervene, which is wh.'1.t
.
b?:.ppened. 208

Thus, Ful-

brizht concluded that "the U .s .. intervened in the Do.cni nican Bepub-

11c for the purpose of preventing the victory of a revolutionary
f'orr;e which was judged to be Cominunist dominated.

Cn the basis of

Arhassodor Bennett's messages to Washington, there is no doubt
th~::i.t

\'!·_~s

the threat of Communism' rather than dan5er to American 11 ve·s

riis primary reason for reccm.mending mili ta~y

inter~-rention. 1120 9
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~renti on see-his The

207
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For Senator Fulbright's view of the interArrop.:ance of. Power.
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Ot!-1cr cri ~~ics hPld that the OAS 118.d gr~nted o.pproval to unilc: 1./T.'ll int.~r",-m1tion by the United States, and o.s a result hod

\

"

:,:-,,r;doneci its role as a
~ony

juridical organization Hnd a force for ha.F,
210
nnd law in the ~estern Hemisphere.Johnson's actions,

-') t: ,e;x-3

I

felt, rcsu l ted not from Conmunist strength in the Domini c'!'m

Bc public but a ''ea k non-Cofnnuni st element,

The non-Communist for-

ces Kere too weak, too lacking in political sophistication, ·and
too little skilled in the arts of government to i•:i thstrind Com:riur:ist
.
211
infiltration and subsequent control.
Undersecretary of State Mann reacted violently to chRr~es tl
,non-:l.ntervention had

b~co:ne

o1)solet!e.

I J.::now of no ;!!nshington offieials who think this way,
Cn the contrary, I believe unilateral intervention by
one American state in the internal political affairs of
:1nother is proscribed in the OAS Charter but that nonintervention is a keystone of the structure of the interAmerican system. American sta.tes have a treaty as ~-;ell
as a sovereign right to choose their political, social
~nd economic systems free of all outside interference.~-1 2
Johnson, as :1oosevelt before him, made his position unmistak::_:i_hly clear.

"Our eoal is to help to prevent another con:1n.unist

'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·
210
R. 'I', Pohan, "The Domi~1j_ can Case:

::'J:c ";,r~,cric>.'n Journql of International Lnw,
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Dr.'3.per, p·..

Uni lnteral Interventia-i."
IX (Oct., 1966), p. Al?.
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i·Tqnn, "The Dominican Crisis:
Correcting Some Xisconcep- ·
The D0partm~=mt of State Bulletin, LIII (November 8, · 1965)
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jcnn i11tervention policy, like Roosevelt, Kas based on broad prjnd_)J.cs l:h i ch could be interpreted in

E:;i_ny

v;:;Ti ous r::CL<:>nings ~md

dcc:raes depending upon the disposition of the United States.

To

-:oiYison threats to order included not only insu:iT..:::ct5-on, but evr.:m

1c;ur'Ie:r.:;ion

:"-nd

infiltr~1_tion.

:re

held "i·rhen a co1:--,1:-1vn1st group seoo

to exploit misery, the entire free Americ2n system is put in dead-~k·ns;e:r."

ls

The dc;_::Tee of de0d ly dancer the

EL-:r~e p1·es1~nce

of com-

::,m:.i st groups involved or 1·;ho :·:as to determine ~·•hen such a pot er:=

tial danger had become a dc2dly danger was not specified.

ActuAl-

ly, the United States .was again ' gi~en a c0 rte
- hlsnche
--·- in decid1n~
----~.o...,.

~ ~,·'f~en,

· ~·:11ere, ::.nd to what degree she chose to intcrver:e 1·:i th troops

I.

.;,.1
.J.....,

T.-,t:J"n
_..,

~-t.-i.--'

f,-...,Crl°C:>
~-~,

~_,,_;.J,_

~lJC"t

-.)

~o...J

1°t

haQ' done ov·:>r
t.:!

c1"vf-y<
._J.
V
J)...

n,-,,~r~

,:;

~t.,.,:_

0

.

'°'',_.,":•io113"l'7
l:-'·'·
I_. 'J ....l..J •

214

LJ'•

'rhe sin118:rity bet;·reen Roosevelt and Johnson is even more
,,

vividly seen in this statement which
could have been ffiade by
1
er ·:_iut

Vis.s m~_.:idc 'Jy Jo~:J:}son.

"We seek no territory.

to impose our will on anyone.

eit~-

We do riot

We intend to work for the self

deterrr:ination of the peoples of the Americas within tte framework
215
o:- freedom,"
The Johnson Doctrlne "although regarded by some

'new corollary to the Monroe Doctrine'

n

nothing more

th~n
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,a case of self-defense for protecting the security of the

Irr

u.s ... 216

this be true, Clark's ririteria for judging the Roosevelt Carol-

l'18.ry

I

is just as applicable to the Johnson Doctrine.

Ijbelieved

"It is not

that the corollary is _justified by the application of the
1doctrlne of self-preservation. 112·1 7

I

I1

The Johnson Doctrine is representative of two of the import-

ant innovations of Theodore Roosevelt in regard to the Monroe D,)c-

i trine.

The first of these, armed American intervention to prevent

ithe implantation of a foreign power hostile to the interests of:
'the United-States in Latin America, was resurrected and adopted
'for modern use.

The fear of a Communist takeover was substituted

:ror the fear of a European intervention of sixty yeaTS previotdy.

rrhe Roosevelt Corollo.ry was 11 berated from the grave i t had been
'laid into by the Clark Memorandum and the successive Good Neighbor

I Policy.
0

Its adapted form shows its lasting impact on American di-

J plomacy in the Western Hemisphere.

lI

Its very adaption is the second Rooseveltian innovation.

tRoosevelt had earlier stated, "No such policy as that of the Mon-

' roe Doctrine

c~n

remain fossilized while the nation grows,

Either

'it must be abandoned or it muqt. be modified to meet the changing
216
·Larman c. Wilson, "The Monroe Doctrine, Cold War Anachro1 nism:
Cuba and the Dominican Republic," The Journal of Politics,
1
28 (May, 1966), p. J46.
217

Clark, p. xxiii to xxiv.
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The Johnson Doctrine as it modifie<l

lthe Monroe Doctrine to meet the problems and threats of a new era,
1

Conununism, vindicated this position.
The Roosevelt Corollary as it developed through the annual

·

message of 1902, the letter to the Cubans in 1904, Roosevelt's

I1letter

to Root on

M~y

.

20, 1904, and the actual pronunciation in

the annual message of 1904 ranks as or:e of the major milestones in
;/1_r,1erican diplomacy, or lack of it.

From its inception it ruled

the conduct of foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere, through
the administrations of Taft and Wilson it gained acceptance and a
wider application.
i~ot

Its renunciation• by the Clark Memorandum did

extinguish its impact on Latin American affairs.

the era of the Good Neighbor Po.licy the

BiS Stick was

Throughout
still suspect.

in all American dealings with their neighbors to the South.

The

reincarnation of the Roosevelt Corollary in the adapted form of
Johnson Doctrine only served to give substance to such doubts and
suspicions• ,
The question of whether Roosevelt was merely an imperialist
bent on wielding the "Big Stick" over the heads of less powerful
'neighbors or whether he was one of the humanitarians of his days
need further study and refinement.

In the two episodes I selected

for this study, these two elements are essentially in~olved.

To

say that they are equally represented would be to miss the point
218

Roosevelt to Spring Rice, July 24, 1905, Morison, IV,
( p. 1286.
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!c.nd probably the truth.

i concerned with

!

America's

'1"4~1

Roosevelt was first and above all else

secur!~ ty

and its posi tlon as a world powe

His training and intellectual assumptions further demonstrated

I

I this concern with America's world reputation and responsi bi li ti es.
I Inherent in many of his belie'fs, however, was a desire and concer
to tmprove the lot of those less-fortunate than himself.

The con

cept of Manifest Destiny which recognized American preponderanC'es
ln the Western Hemisphere also implied what has been called "The
~·lhi

te Man's Burden."

.

.

The precept of Anglo-American superiority he accepted in b?t

If

the Darwinian and Neo-J_.a.marckia.n sf!nse.

That is both a natural-

selection which resulted in the biological superiority of the wMic

I ;orthern

Hemisphere dweller and the debilitating effects of the

f Southern Hemisphere influenced the preponderance of this ruling

I class,

In order to maintain their position, it was necessary for

them to oversee these people but to treat them fairly and eventually instruct them in the art of self-goverrnnent.
Roosevelt's actions demonstrate this dual influence on his
policy making decisions.
duality.

The. Coronary itself points out this

For strategic reasons it was necessary to prevent Euro-

pean intervention and to uphold America's international reputatio
(it could not permit disorder at its very door).

T~ use of fore

to bring about responsible government implied a teaching process
in its application.

Intervention would be required until respon-

sible mature leaders could be found.

Such action could take plac

J~nly if the people themselves were educated in the art of self-

)

~

~government.

'rhis intervention was necessary as long as education

land self-improvement were denied the natives, even if by their
loNn actions.

To end the need for intervention, the causes for it

!must be eradicated.

Isuch measures

!
l

It fell upon the intervening power to take

as necessary to alleviate the situation.

America, the United States was the sole
ciples of the Monroe Doctrine.

1ntervene1~

In Latin

under the prin-

It was, therefore, its

respon~ibi-

f
llity
to educate the inhabitants in conduct proper to the maintenlance of order.
Roosevelt was the wielder of the Big Stick and to a signifi:cant degree the Big Brother of the • South American states.
!

'

APPENDIX I
Message from the President of the United States,
transmitting a protocol of an agreement between the
United States and the Dominican Republic, providing for
the collection and disbursement by the United States of
the customs revenues of the Dominican Republic, signed
on February 7, 1905.
To the Senate:

. I.

I submit herewith a protocol concluded between the
Dominican Republic and the United States.
The conditions in the· Republic of Santo Domingo have
been growing steadily worse for many years. There have been
many disturbances and revolutions, and debts have been contracted beyond the power of the Republic to pay. Some of
these debts were properly contracted and are held by those
who have a legitimate right to their money. Others are
without question improper 9r exorbitant, constit-t:ting
claims which should never be paid in full and pe:chaps only
to the extent of a very small portinn of their nominal
value.
Certain foreign countries have long felt themselves
aggrieved because of the nonpayment of debts due their
citizens. The only way by which foreign creditors could
ever obtain from the Repub].ic itself any guaranty of payment would be either by the acquisition of territory outright or temporarily, or else by taking possession of the
customs-houses, which would of course in itself, in effect,
be taking possession of a certain amount of territory.
It has for some time been obvious that those who profit
by the Monroe Doctrine must accept certain responsibilities
along with the rights which it confers; and that the same
statement applies to those ~ho uphold the doctrine. It can
not be too often and too emphatically asserted that the
United States has not the slightest desire for terrttorial
aggrandizement at the expense of any of its sou~hern neighbors, and will not treat the Monroe doctrine as an excuse
for such aggrandizement, on· its part. We do not propose
to take any part of Santo Domingo, or exercise any other
control over the island save what is necessary to its financial rehabilitation in connection with the collection of
revenue, part of which will be turned over to the government to meet the necessary expense of running it, and part
.r which will be distribut
o rata among the creditors

of the Republic upon a basis of absolute equity. The justification for the United States taking this burden and incurring this responsibility is to be found in the fact
that it is incompat:tble With international equity for the
United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the
only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of
their creditors and yet to refuse, itself, to take any such
steps.
An aggrieved nation can without interfering with the
Monroe Doctrlne take what action it sees fit in the adjustCTent of its db?utes with American states, provided that
action does not take the shape of interference with thei~
form of Government or of the despoilment of their territory under any disguise. But, short of this, when the
question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains,
finally, to collect it is a blockade, or bombardment, or
the seizure of the custom-houses, and this means, as has
been said above, what is in effect a possession, even
though only a temporary possession, of territory. The
United States then becomes a party in interest, because
under the Monroe doctrine it cfan not see any European power
seize and permanently occupy the· territory of one of these ·
republics; and yet such seizures of territory, disguised
or undisguised, may eventually offer the only way in which
the power in question, can collect any debts, unless there
is interference on the part of the United States.
One of the difficult and increasingly complicated
problems, which often arise in Santo Domingo, erows out
of the violations of contracts and concessions, sometimes
improvidently granted, with valuable privileges and exemptions stipµlated for upon grossly inadequate considerations
which were burdensome to the State, and which are not in.frequently disregarded and violated by the governing authorities. Citizens of the United States and of other
governments holding these concessions and contracts appeal
to their respective~governments for·active participation
protec1:1on and intervention. Except for arbitrary wrong,
done or sanctioned by superior authority, to persons or to
vested property rights, the United States Government,
following its traditional usage in such cases, aims to go
no futther than the mere use of its good offices, a measure
which frequently proves ineffective. On the other hand,
there are governments which do sometimes take energetic
action for the protect1on of their subjects in'the enforcement of merely contractual claims, and thereupon American
concessionaries, supported by powerful influences, make
loud appeal to the United States Government in similar
cases for similar action. They complain that in the
actual posture of affairs their valuable properties are
practically confiscated, t{la.t American enterprise is
paralyzed, and that unless they are fully protected, even

by the enforcement of their merely contractual rights, it
means the abando11ment to the subjects of other governments
of the interests· of American :brade and commerce through
the sacrifice of their investments by excessive taxes imposed in violation of contract, and by other devices, and
the sacrifice -of the output of their mines and other industries, and even of their railway and exploitation of
their concessions. Thus ihe attempted solution of the
complex problem by the ordinary ruethods of diplomacy reacts
injuriously upon the United States Government itself, and
in a measure paralyzes the action of the Executive in the
direction of a sound an~ consistent policy. The Unite~
States Government is embarrassed in its efforts to foster
American enterprise and the growth of our commerce through
the cultivation of friendly relations with Santo Domingo, .
by the irritating effects on those relations, and the consequent injurious influence upon that commerce, of :frequent
interventions. As a method of solution of the complicated
problem arbitration has become nugatory, inasmuch as, in
the condition of its finance.s, ~n award against the Republic is worthless unless its payment is secured by the
pledge of at least some portion of' the customs revenues.
This pledge is ineffectual without actual delivery over
of the custom-houses to secure the appropriation of the
pledged revenues to the payment of the award. This situation again r~acts injuriously µpon the relations of the
United States with other nations. For when an award and
such security are thus obtained, as in the case of the
Santo Domingo Improvement Company, some foreign government complains that the award conflicts with its rights,
as a creditor, to some portion of these revenues under
an alledged prior pledge; and still other governments
complain that an award in any considerable sum, secured
by pledges of the customs revenues, is prejudicial to the
payment of their equally meritorious claims out of the
ord~nary revenues; and thus controversies are begotten
between the United States and other creditor nations,
because of the apparent sacrifice of some of their
claims, which may be just, or may be grossly exaggerated,
but which the United States Government can not inquire
into without giving grounds of offense to other friendly
creditor nations. Still further illustrations might
Aasily be furnished of the hopelessness of the present
situation growing out of the social disorders and the
bankrupt finances of the Dominican Republic, where for
considerable periods during recent years the bonds of
civil society have been practically dissolved.
Under the accepted law of nations foreign governments are within their right, if they choose to exercise
it, when they actively intervene in support of the contractual claims of their subjects. They sometimes exercise

-,

this power, and on account of corn;nercial rivalries there
is a growing tendency on the part of other governments
more and more to aid-diplomatically in the enforcement
of the claims of their subjects, In view of the dilemma
in which the Government of the United States is thus place~,
it must either adhere to its usual attitude of nonintervention in such cases--an attitude proper under normal
conditions, but one which in this particular kind of case
results to the disadvantage of its citizens in comparison
with those of other States--or else it must, in order to
be consistent in its policy, actively intervene to protect
the contracts and concessions of its citizens engaged in
agriculture, commerce, and transportation in competition
with the subjects and citizens of other States. This
course would render the United States the insurer of all
the speculative risks of its citizens in the public securities and franchises of Santo Domingo,
Under the plan in the protocol herewith submitted to
the Senate, insuring a faithful collection and application
of the revenues to the specified objects, we are well
assured that this difficult t~sk can be accomplished with
the friendly cooperation and goo~ will of all the parties
concerned, and to the great relief of the Dominican Republic.
The conditions in the Dominican Republic not only
constitute a menace to our relations with other foreign
nations, but they also concern the prosperity of the
people of the island, as well as the security of American
interests, and they are intimately associated with the interests of the South Atlantic and Gulf States, the normal
expansion of whose commerce lies in that direction, At
one time, nnd that only a year ago, three revolutions were
in progress in the island at the same time,
It is impossible to state with anything like approximate accuracy the present population of the Dominican Republic, In the repprt of the commission appointed by
President Grant in 1871, the population was estimated at
not over 150,000 souls, but according to the Statesman's
Yearbook for 1904 the estimated population in 1888 is
given as 610,000. The Bureau of the American Republics
considers this the best estimate at the present population
of the Republic. As shown\by the unanimous report of the
Grant commission the public debt of the Dominican Republic, including claims, was $1,565,831.59t. Th~ total
revenues were $772,684.75!. The public indebtedness of
the Dominican Republic, not including all claims, was on
September 12 last, as the Department of State is advised,
$32,280,000; the estimated revenues under Dominican management of custom-houses were $1,850,000; the proposed budget
for current administration was $1,300,000, leaving only
$550,000 to pay foreign and liquidated obligations, and
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p::=iyments on these latter 'l':i 11 amount during the ensuing
year to $1,700,000, besides $900,000 of Rrrearages of
payments overdue, amounting in ri.11 to ~2,600,000, It is
therefore impossible under existing conditions, which are
chronic, and with the estimated yearly revenues of the
Republic, which during the last decade have averaged
approximately $1,600,000, to defray the ordlnary expenses
of the government and to meet its obligations,
The Dominican debt owed to curopean creditors is
about $22,000,000, and of this sum over ~~18,000,000 is
more or less formally recognized, The representatives of
European governments have several times approached the
Secretary of State, setting forth the wrongs and intol~r
able delays to which they have been subjected at the hands
of the successive governments of Santo Domingo in the
collection of their just claims, and intimating that unless the Dominican Government should receive some assistance from the United States in the way of regulating its
finances, the creditor governments in Europe would be forced
to resort to more effective measures of compulsion to
secure the satisfaction of the'ir claims,
If the United States·Goverrrrnent declines to take action
and other foreign goverTu~ents resort to action to secure
payment of their claims, the latter would be entitled,
according to the decision of the Hague tribunal in the
Venezeulan cases, to the preferential payment of their
claims; and thi's would absorb all the Dominican revenues
and would be a virtual sacrifice of American claims and
interests in the island, If, moreover, any such.action
should be taken by them, the only method to enable them
to secure the payment of their claims would be to ta.ke
possession of the custom-houses, Bnd considering the
state of the Dominican finances this would mean a definite
and very possibly permanent occupation of Dominican territory, for no period could be set to the time which would
be necessarily required for the payment of their obligations and unliquidated claims. The United States Government could not interfere to prevent such seizure and occupation of Dominican territory without either itself proposing some feasible alternative in the way of action, or
else virtually saying to European governments that they
would not be allowed to collect their claims. This would
be an unfortunate attitude for the Government of the United
States to be forced to maintain at present. It' can not with
propriety say that it will protect its own citizens and
interests, on the one hand, and yet on the other hand refuse to allow other governments to protect their citizens
and interests,
The actual situation in the Dominican Republic can
not, perhaps~ be more forcibly stated than by giving a
brief account of the case of the San Domingo Improvement

I.
I

Company.
From 1869 to 1897 the Dominican Government issued
successive series of bonds, the majority of which were
in the hands of European ~olders. Successive issues bore
interest at rate ranglng from 2 J/4 to 6 per cent, and
what with commissions and other deductions and the heavy
discount in the market the government probably did not
receive over 50 to 75 per cent of their nominal value.
Other portions of the debt were created by loans, for
which the government received only one-half of the amount
it was nominally to repay, and these obligations bore
interest at the rate of 1 to 2 per cent a month on their
face, some of them compounded monthly.
The improvidence of the government in its financial
management was due to its weakness, to its impaired credit
and to its pecuniary needs, occasioned by frequent insurrections and revolutionary changes and by its inability
to collect its revenues.
In 1888 the government, in order to secure the payment of an issue of bonds, placed the custom-houses and
the collection of its customs tuties, which are substantially the only revenues of the Republic, in thehands of
the Westend.orps, bankers of Amsterdam, Holland. But the
national debt continued to grow and the government finally
intrusted the collection of its revenues to an American
corporation, the San Domingo Improvement Company, which was
to take over the bonds of the Westendorps. The Dominican
Government finally became dissatisfi'ed with this arrangement, and, in 1901, ousted the Improvement Company from
its custom-houses and took into its own hands tne collection
of its revenues. The company thereupon appealed to the
United States Government to maintain them in their position.
but their request was refused. The Dominican Government
then sent its minister of foreign affairs to Washington
to negotiate a settlement. He admitted that the improve~
ment company had· equities which ought not to be disregarded;
and the Department of State suggested that the Dominican
Government and the Improvement Company should effect by
9rivate negotiation a satisfactory settlement between
them. They accordingly entered into an arrangement for a
settlement, which was mutually satisfactory to the parties.
A similar arrangement was likewise made between the Dominican Government and the European bondholders. The latter
'3rrangement was carried into execution by the Dominican
Government and payments made toward the liquidation of the
bonds held by the European holders. The Dominican Congress
refused to ratify the similar arrangement made with the
improvement company, and the government refused to provide :
for the payment of the American claimants. In this state
of the case it was evident that a continuance of this treatment of the American creditors, and its repetition in other
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cases, would, if allowed to run its course, result in
handing over the island to European creditors, and in time
would ripen into serious controversies between the United
States &.nd other governments, unless the United States
should deliberately and finally abandon its interests
in the island.
The inrp1~ovement comp;;:;.ny and its allied companies
held, besides bonds, ce:cta.in banking and railway interests
in the island. 'l,he Domini can Govern.'Tient, desirous to own
and possess these properties, agreed with the companies
that the value of their bonds and properties was ~4,500,000,
and they submitted to arbitration the question as to ~he
installments in which this sum should be paid and the
security that should be given. The Hon. George Gray,
judge of the United States circuit court of appeals, and
the Hon. Manuel de J. Galvan, both named by the Dominican
Republic, and the Hon. John G. Carlisle, named by the
United States, were the arbitrators and rendered their
award on July 14, 1904. By its terms the Dominican Government was to pay the above-rr..e:ationed sum of $1},500,000,
with 4 per cent interest per a:ri. p:u..l!l, in monthly installments of $37,500 each during two years, and of $41,666.66
each month thereafter, beginning with the month of September, 1904, said awa.rd to be secured by the customs
revenues and port dues of all the ports on the northern
coast of Santo Domingo. The award further provides for
the appointment of a financial agent of the United States,
who was authorized in case of failure during any month to
receive the sum then due to enter into possession of the
custom-~house at Puerto Plata in the first instance and
assume charge of the collection of customs duties and
port dues and to fix and determine these duties and dues
and secure their paymentt in case the s1uns collected at
Puerto Plata should at any time be insufficient for the
payment of the amounts due under the award, or in case of
any other manifest necessity, or in case the Dominican
Government should so request, the financial agent of the
United States was authorized to have and exercise at any
and all of the other ports.above described all the rights
and power vested in him by the award in respect of Puerto
Plata. Under the award the financial agent could only
apply the revenues collected toward the payment 1 after he
had first paid the expenses of collection and ~ertain
other obligations styled "apardos," which constituted
prior charges on the revenues assigned. These prior
charges are specified in the award. The Dominican Gov•
ernment defaulted in their payments; and in virtue of
. the award and the authority conferred by the Dominican
Government, and at its request, possession was delivered
of the custom-house of Puerto Plata to thefiscal agent
appointed by the United States to collect the revenues

assigned by the arbitrators for the payment of the award;
and in virtue of the same authority possession of the
custom-house of Monte Christi has also been handed over.
I sub;nit herewith a report of Mr. John B. Moore, agent
of the United States in this case, and a copy of the award
of the arbitrators.
During the past two years the European claimants,
except the English, whose interests were embraced in those
of the American companies, have, with the support of their
respective governments, been growing ~nore and more im·
portunate in pressing their unsatisfied demands. The
French and the Belgians in 1901 had entered into a contract with the Dominican'Government, but after a few
payments •·:ere made on account it fell into neglect. Other
governments also obliged the Dominican Government to enter
into arrangements of various kinds by which the revenues
of the Republic were in largd part sequestrqt~d, and under
one of the agreem~nts, which was conclnded With Italy in
1903, the minister of that government was empowered directly
to collect from the importers ~nd exporters that portion
of the customs revenues as$igned to him as security. As
the result of chronic disorders, ~ttendant with a constant
increase of debt, the state of things in Santo Domingo has
become hopeless, unless the United States or some other
strong government shall interpose to bring order out of
the Chaos. The custom-houses, with the exception of the
two in the possession of the financial agent appointed by
the United States, have become unproductive for the discharge of indebtedness, except as to persons making emergency loans to the government or to its enemies for the
purpose of carrying on political contests by force. They
have, in fact, become the nuclei of the various revolutions. The first effort of revolutionists is to take
possession of a custom-house so as to obtain funds, which
are then disposed of at the absolute discretion of those
who are collecting them. The chronic dls·orders prevailing
in Santo Domingo have, moreove~, become exceedingly dange~·
ous to the interests of Americans holding property in that
country.
Constant complaints have been received of the
injuries and inconveniences to which they have been subjected. As an evidence of the increasing aggravation of
conditions the fact may be mentioned that about a year ago
the American railway, whch had previously been ~xempt from
such attacks, was seized, its tracks torn up, g_nd a station
destroyed by revolutionary bands.
The ordinary resources of diplomacy and international
arbitration are absolutely impotent to deal wisely and
effectively with the situation in the Dominican Republic,
~hich can only be met by org;arilzing its finances on a sound
basis and by placing the custom-houses beyond the temptation of insurgent chieftains. Either we must abandon our
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duty under our traditional policy toward the Dominican
people, who aspire to a republican form of government
while they are actually drifting into a condition of
permanent anarchy, in which case we must permit some
other government to adopt its own measures in order to
safeguard its own interests, or else we must ourselves
take seasonable and appropriate action.
Again and again has the Domini can Governme.nt invoked
on its own behalf the aid of the United StRtes. It has
repeatedly done so of recent years.
In 1899 it sought to
enter into treaty relations by which it would be placed
under the protection of the United States Government.
The request was refused. Again, in January, 1904, its·
minister of foreign affairs visited Washington and besought the help of the United States GoverTu~ent to enable
it to escape from its financial and social disorders.
Compliance with this request was again declined, for this
government has been most reluctant to interfere in any way,
and has finally concluded to take action only because
it has become evident that failure to do so may result
in a situation fraught with-grave danger to the cause of
international peace.
In 1903 a representative of a foreign govern..~ent
proposed to the United States the joint fiscal control
of the Dominican Republic by certain creditor nations; and
that the latter should take charge of the custom-houses and
revenues and give to the Dominican Government a certain
perc€ntage and apply the residue to the payment ratably
of claims of foreign credi ·~ors. The United States Government declined to approve or to enter into such an arrangement. But it has now become evident that decided action
of some kind can not be muqh longer delayed. In view of
our past experience and our knowledge of the actual situation of the Dominican Republic, a definite refusal of the
United States Government to take any effective action
looking to the relief of the Dominican Republic and to
the discharge of its own duty under the Monroe Doctrine
can only be considered as an acquiescence in some such
action by another government.
That most wise measure of international statesmanship, the Platt amendment, '.has provided a rnethori for preventing such difficulties from arising in the new Republic
of Cuba. In accordance wi t.h the t'erms of this. ,;;Unendrnent
the Republic of Cuba, can not issue any bonds which can be
collected from Cuba, save as a matter of grace, unless
with the consent of the United States, which is at liberty
at all times to take measures to prevent the violation of
of the letter and spirit of the Platt fu~endrnent. If a
similar plan could now be entered upon by the Dominican
Republic, it would undoubtedly be of great advantage to
them and to all other peoples, for under such an arrange-
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ment no larger debt would be incurred than could be
honestly paid, and those who took debts not thus authorized ·
would, by the mere fact of taking them, put themselves in
the category of speculators or gamblers, who deserved no
consideration and who would be permitted to receive rone;
so that the honest creditor would on the one hand be safe
while on the other hand the Renublic would be safeguarded
against molestation in the interest of mere speculators.
But no such plan at present exists; and under existing
circumstances, ,,;hen the condition of affairs becomes such
as it has beco!lle in Santo Domingo, either we must submit
to the likelihood of infringement of the Monroe Doctrine
or we must ourselves agree to some such arrangement as
that herwi th submitted to the Senate. In this c2.se,
fortunately, the prudent 8.nd far-seeing sta temanship of
the Dominican Government has relieved us of all trouble.
At their request we have entered into the agreement herewith submitted. Under it the custom-houses will be administered peacefully, honestly, and economically, 45 per cent
of the proceeds being turned over to the Dominican Government and the remainder being"used by the United States to
pay what proportion of the debts it is possible to pay
on an equitable basis. The Republic will be secured
against over-seas aggression. This in reality entails
no new obligation upon us, for the Monroe doctrine means
precisely such a guaranty on our part.
It is perhaps unncessary to state that no step of any
kind has been taken by the Administration under the terms
of the protocol which is herwith submitted.
The Republic of Santo Domingo has by this protocol
wisely and patriotically accepted the re_sponsibili tes
as well as the privileges of liberty, and is showing
with evident good faith its purpose to pay all that its
resources will permit of its obligations. More than this
it can not do, and when it has done this we should not
permit it to be molested. We on our part are simply
performing in peaceful manner, not only with the cordial
P._cquiescence, but in accordance with the earnest request
of the goverr.1111ent concerned, part of that international
duty which is necessarily involved in the assertion of the
r-:onroe doctrine. We are bound to show that we perform
this duty in good faith and without any intention of
aggrandizing ourselves at the expense of our w~aker
neighbors or of conducting ourselves other,.;ise. than so as
to benefit both these weaker neighbors and those European
powers which may be brought into contact with them. It
is in the highest degree necessary that we should prove
by our action that the world may trust in our good faith
and may understand that this international duty will be
performed by us within our own sphere, in the interest not
merely of ourselves, but of all other nations, and with
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strict justice toward all. If this is done, a general
acceptance of the Monroe doctrine will in the end surely
follow; and this will mean an incre~se of the sphere
in which peacef~l measures for the s~ttlement of international difficulties gradually displace those of a
warlike character.
He can point with just pride to what we have done
in Cuha as a gu9r;:.1nty of our good faith. We stayed in
Cuba only so long as to start her aright on the road to
self-gOV8I'P~ment, Nhich she has since trod With SUCh marked
and distinguished success; and upon leaving the island we
exA.ctcd no conditions save such as would prevent her from
ever becomimg the prey of the stranger. Our purpose i'n
Santo Domingo is as beneficient. The good that this
country got from its action in Cuba was indirect rather
th,qn direct. So it is as regards Santo Domingo. The
chief material advantage that will come from the action
proposed to be taken will be to Santo Domingo itself and
to Santo Domingo's creditors. The advantages that will
come to the United States will be indirect, but nevertheless great, for it is sup:cerrl'ely to our in'_.~rest that
all the co1i:.muni ti es i1!1r'Cedia te ly south of us should be
or become prosperous snd stable, e.nd therefore not merely
in r.•ari1e, but in f8.ct independent and self-governing.
I call attention to the urgent need of prcrnpt action
on this matter. We now have a great· opportunity to secure
peace and stability in the island, without friction or
bloodshed, by acting in accordance with the cordial invitation of the governmental authorities themselves. It
will be unfortunate from every standpoint if we fail to
grasp this opportunity; for such failure will probably
rr:ecin increasing revolutionary violence in Santo Domingo,
and very possibly embarrassing foreign complications in
addition. This protocol affords a practical test of the
efficiency of the United states Government in maintaining
the Monroe doctrine.
·
Theodore Roosevelt
The White House, February

15, 1905.
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APPENDIX II
Messages and Papers of the Presidents
To the Senate:
I wish to call the attention of the Senate at this
executive session to the treaty with Santo Domingo. I
feel that I ought to state to the Senate that the condition of affairs in Santo Domingo is such that it is very
much for the interest of that Republic that action on the
treaty_ should be had at as early a moment as the Senate,
after giving the matter full consideration, may find
practicable.
_
I call attention to the following facts&
1. This treaty was ente:ced into at the earnest request
of Santo Domingo itself, and is designed to afford Sant
Domingo relief and assistance. Its primary benefit wil
be to Santo Domingo. It offers the method most likely
to secure peace and to prevent war in the island.
2. The benefit to the United States will consist chief""!
ly in the tendency under the treaty to secure stability
order, and prosperity in Santo Domingo, a.nd the removal
of the apprehension lest foreign powers make aggression
on Santo Domingo in the course of collecting cl8ims due
their citizens; for it is greatly to our interest that
all the islands in the Caribbean Sea should enjoy peave
and pro~perity and feel good will toward this country.
The benefit ·to honest creditors will come from the fact
that for the first time under this treaty a practicable
method of attempting to settle the debts due them will
be inaugurated.

3. Many of the debts alleged to be due from Santo Do:~
go to outside creditors unquestionably on their face
represent far more money than ever was ac~ually given
Santo Domingo. The proposed treaty provides for a process by which impart1al experts will determine what
debts are valid and what are in whole or in part invali
and will apportion accordingly the surplus revenue
availa.ble for the pay'ment of the debts. This treaty

l~~~~~~o-f_f_e_:_s--~t-~---o-n_l_y~m-e_t_h_o_d_l~;_:_r~p-r_e_v_e_n_._t_i_~~ the

collection of

frau~ulent debts, whether owed to Americans or to
zcns of other nations.

cit1~

4.

This treaty affords the most practicable means of
obtalning pay1;H:mt for the just claims of American c1 t1zens.

I.
I

5. If the treaty is ratified, creditors belonging to
other nations will have exactly as good treatment as
creditors who are citizens of the United States, and at
the same tiL1e S2.n to Domingo wi 11 be protected against
unjust and exorbitant claims. If it is not ratified,
the chances are that'AJnerican creditors will fare. 111 as
compared with those c•f other nations; for foreign m:ti9ns,
being denied the opportu:ni ty to get what is rightfull;f
due their citizens under the proposed arrangement, will
be right to collect the debts due their 6itizens as
they see fit, provided, of course, there is not permanent occupancy of Dominican territory. As is such case
the United States will have nothing to say as to what.
debts should or sho~ld ndt be collected, and as Santo
Domingo will be left without aid, assistance, or pro-,
tection, it is impossible to state that the slm1s collected from it wi 11 not be improper in sJnount. In such ·
event, whatever is 'collectred by means of forcible intervention will be applied to the creditors of foreign nations in p1~eference to creditors who are citizens of th_e
United States.
·
6. The correspondence between the Secretary of State
and the Minister of'Haiti, submitted to the Senate several days ago, shows that our position is explicitly
and unreservedly that under no circumstances do we intend to acquire territory in or possession of either
Haiti or Santo Domingo, it being stated in these letters
that even if the two republics desired to become a part
of. the United States the United States would certainly
refuse its assent.

?.

Santo Domingo grievously needs the aid of a powerful
and friendly nation. This aid we are able, and I trust
that we are willing, to bestow. She has asked for this
aid, and the expressions of friendship, r~peatedly sanctioned by the people and the Government of the United
States, warrant her in believing that it will not be
withheld in the hour of her need.
Theodore Roosevelt.
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